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This dissertation is about the Eurozone and Greek crises of the 2010s, comprising of three 
papers, an introduction and a conclusion. The three papers respectively analyse the political, 
financial and economic dimensions of the crises. Paper 1 shows that double-sided incomplete 
information is a necessary condition for explaining the bargaining dynamics and outcome of 
the third Greek bailout negotiations. Our model also demonstrates that the outcome of the 
negotiations was not that predictable. Finally, the Greek policy-makers could have been more 
aggressive to increase their chance of obtaining a better deal. Paper 2 then investigates the effect 
of political uncertainty on Greek sovereign spreads between October 2009 and July 2012. We 
thus create a dataset comprising of more than 5800 news items covering most policy debates 
prevailing at that time and that are manually coded along several dimensions, in particular as 
expected or unexpected policy developments. The results using an EGARCH(1,1) specification 
suggest that financial markets reacted strongly to unexpected positive policy developments but 
remained, on the whole, more sensitive to negative developments in line with existing findings. 
Finally, paper 3 studies the role played by uncertainty in the protracted slump of investment 
following the Great Recession and Eurozone crisis. Since existing volatility-based proxies for 
uncertainty may discount uncertainty shocks coming from the left tail, we create a proxy for 
disaster risk building on the Growth-at-Risk approach. Using Bayesian VAR models on a panel 
of 12 advanced economies from 1997Q1 to 2019Q3, we find no conclusive effect of disaster 
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1. Motivation and objective 
 
This dissertation is about the Eurozone crisis of the 2010s, with a particular focus on the Greek 
specific developments. By all standards, the Eurozone crisis was an exceptional crisis. It has 
shaken the single currency and the wider European project to its very core. What was at stake 
was the very existence of the single currency. The Eurozone crisis was not only a political crisis 
though, it was also a financial and an economic crisis. The Eurozone has indeed been subject 
to major financial instability with some sovereign bonds losing most of their value and strong 
contagion across countries. The Eurozone even experienced a double-dip recession after the 
first shock of the Global Financial Crisis. The Eurozone crisis has therefore attracted the interest 
of a very important number of scholars, from both political science and economics.  
It is beyond this dissertation to map the full debates that took place within those specific 
disciplines over the causes, consequences and implications of the Eurozone crisis. Nevertheless, 
economists have generally focused on the causes of the crisis (see Baldwin and Giavazzi 2015) 
and on the predicament to make the EMU viable in the long-run (see Baldwin et al 2017, Pisani-
Ferry and Zettelmeyer 2019). Doing so, they have hardly taken into account the political 
constraints that caused what they have judged to be a suboptimal collective management of the 
crisis (Matthijs and Blyth 2015). In the meantime, political scientists have studied the domestic 
and international political consequences and implications of the crisis. But, mirroring 
economists, they have equally discounted economic constraints in their analyses (Copelovtich 
Frieden and Walter 2016). 
In hindsight, it is striking to see that the multi-faceted nature of the Eurozone crisis has 
sparked so few exchanges and dialogue across disciplines. This has resulted into fragmented 
understandings of the crisis where political and economic analyses have evolved in parallel 
within their own discipline boundaries. As such, they might have failed to grasp the multiple 
dimensions of the crisis and the feedbacks loops among them. One should mention exceptions 
though such as the special issues edited by Jones and Torres in 2015 and by Copelovitch, 
Frieden and Walter in 2016. This dissertation thus aims at filling this gap by developing a 
comprehensive understanding of the Eurozone crisis through the analysis of its political, 




2. A brief description of the drivers of the Eurozone and Greek crises 
 
While this dissertation is not about the root causes of the Eurozone crisis, it is necessary to go 
back to the first ten years of the EMU to understand why the crisis was ever possible. By 1999, 
the time of the launch of the euro, there had been a quasi-full convergence of interest rates of 
peripheral countries to the levels of core Eurozone countries. Those very same countries that 
had prior expensive access to credit had now access to mature and large financial markets at 
very low prices. This encouraged widespread borrowing in those peripheral countries. And 
since the Northern Eurozone countries experienced low growth during those years, capital flows 
from the slow-growing core countries flooded peripheral fast-growing economies. But instead 
of financing real convergence as it was expected, capital flows financed non-tradable sectors 
such as the housing market and construction industries. Alternatively, in Greece (and to some 
extent in Portugal), such abundance of cheap credit allowed states to finance almost freely their 
public deficits. 
What is more, this process was self-reinforcing: the more peripheral countries grew, the 
more capital flowed in eventually reinforcing economic activity. In the meantime, the boom 
increased price and wage inflation, weakening competitiveness of the export sectors in those 
countries. This eventually created large intra-Eurozone macroeconomic imbalances as reflected 
by the divergence in current accounts between peripheral and core countries. At some point, 
the credit bubble became unsustainable and caused sudden stops, as in standard Balance-of-
Payment (BOP) crises (see Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012). Accumulated debts had to 
swallowed in one way or another since the private sector was not willing anymore to finance 
them. Without European-wide mechanism, states quickly took on the respective claims and 
debts of the private sector, as in Ireland or Spain, to prevent a complete breakdown of the 
economy. This resulted into a massive increase of the public debt of member states.  
This was precisely the time where the deficiencies of the institutional setup inherited 
from the Maastricht compromise resurfaced. Indeed, the prevailing architecture of the euro did 
not solve what Pisani-Ferry (2012) deemed to be a new impossible trinity. In this trilemma, one 
cannot have simultaneously strict no-monetary financing, sovereign-bank interconnectedness, 
no co-responsibility for public debt. Obviously, there was no monetary financing of public debt 
in the Eurozone as the Treaties, or at least their then prevailing interpretation, did not allow the 
ECB to act as the lender of last resort for sovereigns. Still, financial systems, in particular 
banking systems, remained extremely fragmented. Member states were responsible for their 
banks (supervising and rescuing) while the same banks held a disproportionate amount of debt 
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securities from their own country, creating the risks of doom-loops. And finally, countries were 
only liable for their own debts because of the no-bailout clause in the Treaties. As a 
consequence, the economic and monetary union was extremely fragile and vulnerable to self-
fulfilling solvency crises (de Grauwe 2011). Prior to the crisis, financial markets expected that 
financial distress in one member state would force other countries to bail it out, therefore 
solving the trilemma in place of the policy-makers. Once Eurozone policy-makers from the 
creditor countries signalled their reservations to rescue distressed peripheral countries, the 
trilemma came back with a revenge: policy-makers had to find a way to solve the trilemma 
themselves.  
 
3. A comprehensive approach to the Eurozone crisis 
 
This dissertation precisely explores how such a common balance-of-payment crisis that was 
never supposed to happen in a monetary union (see Ingram 1973) became a major political 
crisis that had existential implications for the governance of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). It also studies the other side of the coin, namely how this political crisis quickly mutated 
into a financial crisis and eventually turned into a lasting economic crisis. To put it simply, we 
try to connect the dots between the three dimensions of the Eurozone crisis. This dissertation 
has therefore an interdisciplinary scope. We not only analyse the political consequences of the 
balance-of-payment crisis in a monetary union but we also investigate the economic and 
financial consequences of the political crisis. 
 
3.1. The conceptual framework 
 
Our first premise in this dissertation is that the political conflict over the adjustment process is 
at the center of the Eurozone crisis. There were obviously economic and financial 
vulnerabilities in the Eurozone that we have mentioned above and that were necessary for the 
crisis to occur. However, they were not sufficient to trigger the Eurozone crisis. Those 
vulnerabilities did not appear in one day but pretty close to no one cared for years. Financial 
markets started to panic only once they realised that there was some doubt about political 
solidarity in the Eurozone after the Greek budget revelations. As Corsetti (2015) puts it, it is 
the policy conflict on adjustment that let the “‘risk premia genie’ out of the bottle” because it 
fed doubts about the stability of the euro itself. And without the genie out of the bottle, the 
deleveraging process that started since the Global Financial Crisis would have likely continued 
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without a double-dip recession, much like for other European countries outside of the Eurozone 
(de Grauwe 2015).  
Second, as we are trying to connect the different dimensions of the Eurozone crisis, we 
assume that there must be at least one factor that binds them together. From the existing 
literature, we can identify two potential channels of transmission, that are not mutually 
exclusive and that may even be somewhat related. The first theoretical channel of transmission 
is the fragility channel. Because of the fragility of the Eurozone, peripheral countries had to 
engage into pro-cyclical fiscal policy tightening once financial markets lost confidence in those 
countries (de Grauwe and Ji 2013). But because of very high multipliers, this process turned 
out to be self-defeating (Blanchard and Leigh 2013). Instead of reducing debt levels, austerity 
contributed to increase them: the fall in activity was so critical that it more than compensated 
the fiscal consolidation effort. Concerns about fiscal solvency thus further raised risk premia, 
exacerbating the need for further fiscal adjustment. This process was itself reinforced by doom 
loops between banks and sovereigns. The fragility channel explains the markets’ loss of 
confidence as the result of collective movements of fear and panic though. As a consequence, 
the role of the political crisis is only secondary: the financial crisis came first and the 
management of the crisis simply worsened the situation.  
There is however an alternative channel of transmission, the uncertainty channel, that 
allows for a much more active role for the political crisis in the evolution of the Eurozone crisis 
into both a financial and an economic crises. Contrary to the fragility channel, it is primarily 
the crisis management that affects the financial markets and in turn the real economy. Actually, 
in recent years, theoretical (as well as empirical) work have investigated both the financial and 
macroeconomic effects of political uncertainty. On the effect of political uncertainty on 
financial markets, one can cite the work of Pastor and Veronesi (2011). They develop a 
theoretical model linking political uncertainty to asset prices. They show that political 
uncertainty commands a risk premium whose magnitude is larger in weaker economic 
conditions. The work of Collignon et al (2013) is also insightful. The authors model the 
interaction between financial markets and political communication where markets do not know 
the real rate of return of Greek assets and must infer it from the signals emitted by informed 
European governments.  
The theoretical effects of uncertainty on investment have been studied for a long time. 
Actually, several theoretical mechanisms have been identified. First, according to Bernanke 
(1983), the presence of uncertainty creates an option value for deferring investment projects 
and adopt a wait-and-see strategy (see also Dixit and Pindyck 1994 and Pyndick 1990). Second, 
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financial constraints can also propagate uncertainty shocks to the economy (Arellano et al 2012, 
Christiano et al 2014, Gilchrist et al 2014). When uncertainty increases, the cost of external 
finance increases as well for firms that hit their financial constraints. This in turn impacts 
economic activity because firms are less willing to invest out of fear of having to bear the risk 
of default (Arellano et al 2012). Third, uncertainty can also affect consumers through risk-
aversion and precautionary savings (Romer 1990, Carroll 1997, Fernández-Villaverde et al 
2016, Caballero 1990). The fall in consumption will then negatively affect economic activity. 
Finally, uncertainty can affect economic activity through a change in the probability of disaster 
(Gourio 2012 and 2013). Gourio (2012 and 2013) show that an exogenous increase in the 
probability of disaster leads to recessions driven by a reduction of investment and employment 




We operationalise our conceptual framework through three distinct papers. We briefly outline 
the motivation, research question, research design and the main findings of each paper. In Paper 
1, we study the political conflict at the heart of the crisis, defined as a distributive conflict 
between debtor and creditor countries (see Frieden and Walter 2015). Indeed, the intra-
Eurozone imbalances de facto divided the Eurozone into creditor and debtor countries with 
contradictory interests, thus setting the very terms of the dispute. Since the political crisis had 
so many dimensions (see Brunnermeier James and Landau 2016 for a review of all the 
dimensions, see the special issue by Wasserfallen et al 2019), we focus on the Greek crisis and 
in particular on the negotiations over the third Greek bailout. As such, our goal in the paper is 
more specific than answering a general question about the political dimensions of the Eurozone 
crisis. But while the Greek case has its own specificities, it remains illustrative of the wider 
conflict over the distribution of the adjustment costs that has been present in each and every 
policy debate that arisen during the Eurozone crisis. What is more, we focus on this episode of 
the crisis because we believe that existing analyses fail to account for the outcome as well as 
the bargaining dynamics. We therefore aim at answering the following two specific research 
questions: why has Greece failed to obtain a debt relief? Why have the negotiations lasted for 
months? To answer these questions, we develop a game-theoretical model that integrate the 
main features of the negotiations. We thus demonstrate that double-sided incomplete 
information is a necessary condition for explaining the bargaining dynamics and outcome of 
the third Greek bailout’s negotiations. We further argue that the outcome of the negotiations 
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was not as predictable as it has often been perceived.  Finally, the Greek policy-makers could 
have been more aggressive in order to increase their chance of obtaining a better deal. 
In the following two papers, we aim at testing whether there had been feedback loops 
between the different dimensions of the crisis. To do so, we follow the uncertainty channel path 
rather than the fragility channel because we want to insist on the centrality of the political 
dimension of the Eurozone crisis. In Paper 2, we study the interaction between political 
uncertainty prior to the Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech and financial markets. In this paper, 
we try to determine whether political uncertainty, defined as the uncertainty over future policy 
choices, has affected financial markets. More specifically, we assess the effect of the 
uncertainty surrounding the crisis management on Greek sovereign spreads by focusing on 
policy-oriented news. We thus construct a dataset of more than 5800 manually coded news 
items. The dataset provides an encompassing picture of the crisis management as we included 
most, if not all, Greek-specific and Eurozone-wide policy debates (the design of the Greek 
bailouts, the crisis resolution mechanisms, debt restructuring, fiscal rules, Grexit, Eurobonds, 
the role of the ECB, etc). We classify the news items along several dimensions to have a precise 
picture of the effect of different types of news on financial markets. In particular, we 
differentiate between expected and unexpected decisions to have a finer sense of how markets 
responded to policy developments. We then use the information included into our dataset to 
answer several questions: what was the effect of news on Greek spreads during the crisis? 
Which types of news were more relevant than others? How have news affected volatility in 
Greek spreads? Our results based on EGARCH models show that news have had an effect on 
Greek sovereign spreads from October 2009 to mid-2012, corresponding to the heightened 
period of the Greek and Eurozone crises. The results using an EGARCH(1,1) specification 
suggest that financial markets reacted strongly to unexpected positive policy developments but 
remained, on the whole, more sensitive to negative developments in line with existing findings.  
In Paper 3, we focus on the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty in order to determine 
whether uncertainty can explain the protracted slump in investment in the Eurozone (and 
beyond).  We focus on disaster risk in contrast to existing papers using volatility-based proxies 
for uncertainty. The motivation for this paper is based on the fact that existing volatility-based 
proxies for uncertainty may discount shocks coming from left tail risk. Indeed, volatility is 
appropriate to describe a distribution only if it is normally distributed. Building on the recent 
work of Adrian et al (2019) on downside risks to growth, we construct a proxy for disaster risk 
defined as the conditional probability of occurrence of extreme left tail events. Using Bayesian 
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panel VAR models for 12 advanced economies from 1997Q1 to 2019Q3, we find no conclusive 
evidence on the effect of disaster risk shocks on investment.  
 
4. Discussion and contribution of this dissertation 
 
In the first paper, we try to figure out whether it was pointless for Greece to challenge the status 
quo in 2015. By doing so, we therefore take the footsteps of many scholars who have studied 
interstate bargaining in the Eurozone and the European Union. However, we demonstrate that 
the standard power-based understanding of the negotiations over the third Greek bailout is too 
restrictive. Contrary to the assumption of complete information generally made in EU studies, 
information asymmetry can play a very important role. What is more, our findings have 
implications beyond the Greek case. As integration reaches core state power, distributive 
conflicts become all the more likely and acute. And precisely in those types of conflicts, 
stakeholders have an interest in misrepresenting their true preferences in order to obtain a 
greater share of the cooperation gains. 
The starting point of the second paper was to remedy one of the limitations we found in 
the existing literature, namely that news dataset can be black boxes, undermining confidence in 
the results. The paper thus contributes to the literature on the effect of news on financial markets 
in methodological terms. Not only though. We indeed try to very meticulously build in a very 
transparent way a consistent and comprehensive news dataset. In particular, we try to deal with 
three common problems in the existing literature, namely the problem of endogeneity, of 
credibility and of expectations. Still, with our novel dataset, we obtain results that somewhat 
contradict the findings in the existing literature on the effect of news on financial markets during 
the Eurozone crisis. We find financial markets reacted strongly to unexpected positive policy 
developments but remained, on the whole, more sensitive to negative developments in line with 
existing findings.  
In the third paper, in line with an expanding literature, we construct an alternative proxy 
for uncertainty for advanced economies based on disaster risk. We then estimate the effect of 
disaster risk shocks on investment in those economies. 
From this dissertation, we also draw two general policy lessons. The first lesson is that, 
in spite of the destabilizing effect of politics on financial markets and the economy, it would be 
counter-productive to limit policy-makers’ room of manoeuvre with more rules because 
distributive conflicts can only be settled through politics and policy-makers’ discretion, thereby 
assuring the sustainability of the economic system. The second lesson is that systematically 
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minimising uncertainty may not always be an optimal policy. It may be beneficial for the 
economy as a whole to allow some degree of uncertainty or disorder as stressors of rather 
moderate levels may improve the capacity of the economy to resist to stronger shocks or tail 

























Paper 1. Negotiating the Third Greek Bailout: A Signalling 




Using a game-theoretical framework, we show that double-sided incomplete 
information is a necessary condition for explaining the bargaining dynamics and 
outcome of the third Greek bailout’s negotiations. Our model also demonstrates 
that the outcome of the negotiations was not that predictable. Finally, the Greek 
policy-makers could have been more aggressive to increase their chance of 




























1. Introduction  
 
For many commentators, Alexis Tsipras, the then newly-elected Greek Prime Minister, deluded 
himself and cost his country years of additional and unnecessary pain when he decided to play 
hardball with the creditors after winning the snap elections in January 2015. He simply entered 
a game he was doomed to fail from the very beginning because he had no leverage on Greece’s 
creditors. After all, Tsipras’ kolotumba and complete surrender to the Europeans’ terms in July 
2015 was no surprise. Adopting a power-based analysis of bargaining, some scholars have 
indeed demonstrated that the outcome of the negotiations was rather predictable because the 
costs of non-cooperation would have primarily fallen on Greece (Lim et al 2018, 
Schimmelfennig 2015).  
On the contrary, we argue that Greece did come to the negotiations’ table with 
substantial leverage (see inter alia Pitsoulis and Schwuchow 2017, Legrain 2015, Varoufakis 
2017 and Coppola 2015). By early 2014, Greece had reached a primary surplus, meaning that 
Greece could rationally decide to default on its loans for the first time since the beginning of 
the crisis. While a default would not have led automatically to an exit from the Eurozone (and/or 
the European Union), it might or might have not set in motion a chain reaction eventually 
leading to a Graccident. One may argue that Grexit or a Graccident had become a rather minor 
economic problem for the Europeans since Mario Draghi had decided to turn the ECB into a 
lender of last resort for sovereigns in 2012. Nevertheless, it remained a major political issue for 
the Europeans. A Graccident (or simply a default) would have entailed heavy symbolic costs 
as well as political costs because policy-makers in (Northern) European countries had invested 
a tremendous amount of political capital since 2010 by pledging repeatedly to their citizens, 
and as a condition for bailing Greece out in the first place, that every euro lent to Greece would 
be fully repaid. 
Having the possibility to default does not equate with the willingness to do it. The 
Samaras government, precisely the one that created the surplus, had the opportunity to default, 
but it never came even close from threatening the Europeans directly with it. SYRIZA’s win 
did not change the underlying preferences of Greece of obtaining a (substantial) debt relief 
while staying in the Eurozone. Still, it created, for the first time, uncertainty over how far Greek 
policy-makers would go to secure a debt relief.  
Indeed, we argue that information asymmetry is necessary to understand the 
negotiations over the third Greek bailout. More specifically, we contend that the strategic use 
and manipulation of information through costly signals was a central part of the bargaining 
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process. In that sense, our argument is related to Hennessy’s (2017) signalling game. In 
addition, those few papers that have attempted to formalise the effect of incomplete information 
on the bargaining process (see Hennessy 2017 and Pitsoulis and Schwuchow 2017, see also 
Schneider and Cederman 1994) have relied on the restrictive assumption of one-sided 
incomplete information. To some extent, this results into a partial analysis of the bargaining 
process where the behaviour of one stakeholder is passive. And as Powell (1988) shows, the 
incorporation of double-sided incomplete information is not a useless elaboration as it 
significantly changes the dynamics of negotiations, especially under the shadow of a risk of 
mutual assured destruction, here a Graccident. 
To analyse the negotiations over the third Greek bailout, we model a game where both 
sides possess incomplete information about their counterpart’s true preferences. We show that 
the presence of double-sided incomplete information made the negotiations much less 
predictable than generally acknowledged. In addition, the presence of incomplete information 
is necessary to explain the length of the negotiations. Finally, we argue that the Geek policy-
makers could have been more aggressive to increase their chance of getting a better deal. 
This paper makes at least three contributions. First, it offers a new narrative of the third 
Greek bailout’s negotiations where the bargaining outcome is not that predictable. Second, it 
contributes to the wider literature on the political economy of the eurozone crisis by offering a 
formal model for debt negotiations between debtor and creditor countries within a monetary 
union. Third, it contributes to the literature on interstate bargaining in the EU by showing that 
information asymmetries are an important determinant of bargaining power. 
Before proceeding, some clarifications are in order as to the scope of the analysis. This 
paper, while focusing on the international negotiations between Greece and its creditors, will 
not study the underlying factors shaping Greece and its creditors’ preferences (we will be using 
“creditors” and “the Europeans” interchangeably throughout the paper). We will simply make 
plausible assumptions about the players’ preferences ordering without elaborating at length 
about the determinants of the players’ preferences.  
In section 2, we review the existing literature on the Greek bailouts’ negotiations and 
explain why focusing on incomplete information can be insightful for the analysis of the 
negotiations over the third Greek bailout compared to other sources of bargaining power such 
as outside options, domestic constraints or formal voting rules. In section 3, we describe the 
main features of the negotiations that we later include in the formal game in section 4. In section 
5, we develop a narrative of the negotiations using some insights from the game. In section 6, 
we draw some concluding remarks. 
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2. Bargaining power and the Greek bailout negotiations 
 
Bargaining power is a central element of negotiations1 and comes from different sources 
according to a well-established literature. First, bargaining power depends on a state’s best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement, i.e. its outside option. This is a standard and central 
prediction in International Relations and Liberal Intergovernmentalism that the state who has 
more to lose from non-cooperation has less bargaining power (Keohane and Nye 1977, Putnam 
1988, Moravcsik 1998). Similarly, the most impatient player in negotiations has to make the 
most concessions (Rubinstein 1982). Specifically on the Eurozone and Greek crises, 
Schimmelfennig (2015) argues that the negotiations exhibited elements of a chicken game with 
hard bargaining and brinkmanship because the failure to reach an agreement would bring 
“mutual assured destruction” (at least before mid-2012). But since Greece had more to lose 
from non-cooperation, most of the burden of adjustment fell on Greece. Lim et al (2018) show 
that the negotiated outcomes were closer to the creditors’ ideal-points precisely, largely in part 
due to the presence of asymmetric outside options. While their work is not specifically focusing 
on the Greek bailouts, Finke and Bailer (2018) lend support to the idea that debtor countries 
had reduced bargaining power, at least in the heightened period of the Eurozone crisis precisely 
because they had limited capacity to withhold the consequences of a non-agreement.  
This reading of the negotiations is highly dependent on the way outside options are 
defined though. When defined in economic terms as in Schimmelfennig (2015) and Lim et al 
(2018), obviously Greece would have had a worse outside option compared to the Europeans, 
in particular during the negotiations over the third Greek bailout. However, when defined in 
political terms, the asymmetry somewhat fades away. Indeed, while the Europeans would have 
had the economic capacity to bear the costs of Grexit, they may not have had the political 
willingness to take responsibility for the disintegration of Europe. In addition, there would have 
been immediate political costs associated with Grexit or even simply a default. Take for 
instance the case of Germany. Without a deal, all the political capital invested by German 
policy-makers in repeating again and again that every euro lent to Greece would be repaid 
would have simply been lost.  
 
1 It is interesting to notice that in existing studies (not specifically focusing on the Greek bailouts though), 
preferences were found to be generally derived from national considerations, were they economic (see 
Schimmelfennig 2015, Tarlea et al 2019), political (see Hagemann et al 2017, Moschella 2017, Ardagna and 
Caselli 2014, Schneider and Slantchev 2018, see Rothacher 2015 for a synthesis between economic and political 
considerations) or even ideational (see Brunnermeier, Landau and James 2016, Bulmer 2014, Schäfer 2016, 
Blyth 2013, Zahariadis 2016a). 
26 
 
Second, as theorised by Putnam (1988), domestic politics or domestic constraints should 
affect bargaining power in the context of two-level games where international agreements need 
to be ratified at home, which was definitely the case in the negotiations over the Greek bailouts. 
Paradoxically, this theory also predicts that the more a negotiator is constrained at home, the 
greater bargaining power she will enjoy, i.e. the so-called Schelling Conjecture. But in spite of 
the popularity of this theory, very few empirical tests have been made in European studies. 
Slapin (2006) and Hug and König (2002) have tested the predictions of two-level games on the 
Amsterdam treaty reform and found that domestic constraints did influence the final bargaining 
outcome. More recently though, Lundgren et al (2018) econometric results suggest that 
domestic constraints did not systemically affect bargaining success in the Eurozone reform 
negotiations.  
The specific evidence on domestic constraints as a source of bargaining power during 
the Greek bailout negotiations is also mixed. Resorting to Putnam’s two level game theory, 
Zahariadis (2016b) shows that governments with fewer power resources, worse best alternative 
to negotiated agreement and fewer domestic constraints are more likely to follow soft rather 
than hard bargaining strategies2. Moschella (2017) also argues that Merkel’s bargaining 
position was strongly influenced by the progressive empowerment of the Bundestag. For Lim 
et al (2018) though, domestic constraints certainly played a role but not the one expected. 
Greece obtained concessions from its creditors as expected by the Schelling Conjecture but less 
because of domestic politics than by the technocratic assessments of third parties like the IMF 
and international credit-rating agencies that credibly signalled that Greece could not achieve 
full adjustment solely through internal devaluation3. In addition, Frieden and Walter (2018) 
make the interesting case that domestic constraints and outside options generally interact with 
each other in determining bargaining strength. Domestic constraints will more acutely bite 
when influential domestic actors prefer the outside option to a compromise. In our case, this 
argument would have been particularly powerful in undermining the role of domestic 
constraints. During the Greek bailout’s negotiations, the alternative was not between the status 
 
2 See also Zahariadis (2016a) who explains how ideology induced the Greek government to follow the hard 
bargaining strategy observed during the negotiations and how it acted as a barrier to compromise. 
3 The evidence on the political economy of IMF lending can be also insightful for our case study as IMF lending 
negotiations are maybe closer in their logic to negotiations over the Greek bailouts than negotiations over treaty 
changes. But there again, the evidence is still inconclusive. Rickard and Caraway (2014) econometric results show 
that elections gave leverage to governments in international negotiations with the IMF while Stone (2008) and 
Dreher and Jensen (2007) do not find such effects. Testing a more political economic hypothesis, Caraway et al 
(2012) show that governments are able to leverage powerful domestic labour movements in their negotiations with 
the IMF. The paper by Lehman and McCoy (1988) on the 1988 Brazilian debt negotiations between Brazil and the 
international bank advisory committee is also interesting. 
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quo and a new deal as in most EU negotiations but between a potential political disaster and a 
new deal. In all likelihood, domestic constraints would not have carried much weight in the 
face of a probable major political (and financial) crisis (see Schneider and Slantchev 2018).  
Third, bargaining power comes from formal voting rules as predicted by rational choice 
institutionalism (Shepsle 2006). Very much like in the standard median voter model, formal 
voting rules determine the “pivotal voter” (see Krehbiel 1998 and 2008). Tsebelis (2016) argues 
that the unanimity rule reinforced the creditors’ bargaining power by making the status quo 
extremely sticky to any challenge. Under unanimity, each state has indeed a veto power: 
decisions need to be made at the lowest common denominator. In such settings, the state with 
the most extreme preferences is generally the pivotal voter and thus enjoys the most bargaining 
power. Finke and Bailer (2018) and Lundgren et al (2018) also find that voting rules did matter 
for explaining bargaining success throughout the Eurozone crisis. 
On the specific case of the third Greek bailout negotiations, we believe that Tsebelis 
(2016) overstates the relevance of the unanimity rule. He indeed focuses on the apparent 
unanimity within the Eurogroup against Greece, but the Eurogroup was actually not the forum 
where the real decisions were made. Nor did the (plenary) European Council by the same 
occasion. As we will later show, the relevant decisions were taken by a very few number of 
participants, above all Chancellor Merkel, President Hollande and Prime Minister Tsipras. 
Even if we exaggerate the inability of those three sources of bargaining power to explain 
the outcome of the third Greek bailout negotiations, they still cannot explain why the 
negotiations dragged for months. Indeed, those determinants are silent over the time dimension 
of negotiations. For instance, if two stakeholders perfectly knew the value of their counterpart’s 
outside option or win-set in the context of a two-level game, the optimal bargaining outcome 
would be reached quite rapidly. Otherwise, there would be inefficiency loss attached with 
longer negotiations. 
That is why it may be necessary to resort to incomplete information. This concept is 
central in crisis bargaining, in particular in the field of International Relations. Take for instance 
Fearon’s (1995) canonical model of war. In his model, confrontation is costly for both sides, 
therefore states have incentives to reveal their preferences but, in the meantime, they also have 
incentives to misrepresent their true preferences, especially the value of their outside option, in 
order to receive a better settlement. Incomplete information is also present in Putnam’s work 
as it can play a role at the international level of negotiations. Incomplete information is also a 
necessary condition for nuclear crisis bargaining, whose process resembles the dynamics 
observed during the third Greek bailout’s negotiations, to occur (see Powell 1987 and 1988). 
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When the respective level of resolve is common information4, the state with the greater resolve 
would never face resistance to its initial challenge as the less-resolved state would concede the 
issue and there would be no nuclear crisis. But in presence of incomplete information, it is not 
always the state with the greatest resolve that prevail: bluffing sometimes succeeds. An increase 
in an adversary's resolve may even make a state more, not less, likely to escalate (Powell 1987 
and 1988). 
Some authors have delved into such informational problems even though they are 
generally assumed to play a minor role in EU negotiations (see inter alia Moravcsik 1998, 
Bailer 2004 and 2011, Thomson et al 2006). In EU studies, and prior to the crisis, the work of 
Schneider and Cederman (1994) is maybe the one that has taken information asymmetries the 
most seriously. The authors show that incomplete information is an important source of 
bargaining power and that European policy-makers have not shied away for misrepresenting 
their true preferences in order to obtain a better deal. Specifically on the Eurozone crisis, 
Tsebelis (2016) touches upon the notion of incomplete information as a factor behind the length 
of the negotiations. He argues that Greek policy-makers took time to understand that the 
unanimity rule structurally weakened their hand. In line with Schneider and Cederman (1994), 
some scholars have also formalised the effect of informational asymmetries during the Greek 
bailouts’ negotiations by resorting to game theory. Pitsoulis and Schwuchow (2017) use 
incomplete information to explain the strategy followed by Greek policy-makers in the run-up 
to the third Greek bailout. According to the authors, Greek policy-makers, far from being erratic 
and irrational, decided to hold out by betting on the costs of reforms, through a referendum, 
after they realised that the Europeans would not offer early concessions. As the costs of holding 
out increased, so should have the risk of a Graccident to occur. However, incomplete 
information about Greece’s commitment to brinkmanship seems to be a secondary and 
somewhat redundant element in the game. There is no manipulation of information or exchange 
of signals between the players. Domestic constraints rather appear as the main element 
explaining the length and brinkmanship pattern followed by the negotiations. The two players 
simply bet on the results of a referendum, i.e. that domestic constraints will either be high or 
low, while there is no explicit link with Greece’s commitment to brinkmanship. 
Hennessy (2017) analyses the role of costly signalling during crisis bargaining over the 
three Greek bailouts. She assumes that Greece had only incomplete information about the 
Europeans’ commitment to support it financially. Accordingly, she builds a formal model 
 
4 Brinkmanship is generally seen as a “competition of risk-taking” where the state with the greater resolve 
should prevail (see Jervis 1979, Schelling 1966). 
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where a debtor’s (here Greece) actions depend on its beliefs over the type of creditor (here the 
Europeans) it is facing, i.e. whether the creditor is ready to pull the plug or not if the debtor 
does not comply with the terms of the bailout. She argues that, since the Europeans could not 
issue credible signals from 2010 to 2012 because of the systemic risk attached to Grexit or a 
Greek default, Greece could shirk major adjustment without punishment5. After 2012 though, 
she argues that the exchange of credible and costly signals induced Greece to comply with 
conditionality. For the specific case of the third Greek bailout’s negotiations, she argues that 
Greece wrongly took a EU hardliner for a EU unifier. Hennessy (2017) takes the creditors’ push 
for Grexit in the immediate aftermath of the Greek referendum as such a proof. All in all, and 
much like Tsebelis (2016), the length of the negotiations were simply the learning process 
through which Greece understood this stark reality.  
While we have sympathy for Hennessy’s (2017) approach, she relies on the restrictive 
assumption of one-sided incomplete information. To some extent, this results into a partial 
analysis of the bargaining process where the behaviour of one stakeholder is somewhat passive 
(see also Schneider and Cederman 1994). For instance, in Hennessy (2017), there could not 
have been a situation where both players could have bluffed and/or mutually affected their 
opponent’s perceptions of their preferences. Only the Europeans could have done such things. 
Incorporating double-sided incomplete information thus offers a richer understanding of 
bargaining dynamics (see Powell 1988). 
 
3. A signalling game with double-sided incomplete information 
 
In this section, we develop a formal game that models (and thus greatly simplifies) the debt 
negotiations between Greece and its official creditors in the run-up to the third Greek bailout. 
To construct the game, we integrate the main features of the observed negotiations and in 
particular double-sided incomplete information. 
 
3.1. Negotiations in the shadow of default (and Grexit) 
 
During the negotiations, the Greeks threatened on several occasions to default on their official 
loans were the Europeans to refuse to grant them a debt relief. Indeed, Greece had reached a 
primary surplus in 2013 for the first time since the beginning of the crisis (see figure 1). This 
 
5 This point is debatable as Greece was very likely insolvent by that time (see IMF 2013). Even with all the 
goodwill in the world, swimming against the (debt) tide is never an easy task. 
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made a huge difference in the negotiations because Greece was theoretically no more dependent 
on external financing and could have rationally decided to default on its debt (notice that Greece 
had a primary surplus throughout the negotiations)6. In response, the Europeans assured that 
either the attempt to renegotiate the deal or a default would lead to the end of financial help. 
 
Figure 1. Greek primary surplus (in billion euros)  
 
 
Source: Greek Ministry of Finance 
Notes: “Outcome” refers to the actual realized primary fiscal balance; “Target” refers to the 
targeted primary balance in the second Greek memorandum. 
 
A default could have had disastrous and somewhat unpredictable consequences for both 
Greece and the Europeans even though a country’s belonging to the EMU is not dependent on 
it defaulting, as the 2012 PSI and the Cypriot experience have demonstrated. In addition, the 
European Council, short of Greece that is, cannot legally decide to unilaterally exclude Greece 
from the Eurozone if Greece were to default as there is no provision in the Treaties for doing 
so7. Even the ECB cannot cause an immediate Grexit by cutting off liquidity to the Greek 
banking system. However, in the specific context of the Greek crisis, a default may or may not 
unleash an uncontrollable chain reaction leading to a Graccident: default may or may not lead 
to capital controls, capital controls may or may not lead to a banking crisis, a banking crisis may 
or may not lead to a parallel currency, a parallel currency may or may not lead to Grexit8. By 
having a primary surplus, Greece has therefore the possibility to trigger such a chain reaction 
 
6 Obviously, a default would not have been a panacea and would have had numerous and important risks. The 
uncertainty caused by a default may deteriorates already poor tax collection, cause a banking crisis, etc. Notice 
that by the time of the negotiations, most Greek debt was held by European and international official creditors. 
7 The action closest to expelling a country would be the suspension of its voting rights for serious breach of 
EU values, decided unanimously (excluding the state concerned) by the European Council (art. 7 of TEU). 

















that may end up or not with a Graccident. Since it is difficult to know with certainty the 
consequences of a default and how the stakeholders would have reacted, we will assume that 
default can lead to a Graccident with a probability ℎ in the game. 
 
3.2. The presence of double-sided incomplete information 
 
If both the Greeks and the Europeans perfectly knew in advance the preferences of their 
opponent, the negotiations would have ended up much more rapidly than we have actually 
witnessed. The player with the worst outside option would have simply bowed to its opponent. 
However, the specific context of the negotiations over the third Greek bailout made the strategic 
manipulation of information over the true preferences of the stakeholders possible and even 
rational so as to turn the negotiations to one’s own favour.  
On the one hand, the Europeans were uncertain about Tsipras’ preferences and how far 
he would have gone to secure a debt relief. They knew that Tsipras was aiming at obtaining a 
major debt relief while staying in the Eurozone as he repeatedly claimed since the 2012 and 
each and every later election campaigns, not least the 2015 campaign. Still, Tsipras and 
SYRIZA had no record in power and SYRIZA, as a constellation of fringe radical left parties, 
had no links with the centre-left and right European political parties ruling all over the 
Eurozone.  Tsipras and SYRIZA as such were not connected to those networks: new members 
of the Greek cabinet and parliament were outsiders. The Europeans had thus only fragmentary 
knowledge about Tsipras’ personality: was he serious about his pledges or was it simply 
electoral posturing? What is more, and unlike mainstream Greek political parties, there was an 
important internal divide within the party’s central committee on the question of Grexit. An 
important minority within the party was in favour of Grexit (see Tsebelis 2016, Galbraith 2016). 
How this balance would evolve over the course of the negotiations was unclear. It was also 
unclear whether the Greek public would support its government if negotiations turned nasty 
(Galbraith 2016), in particular if the Greek government were to default on its loans. For 
instance, Greece had important repayments to the IMF to honour in March and June 2015. 
Would have it been that unpopular to “postpone” those repayments? 
Anyway, it appears from several memoirs and historical accounts that European leaders 
held only incomplete information about the newly-elected Greek government’ preferences. In 
their account of the events, Dendrinou and Varvitsioti (2019) report that European officials, 
Juncker above all, were not aware what Tsipras would have broughtg to the table as they refused 
to interact with him prior to his election. Only Rehn had met Tsipras in December 2013 for a 
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brief but very tense exchange. About his first trip to Athens in January 2015, Jeroen 
Dijsselbloem, in his memoirs (2018), writes the following:  
 
“Martin Schulz, president of the European Parliament, had got there before me. I rang 
him on the way to hear his impressions. He confessed to being greatly worried. The new 
government was reckless […].” 
 
French President Hollande, in his memoirs (2018), also conveys a sense of uncertainty about 
Tsipras’ intentions, and claims to have invited Merkel to wait and judge Tsipras on his acts. 
On the other, it was also unclear to Greek policy-makers what the Europeans’ 
preferences were. For instance, Germany, a major stakeholder in the negotiations, had uncertain 
preferences on Grexit. Schäuble was clearly in favour of Grexit and was ready to significantly 
help Greece to sail through the transition period (see Varoufakis 2017). For Merkel, there might 
have had room for much more ambiguity. She indeed held Greece back in 2012 after 
considering letting Greece go (Spiegel 2014). But at that time Greece represented a systemic 
risk to the Eurozone. This was no more the case in 2015, at least financially. Still, Grexit (or at 
least a hard default) in 2012 or 2015 would have been equally loaded politically and 
symbolically for her. Germany and other Northern countries might have also been willing to 
make an example of Greece and build a reputation for toughness to educate systemic countries 
such as Spain, Italy or even France (Varoufakis 2017 hints at this possibility, arguing that 
Greece could have simply been a pretext for a larger, much more significant battle, see also 
Giugliano 2015). 
We thus take into account the presence of incomplete information by assuming that each 
player can be of two types, either compromise-averse or Grexit-averse, i.e. ready or not to 
take/accept the risk of a Graccident. Each player’s type is assumed to be private information 
(see section 3.5 for how different player’s types affect their payoffs ordering).  
 
3.3. Exchanging costly signals with a time limit 
 
Throughout the negotiations, both sides exchanged threats, counter-offers, concessions etc. In 
the presence of incomplete information, such signals are instrumental for the strategic 
manipulation of information over the true preferences of the stakeholders. For a signal may 
either reveal genuine aversion to compromise or exploitation by a negotiator pretending to be 
compromise-averse. For instance, a concession signals that a player is not ready to do whatever 
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it takes, including risk Greece’s belonging to the Eurozone, to shift the burden of the adjustment 
onto her opponent.  It may also enable a player to test the credibility of one’s opponent threat 
and determine the limits one’s compromise-averse opponent might not tolerate. 
However, sending signals induces delays in reaching an agreement and delays come 
with costs for both the Greeks and the Europeans. A deal reached after a lengthy showdown 
increases the kind of fiscal adjustment/debt relief needed because of the economic deterioration 
that political uncertainty would have caused. The necessity to implement additional reforms 
may thus prove to entail political cost as well (see Pitsoulis and Schwuchow 2017 for a similar 
argument, namely that holding out is costly). Delays are also costly even when a player has 
obtained a good deal from her own perspective. From the Europeans’ perspective, economic 
deterioration in Greece caused by the delay would necessitate greater European financing. From 
the Greek perspective, the loss of economic activity and jobs would by itself be costly, in 
economic and/or in political terms.  
Signals are also costly to break because a public commitment entails audience costs for 
policy-makers. All along the Greek crisis, there has been daily and intense media reporting: 
each and every development of the negotiations was therefore under the scrutiny of national 
audiences. For Greek policy-makers, signals create potential audience costs by raising the 
expectations of the voters but not delivering at the end of the day. For Europeans, accepting a 
fair deal for the Greeks after a showdown is also costly politically because of those same 
audience costs. We will thus assume that signalling creates disutility for the players. 
 This exchange of signals had a time limit though. As argued previously, the debt 
negotiations took place under the shadow of a default, voluntary or unvoluntary for that matter. 
However, as Greece had some fiscal surplus at the beginning of the showdown, there was some 
time before Greek policy-makers had to make a hard and final decision on a default. The signals 
were precisely about informing or manipulating information over what the stakeholders would 
do once Greek fiscal reserves are exhausted: escalate or back down. In order to model the 
mutual exchange of signals as well as the time dimension of the negotiations, we will assume 
that each player can play twice to allow for (Bayesian) belief updating to take place. We restrict 
ourselves to two moves for each player mainly for the sake of simplicity as adding more moves 






4. The formal game 
 
4.1. Description of the game 
 
Let us assume that there are two players, G (for Greece) and E (for the Europeans). Voluntarily 
abstaining from describing the complexity of group dynamics that would have taken place 
within the group of European creditors made up of sovereign states and international and 
regional and international organisations (this could be an interesting topic for future research, 
see Henning 2017), let us assume that the Europeans can be modelled as a unitary actor, which 
is in line with the approach taken by several other papers dealing with the Greek bailouts’ 
negotiations (see Lim et al 2018, Pitsoulis and Schwuchow 2017, Hennessy 2017). Again, in 
line with existing papers, let us assume that the preferences of the Europeans are typical of a 
creditor country (we develop this point further below). 
The game goes as follows. E decides to grant a debt relief to G or not. If E grants debt 
relief to G, the game ends with a fair deal for Greece. On the contrary, if E does not grant debt 
relief to G, then G decides to challenge the status quo in order to obtain a debt relief or resign 
to implement the memorandum without a debt relief. If 𝐺 resigns, the game ends with G 
continuing to apply the existing memorandum. If 𝐺 challenges the status quo, 𝐸 has to decide 
whether to reject or accept debt relief after a challenge. If 𝐸 accepts, the game ends with G 
obtaining a debt relief. On the contrary, if 𝐸 rejects the challenge, 𝐺 must decide whether to 
back down or defaults. If 𝐺 backs down, the game ends with G continuing to adjust without a 
debt relief. If 𝐺 defaults, the game continues. Nature (N) then decides whether a default leads 
involuntary Grexit with probability ℎ and to a new deal with probability 1 − ℎ. In case Grexit 
happens by accident, both players bear the costs9 of a Graccident and the game ends (see figure 
2). Otherwise, a Graccident does not happen and the game ends10.  
There are 6 possible outcomes in this game that very plausibly cover the whole range 
of possible outcomes. The first outcome is a quick fair deal if Europe accepts to grant debt relief 
to Greece (under Samaras). The second outcome is a quick asymmetric deal with Greece if 
Tsipras, after being elected, decides after all to implement the second bailout without further 
due. The third outcome is a delayed fair deal with Greece if Tsipras decides to ask for new 
 
9 We assume that the costs of a Graccident that matter for the players, i.e. policy-makers, are political costs but 
there can also be economic and financial costs attached to a Graccident. 
10 Like we cannot perfectly describe how a Graccident would occur, we willingly remain vague here and do not 
describe what kind of deal would materialise were a Graccident no to occur as this would go beyond prediction. 
It may be that a fair or an asymmetric deal may occur. 
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terms and Europe accepts. The fourth outcome is a delayed asymmetric deal with Greece if 
Tsipras, after being refused new terms by Europe decides, not to default and yield to Europe’s 
conditions. The fifth outcome is Grexit if Greece decides to default on its loans after being 





First, payoffs are assumed to reflect the conflict between debtors and creditors during a standard 
debt crisis (see Frieden 2015 on the political economy of adjustment and rebalancing, 
Copelovitch Frieden and Walter 2016). At the core of any debt crisis lies a distributive issue: 
who will bear the adjustment costs? Indeed, debt crises generate losses that need to be 
swallowed through adjustment. And adjusting to a debt crisis, at least in the Eurozone, can be 
achieved either through the sole debtor’s fiscal adjustment or through the creditors’ debt relief 
or through a mix of the two solutions (outside of the Eurozone, external adjustment through the 
exchange rate and monetary financing are two obvious potential solutions). Intuitively, creditor 
countries prefer adjustment to be fully borne by the debtor country, i.e. adjustment through 
fiscal adjustment. On the contrary, debtor countries prefer adjustment through debt relief. 
Henceforth, a player will obtain a higher payoff if it is able to shift the burden of adjustment 
onto its opponent11. In other words, payoffs reflect the respective balance in terms of the 
distribution of the adjustment costs. Deals with (no) debt relief are assumed to impose most of 
the adjustment costs on the creditors (Greece). Still, we remain silent over the precise 
distribution of a deal. Concessions are therefore possible at the margin if they do not affect the 
overall balance of a deal. 
Second, in order to operationalise incomplete information in the negotiations, we 
assume that each player can be of two types, depending on the desirability of one’s own outside 
option, i.e. the desirability of running the risks of a Graccident. Each player can either be 
compromise-averse or Grexit-averse, depending on a player’s preferences ordering, in 
particular with regard to running the risk of a Graccident compared to the other options 
available. Again, we restrict ourselves to these two possibilities as they cover the range of 
plausible preferences ordering.  
 
11 The logic is that of a zero-sum game even though the payoffs are not set formally as in zero-sum game. 
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Third, we assume that signalling is not simply cheap talk but is costly for the players. 
Payoffs are made up of two elements. The first element would represent the utility derived from 
reaching a compromise however bad or good this may be from a player’s perspective, i.e. the 
cooperation gains from not suffering the costs of a default. The second element of an outcome’s 
payoff would represent the disutility caused by costs associated with a delayed compromise. 
For instance, part of the wedge between outcomes 1 and 4 for the Europeans comes from the 
kind of higher financial support required to bailout Greece. Signals are also costly to break 
because a public commitment entails audience costs for policy-makers. For instance, for a 
Greek player, what (partially) drives the wedge between the payoff of a quick asymmetric deal 
(outcome 2) and that of a delayed asymmetric deal (outcome 4) is precisely the existence of 
audience costs from raising the expectations of the voters but not delivering at the end of the 
day. 
Based on the above considerations, we obtain the following preferences’ orderings. 
Greece always prefers a fair deal (outcome 1 or 3), defined here as a deal with a significant debt 
relief, to an asymmetric deal (outcomes 2 or 4), defined as a deal without debt relief. In addition, 
Greece always strictly prefers a quick asymmetric deal (outcome 2) to a delayed one (outcome 
4) because of the higher costs associated with a delayed deal. Greece’s type will thus depend 
on whether running the risks of a Graccident is preferred to an asymmetric deal or not. If Greece 
is Grexit-averse, Greece prefers a new asymmetric deal (outcomes 2 or 4) to running the risks 
of a Graccident (outcome X). On the contrary, if Grexit is compromise-averse, Greece prefers 










12 For the sake of simplicity and clarity of the argument, we assume that a compromise-averse Greek player would 
always choose to default and take the risk of a Graccident, namely that ℎ ≥ ℎ̅. Indeed, when ℎ < ℎ̅ = (𝜋𝐺
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Figure 2. The game with complete information 
 
 
Similarly to Greece, Europe always prefers a quick deal to a delayed one as 
implementation delays and macroeconomic deterioration in the debtor country imply more 
financial support for the creditors. Unlike Greece, Europe does not always prefer an asymmetric 
to a fair deal to Greece though. On the contrary, Europe prefers a fair deal with Samaras 
(outcome 1) compared to a delayed asymmetric deal with Tsipras (outcome 4). A deal with 
Tsipras even without a debt relief would still require appropriate financing from the creditors. 
And granting financial support after a showdown could be extremely badly perceived by 
enraged public opinions in Northern European countries, even if most of the adjustment remains 
with Greece (see our argument about audience costs). On the contrary, a quiet debt relief 
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Outcome 1: quick 
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asymmetric deal 
Outcome 4: delayed 
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costs. When compromise-averse, Europe prefers running the risks of a Graccident (outcome X) 
to any other option short of a quick asymmetric deal (outcome 2). When Europe is Grexit-
averse, it prefers any option to running the risks of a Graccident, even a fair deal with Tsipras 
(outcome 3).  The resulting preference orders are summarized in the following four 
assumptions: 
 

























4.3. Solving the game with complete information 
 
Under complete information, Grexit-averse players never attempt to bluff and the two sides 
always reach a solution, cooperative or not for that matter, immediately. Otherwise, there would 
be inefficiency loss attached with longer negotiations. However, such a finding contradicts what 
happened during the negotiations over the third Greek bailout as the crisis lasted for months 
before a deal was eventually found. Proposition 1 summarizes this case more formally. 
 
Proposition 1. Under complete information, the game has three equilibria. Equilibrium 1: if 
Europe is Grexit-averse and Greece is compromise-averse, the negotiations result in a quick 
fair deal for Greece. Equilibrium 2: if Europe is compromise-averse or Grexit-averse and 
Greece is Grexit-averse, the negotiations result in a quick asymmetric deal for Greece. 
Equilibrium 3: if Europe and Greece are compromise-averse, the negotiations result in a 
default and a Graccident happens with probability h. 
 
4.4. The game with double-sided incomplete information 
 
To the game with complete information, we now add double-sided incomplete information: 
each player only privately observes its own type but is uncertain of its opponent’s type. What 
is more, Nature determines whether a player is compromise-averse (S(trong)) or Grexit-averse 
(W(eak)). We assume that 𝑞 is the probability that Greece is compromise-averse and 𝑝 is the 




 All in all, the sequential bargaining game thus turns into a signalling game with double-
sided incomplete information (see figure 3). When bargaining, a Grexit-averse Greece (Europe) 
is therefore unsure whether it faces a Grexit- or a compromise-averse Europe (Greece) and must 
take into account the signals sent by Europe (Greece) when following a particular strategy. 
 
Figure 3. The game with incomplete information 
Note: the number at the end of each branch denotes the outcome reached (see above) 
In light of the above preferences (see table 1), the game simplifies in the following 
way thanks to backward induction (see figure 4). For a summary and description of the 
different parameters of the game, see table 2. 
From our assumptions, playing (Challenge, Default) is a strictly dominant strategy for 
a compromise-averse G (SS and WS nodes), irrespective of the strategy E selects (cf. our 
assumptions on a player’s preferences). Similarly, (No Debt Relief, Reject) is a strictly 
dominant strategy for a compromise-averse E (SS and SW nodes), irrespective of the strategy 
G selects. When both players are compromise-averse (SS node), Graccident (outcome 5) 
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Figure 4. Simplified game with incomplete information 
 
Proposition 2. Under double-sided incomplete information, the game has 4 sequential crisis 
equilibria and depends on the values of p and 𝑞. 
Equilibrium 1 exists only when 0 < 𝑞 ≤ ?̅? and 0 < 𝑝 ≤ ?̅?. Grexit-averse and compromise-
averse Europe never grants a debt relief at the beginning of the negotiations. Compromise-
averse Greece always challenge the status quo. Grexit-averse Greece randomizes its strategy 
between challenging the status quo and resign. In the latter case, a quick asymmetric deal 
occurs. In the former case, Grexit-averse Europe randomizes its strategy between rejecting and 
accepting a Greek offer. If Greece is compromise-averse, Greece defaults and a Graccident 
occurs with probability h. If Greece is Grexit-averse, a delayed asymmetric deal occurs. 
Equilibrium 2 exists only when 0 < 𝑞 ≤ ?̅? and ?̅? < 𝑝 < 1. Grexit-averse and compromise-
averse Europe never grants a debt relief at the beginning of the negotiations. Compromise-
averse Greece always challenge the status quo. Grexit-averse Greece resigns and a quick 
asymmetric deal occurs. Compromise-averse Greece challenges the status quo. Grexit-averse 
Europe randomizes its strategy between rejecting and accepting a Greek offer. Compromise-
averse Greece defaults and a Graccident occurs with probability h. 
Equilibrium 3 exists only when ?̅? < 𝑞 < 1 and 0 < 𝑝 ≤ ?̅?. Grexit-averse and compromise-
averse Europe never grants a debt relief at the beginning of the negotiations. Compromise-
averse Greece always challenge the status quo. Grexit-averse Greece randomizes its strategy 
N 
SS SW WS WW 
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between challenging the status quo and resign. In the latter case, a quick asymmetric deal 
occurs. In the former case, Grexit-averse Europe accepts the Greek offer and a delayed fair 
deal occurs. Compromise-averse Europe rejects the Greek offer. If Greece is compromise-
averse, Greece defaults and a Graccident occurs with probability h. If Greece is Grexit-averse, 
a delayed asymmetric deal occurs. 
Equilibrium 4 exists only when ?̅? < 𝑞 < 1 and ?̅? < 𝑝 < 1. Grexit-averse and compromise-
averse Europe never grants a debt relief at the beginning of the negotiations. Compromise-
averse Greece always challenge the status quo. Grexit-averse Greece resigns and a quick 
asymmetric deal occurs. Compromise-averse Greece challenges the status quo. Grexit-averse 
Europe accepts the Greek offer and a delayed fair deal occurs. Compromise-averse Europe 
rejects the Greek offer. If Greece is compromise-averse, Greece defaults and a Graccident 
occurs with probability h. 
 
We can draw several insights from Proposition 2. First, adding double-sided incomplete 
information to our bargaining game creates a theoretical world where the bargaining outcome 
is not that predictable and depends on the players’ mixing strategies, especially when at least 
one of players is Grexit-averse. In the theoretical world where both players are Grexit-averse 
and the probability of one’s opponent being compromise-averse is low enough, three outcomes 
are thus possible: (i) a quick asymmetric deal, (ii) a delayed fair deal and (iii) a delayed 
asymmetric deal. The last case is the actual outcome of the negotiations.  
Second, when a player is Grexit-averse and the probability of one’s opponent being 
compromise-averse is low enough, she has an incentive to conceal its true type. Grexit-averse 
Greece will thus have incentives to bluff in order obtain a better deal, typically outcomes 1 or 
3. The risk for a Grexit-averse Greek player is for her bluff to be called since she will eventually 
back down if pushed to and experience audience costs. Similarly, Grexit-averse Europe will 
have incentives to bluff in order to reach outcome 2 or at least outcome 4. The risk of a bluff 
for Grexit-averse Europeans is that Greece turns out to be compromise-averse and defaults on 
its loans, leading up to a Graccident or not. When the probability of one’s opponent being 
compromise-averse is too high, a Grexit-averse player will prefer to quickly back down rather 
than back down later on and experience lower utility. 
Third, there can thus be long negotiations between Greece and the Europeans, even 
when both players are compromise-averse.  
Fourth, since Grexit-averse and compromise-averse Europeans follow the same strategy 
by not granting a debt relief, Grexit-averse Greece learns nothing about its adversary’s type 
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from the Europeans’ first move. Not granting a debt relief reveals no information about the 
Europeans’ type. Grexit-averse Greece can only rely on what she knows of the prior distribution 
𝑝 of the Europeans’ types.  
Fifth, the probability that Grexit-averse Europeans reject the Greek offer 𝛾∗ is increasing 
with 𝜋𝐺
4 ceteris paribus. Similarly, the probability that Grexit-averse Europeans reject the Greek 
offer 𝛽∗ is increasing with 𝜋𝐸
3 ceteris paribus. In other words, the greater the audience costs of 
backing down, the lower the probability of one’s opponent from escalating (see Appendix B). 
 
Table 1. Parameters of the game 
Variables Description 
𝜋𝑖
1 Payoff of outcome 1 (quick fair deal) for player i 
𝜋𝑖
2 Payoff of outcome 2 (quick asymmetric deal) for player i 
𝜋𝑖
3 Payoff of outcome 3 (delayed fair deal) for player i 
𝜋𝑖
4 Payoff of outcome 4 (delayed asymmetric deal) for player i 
𝜋𝑖
𝑋 Expected payoff of Greece playing default for player i 
𝑝 Probability that Europe is compromise-averse 
𝑞 Probability that Greece is compromise-averse 
ℎ Probability of a Graccident 
𝛼 Probability that Europe plays No debt relief when Grexit-averse 
𝛾 Probability that Europe plays Reject when Grexit-averse 
𝛽 Probability that Greece plays Challenge when Grexit-averse 
𝜇𝐸  E’s belief that G is compromise-averse after observing a “Challenge” 
𝜇𝐺  G’s belief that E is compromise-averse after observing “No debt relief” 
𝜃𝑖(𝑘) k
th  information set of player i 
Note: 𝜋𝑖
𝑋 is defined as 𝜋𝑖
𝑋 = ℎ𝜋𝑖






5. How could have Greece increased its chance of obtaining a better deal? 
 
While the game is a very stylised representation of the negotiations, it remains insightful to 
understand why Greece failed to secure a debt relief. In addition, if we follow the logic of our 
game, Greece could have increased its chance of obtaining a fair deal by reducing the utility 
she would have obtained from a delayed asymmetric deal. In the game, the payoffs are fixed. 
But in the actual negotiations, it is sensible to assume that the payoffs’ value would have been 
set in a much more dynamic way, depending on the specific offers, statements, moves made by 
the two sides. Indeed, Greece could have manipulated the audience costs from backing down 
to reduce the payoff from a delayed asymmetric deal 𝜋𝐺
4 in order to reduce the value of 𝛾∗.  
While a risky strategy, the Greeks could have been more aggressive by increasing the 
audience costs from backing down. Among other options, a referendum could have possibly 
played this role. The Greek Prime Minister did call a referendum. However, it should have been 
called sooner in the negotiations than what actually happened in order to have had an effect on 
the Europeans’ belief over Greece’s type, in particular before the Greeks started to send 
contradictory signals (see Appendix A). The “No” could have thus rallied much more support 
than it did in July in the midst of chaos. As such, it could have created an extremely important 
sense of unity and legitimacy around the Greek government, making more credible the Greek 
position of no-compromise and more credibly tying the hands of the Greek government. In 
comparison, in July, after the second program ended and capital controls had been installed, 
there was no time left for further negotiations in spite of the clear “No” victory.  
In addition, and to support such an aggressive stance in the negotiations, the Greeks could 
have conveyed privately to the Europeans in a clear and unambiguous manner how Greece 
would deal with the consequences of a Graccident or with an end of official funding. For 
instance, they could have told their European counterparts that Greece would be ready to 
introduce a parallel currency or that Greece was ready to default on the remaining SMP bonds 
that Greece still owed to the ECB in case the ECB were to stop providing ELA to Greek banks 
(see Varoufakis 2017).  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
With the help of a game-theoretical model, we have demonstrated that incomplete information 
is a necessary condition to explain the outcome and dynamic of the negotiations over the third 
Greek bailout. In particular, incomplete information is a necessary condition for explaining why 
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a bargaining outcome had been delayed for months. What is more, our main result is that the 
third Greek bailout negotiations were much less predictable than generally acknowledged. 
Contrary to the mainstream understanding of the negotiations that Greece had no leverage in 
the negotiations, we argue that it was neither unpreparedness nor pure folly for Greek policy-
makers to engage into a showdown in order to obtain a better deal for Greece, even if this meant 
full surrender at the end of the day. On the contrary, we show that the Greeks could have been 
more aggressive to increase their chance of obtaining a better deal. 
As the Greek negotiations over the third Greek bailout were exceptional by all standards, 
the game theoretical model may not be fully replicable to other, more regular, bargaining 
situations. Still, the focus on the strategic manipulation of information when this information is 
unevenly distributed among actors may be insightful for the study of interstate bargaining in 
the EU and beyond (see Moravcsik 1998). Informational problems may indeed be particularly 
relevant for analysing bargaining over the integration of core state powers or the design of 
burden and risk sharing mechanisms in the EU and the Eurozone (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 
2013, Schelkle 2017). Those negotiations have by essence distributional consequences and 
while member states may have an interest in preserving the joint gains from integration, they 
may differ on the way to preserve it. As a result, stakeholders may have incentives to manipulate 
information about outside option or about the ratification process through threats and signals in 
order to obtain concessions. In addition, by applying double-sided incomplete information, our 
model provides a realistic setting in which each side can use information strategically. As such, 













Paper 2. Financial markets’ reactions to policy developments 





In this paper, we study the interaction between policy uncertainty prior to the Draghi’s 
“whatever it takes” speech and financial markets. More specifically, we assess the effect 
of policy-oriented news on Greek sovereign spreads. We do so by constructing a novel 
dataset of more than 5800 manually coded news items. The dataset provides an 
encompassing picture of the crisis management as we included most, if not all, prevailing 
policy debates (the design of bailouts, the crisis resolution mechanisms, debt restructuring, 
fiscal rules, Grexit, Eurobonds, the role of the ECB, etc). We classify the news items along 
several dimensions to have a precise picture of the effect of different types of news on 
financial markets. In particular, we differentiate between expected and unexpected 
decisions to have a finer sense of how markets responded to policy developments. Our 
results based on EGARCH models suggest that news have had an effect on Greek sovereign 
spreads from October 2009 to mid-2012, corresponding to the heightened period of the 
Greek and Eurozone crises. We find that financial markets did react extremely strongly to 
unexpected positive decisions and events. Our results are also consistent with the 
asymmetric effect of news commonly reported in the existing literature as financial markets 















In October 2009, the then Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou revealed that his country’s 
budget deficit had been significantly understated. In hindsight, this was the starting point of the 
so-called Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Since the Eurozone was not equipped to deal with the 
sort of problems caused by macroeconomic imbalances, financial sudden stops and sovereign 
insolvency, the eurozone policy-makers had to simultaneously engage with firefighting and 
institution-building. A long-delayed joint EU-IMF bailout was finally granted to Greece in May 
2010. Few days later, European leaders decided to create an instrument, the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF), able to provide financial assistance to troubled Eurozone members. 
In December 2010, the same European leaders went a step further and decided to equip the 
eurozone with a permanent bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). As the 
crisis worsened, the new crisis instruments got gradually upgraded while Greece (and other 
peripheral countries) asked for more financial support. 
In the meantime, the European Central Bank (ECB) took steps to contain the crisis, at 
first reluctantly though, by buying sovereign bonds on the secondary markets and by easing its 
collateral policy in order to continue accepting heavily downgraded Greek bonds. After the 
nomination of Mario Draghi in late 2011, the ECB became much more pro-active. In December 
2011 and February 2012, the ECB announced the Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO), 
a fixed rate full allotment program of lending to banks. And in July 2012, the ECB decided to 
make use of its unlimited firepower and endorsed its role as a lender of last resort for sovereigns 
with Draghi’s famous “whatever it takes” speech 
During those years, European policy-makers struggled to offer a consistent response to 
the Greek solvency problems as well as to the other systemic fault lines uncovered by the 
specific Greek situation. The process of crisis decision-making was indeed all but linear and 
clear, fraught with enormous difficulties and uncertainties. Political deals were generally 
reached at the eleventh hour during what became ordinary “last chance summits” after weeks, 
if not months of hard bargaining. And on many occasions, those hard-fought compromises were 
obsolete as soon as few hours after they were achieved, either because of rapidly changing 
conditions or because they were not ambitious enough or even because political leaders 
undermined the deals for domestic political reasons. 
As a matter of fact, the public positions of the many different stakeholders involved in 
the crisis-management process were often contradictory on the many dimensions of the crises 
(see Brunnermeier, James and Landau 2016 for a review of the main debates that had to be 
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solved by European policy-makers). In a context of asymmetric information, the signals sent 
by European policy-makers over future policies were at best inconsistent, intentionally – as 
policy-makers debated in public – or not for that matter. In addition, the Eurozone and Greek 
crises attracted a lot of attention from the media that reported on a daily basis over the very 
latest policy developments and political comments, with its inevitable share of rumours and 
denials. 
As figure 1 (left panel) shows, none of the policy steps created the sufficient shock and 
awe on Greek sovereign spreads until Draghi’s intervention in July 2012. In addition to the 
upward trend observed in the left panel of figure 1, Greek sovereign spreads exhibited varying 
degrees of volatility (see figure 1, right panel). Volatility increased around the first Greek 
bailout in May 2010. This was followed by a relatively long period of calm as Greece seemed 
to be on track with its programme. Financial stress resumed with greater intensity from May 
2011 up to Draghi’s intervention in July 2012 once it became clear Greece would not succeed 
in adjusting without a debt restructuring. 
In this paper, we precisely assess how political uncertainty, defined as the uncertainty 
over future policy choices, affected financial markets during the Greek and Eurozone crises. 
We focus on the Greek sovereign spreads for two reasons. First, because Greece was obviously 
the starting point of the wider Eurozone crisis. Second, because policy developments in 
response to the Eurozone crisis had, in most cases, repercussions for Greece since the Greek 
crisis lasted even after the heightened of the Eurozone crisis. 
To perform our analysis, we have created a novel dataset of more than 5800 manually 
coded single policy-oriented news items covering the period from October 1, 2009 to July 25, 
2012 on the eve of Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech13. The dataset provides an encompassing 
picture of the crisis and its management as we included most, if not all, policy debates during 
the Greek and Eurozone crises over the design of bailouts, the crisis resolution mechanisms, 
debt restructuring, fiscal rules, Grexit, Eurobonds, the role of the ECB, etc. We classified the 
news items along several dimensions to estimate the respective effect of different types of news. 
Accordingly, we differentiated between positive and negative news, between political 
communication, media reports and actual decisions, and between Greek-specific and Eurozone-
wide news. As a further refinement, we differentiated between expected and unexpected 
 
13 Manually coding the news represents both a liability and an asset. It is a liability insofar as it involves a 
substantial degree of subjectivity in judging the positive or negative tone of news items. In the meantime, it 
allows for a much more flexible and context-specific coding of news by taking into account the evolution of the 
positions of the different stakeholders. 
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decisions to have an even more precise sense of how markets responded to policy 
developments. This differentiation between expected and unexpected news as well as the 
comprehensive nature of our dataset dealing simultaneously with decisions, media reports and 
political communication represent insightful contributions to the existing literature on the effect 
of news on financial markets during the Eurozone and Greek crises. 
 
Figure 1. Daily Greek 10-year sovereign bid spreads (basis points) 
  
Notes: The left panel plots the Greek 10-year sovereign bid spread vis-à-vis the German Bund 




The research design of this paper is mainly exploratory as we do not test directly the 
predictions of theories with regard to the effect of news on financial markets (see Collignon et 
al 2013 for an interesting formal model of financial markets’ reacting to political signals in the 
presence of asymmetric information or Pastor and Veronesi 2011). We rather build on the 
information contained in our dataset to answer various questions about the market behaviour 
during the Greek and Eurozone crises: what was the effect of news on Greek spreads during the 
crisis? Which types of news were more relevant than others? How have news affected volatility 
in Greek spreads? 
Our results based on EGARCH (1,1) models suggest that news have had an effect on 















































































































































































financial markets did react extremely strongly to unexpected positive decisions and events. 
Unexpected positive news have more impact in absolute terms than unexpected negative news. 
Our results are also consistent with the asymmetric effect of news commonly reported in the 
existing literature as financial markets were sensitive to negative news as a whole (decisions, 
events and political communication). The daily number of Greek-specific negative 
developments (excluding decisions and events) has widened Greek spreads as well while we 
find no such effect for positive developments.  
Our findings offer a new interpretation of the Eurozone and Greek crises management. 
Indeed, in other studies analysing the effect of news on financial markets, the asymmetric effect 
of news somewhat disempowers policy-makers: no matter what they did, no matter how hard 
they fought to solve the crisis, financial markets did not take policy-makers’ (positive) steps 
into account. This result can feed a narrative where all the blame is on financial markets’ 
irrationality. On the contrary, our results rather point to the other direction: financial markets 
did acknowledge the policy efforts. Policy-makers could thus put an end to a financial turmoil 
they contributed to create with a more appropriate crisis management. What was maybe missing 
from European policy-makers was the decisive proof that they were actually ready to walk the 
walk after talking the talk. Arguably, the much-awaited decisive action occurred on July 26, 
2012. 
Before laying out our methodological approach that we have used to construct our news 
dataset (in sections 3 and 4) and present our econometric results (section 5), we first critically 
overview the existing literature (section 2). In section 6, we draw some concluding remarks. 
 
2. News and Financial Markets 
 
This paper is closely related to the existing literature on the effects of news and statements by 
politicians during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis14. In this literature, most scholars find a 
link between news and different financial assets such as sovereign bonds, the euro exchange 
rate, stock returns, etc. What is more, when differentiating between good and bad news, most 
studies find a more significant effect for the latter (see Büchel 2013, Haupenthal and 
Neuenkirch 2017, Bird Du and Willett 2017, Conrad and Zumbach 2016) with the notable 
exception of Mink and de Haan (2013) who find no asymmetric effect. Some studies also 
 
14 As such, this paper is also related to the literature on the effects of political communication on financial 
markets (see Blinder et al 2008). See Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) on news’ effect during the Asian crisis 
and Hayo and Kutan (2005) on the effects of IMF-related news on emerging markets for interesting papers prior 
to the crisis. 
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suggest that there is a “credibility” effect of news on financial markets: news emanating from 
less credible policy-makers tend to be discounted altogether by the markets (Büchel 2013, Mohl 
and Sondermann 2013, Bolstad and Elhardt 2015). Finally, this credibility effect seems to be 
complemented by an “additive” effect when several politicians from AAA-rated countries 
speak on the same day (see Mohl and Sondermann 2013 and Ehrmann et al 2014). 
Nevertheless, the results differ from one paper to the other for the simple reason that 
scholars use different econometric models, different data sources and different ways of 
measuring what a “news” is. Starting with what had been included in the “news” variable, 
several scholars only estimate the impact of political communication on financial markets. 
Büchel (2013) studies the impact of hawkish and dovish political statements – statements 
expressing respectively low and high commitment to shield private creditors – on the GIIPS' 
CDS and bond yield spreads during Europe's sovereign debt crisis thanks to the Factiva 
database (see also Petrakis et al 2012). Unlike Büchel (2013), Mohl and Sondermann (2013) 
investigate the effect of political communication without differentiating the positive or negative 
content of the 15 000 news agencies reports from May 2010 to June 2011 included in their 
dataset. Conrad and Zumbach (2016) also compile the statements emanating from the main 
European  policy-makers from August 2011 to December 2011 and classified those statements 
into two categories: positive/negative statements that refer to the economic situation or austerity 
measures in the peripheral countries and positive/negative statements that refer to the Eurozone 
as a whole. Some papers study the role of a single type of political communication: Haupenthal 
and Neuenkirch (2017, see also Gregori and Sacchi 2017 for a similar attempt at the daily 
frequency level) investigated the effect of positive and negative statements about Grexit on 
intraday stock returns in Germany, Greece, and the euro area during the period from 1 January 
2015 to 19 August 2015 while Gade et al (2013) examine to what extent political 
communication on fiscal policy and public finances had an effect on sovereign bond spreads 
(Falagiarda and Gregori 2015 took the same approach but restrict themselves to the Italian case, 
see also de Jong 2018 on the effect of Dutch fiscal announcements on Dutch sovereign spreads). 
 The literature focusing on the Eurozone crisis is not restricted to political 
communication though. For instance, Ehrmann et al (2014) assess the impact of a wider range 
of news – i.e. macroeconomic fundamentals, policy actions and the public debate among policy 
makers – on the euro exchange rate. Alternatively, Beetsma et al (2013) rely on Eurointelligence 
daily reports to construct their news variable which is set up so as to measure the intensity of 
the news by the number of words on the news item as well as by the number of times certain 
words are mentioned. Their dataset is pretty eclectic: they include for instance news indicating 
51 
 
relaxed commitment to budgetary targets, disagreements over economic policy and information 
on rising poverty levels (Bolstad and Elhardt 2015 also compiled statements and decisions from 
2009 to 2012 through Eurointelligence reports and complemented them with other news 
sources). Going further, several scholars only focus their analysis on policy decisions. Kilponen 
et al. (2012) only study policy decisions by identifying more than 50 important policy decisions 
from 2007 to 2012. In a similar vein, Smeets and Zimmermann (2013) examine whether Euro 
summits, as well as their agreed and communicated results, had a significant impact on Europe’s 
financial markets. 
 When differentiating between good and bad news, most scholars classify the content of 
news manually (for instance Büchel 2013, Beetsma et al 2013, Bolstad and Elhardt 2015) with 
or without the help of content analysis (see Haupenthal and Neuenkirch 2017, Büchel 2013, 
Conrad and Zumbach 2016 for applications of content analysis). Gade et al (2013), for their 
part, classify over 25,000 news reports from 2009 to 2011 using an algorithm searching for the 
name of policy-makers and then for predetermined words that are expected to have either a 
positive or a negative connotation in relation to fiscal policy or public finance15. 
Turning to estimation techniques, a variety of econometric models are used to study the 
impact of news. While some studies rely on ordinary or pooled least squares (Falagiarda and 
Gregori 2015, Beetsma et al 2013, Gade et al 2013), many studies use GARCH models in order 
to take into account the kind of volatility clustering observed in financial time series (see inter 
alia Büchel 2013, Ehrmann et al 2014, Mohl and Sondermann 2013, Haupenthal and 
Neuenkirch 2017). In addition, a third technique can be found in the literature, namely the so-
called event-study approach16. For instance, Mink and de Haan (2013) first identify the twenty 
days with extreme returns of Greek sovereign bonds, link them to news using Reuters data 
source, and then categorise the news events during those days into news about Greece and news 
about the prospects of a Greek bailout. Smeets and Zimmermann (2013) define the events of 
interest as the meetings of the heads of state and government while Bird, Du and Willett (2017) 
take announcements made independently by selected national governments, the IMF, the ECB 
and the EC, as well as jointly by the Troika (see also Bolstad and Elhardt 2015). 
 
 
15 See also Choularias (2015) for textual sentiment analysis, i.e. pessimism vs optimism, of reports during the 
European crisis. “Word count” methods or computer linguistics may miss the context of a news report and thus 
fail to get the content right. In addition, relevant reports may be filtered out if the wording of a report is different 
from the words chosen in the search string (see Wolflinger et al 2018). 
16 Event studies consist in finding the abnormal return attributable to a particular event by comparing the pattern 
of financial market movements during a pre- and post-event period (see MacKinlay 1997). 
52 
 
In spite of their diversity, these studies share several common methodological 
shortcomings. Many studies in the existing literature may indeed suffer from an endogeneity 
problem for at least two reasons. First, when there is high volatility in the markets, the number 
of press reports tend to increase as analysts search for stories that could explain such market 
swings, ending up creating “news.” For instance, Beetsma et al (2013) measure the “intensity” 
of the news by the length (number of words) of the news items as well as by the number of 
times a particular word and country is mentioned on each given day. And they indeed find that 
more intensity raises the domestic interest spread of GIIPS countries. Moreover, their data 
source is Eurointelligence, which apart from reporting major news of the previous day, also 
includes selected summaries of op-eds produced by influential columnists. However, such 
articles are not precisely what one may call “news” but are rather reactions to other news, events 
or simply to market developments. Arguably, the length of such morning briefings may increase 
following days of high market volatility (see also Bolstad and Elhardt 2015, Bouzgarrou and 
Chebbi 2015 for papers using Eurointelligence reports). 
Second, policy-makers may decide to communicate precisely in reaction to high 
volatility in the markets. This creates a reverse causality problem. Nevertheless, Büchel (2013) 
argues that news are contemporaneously exogenous because (i) financial markets are assumed 
to react immediately to a statement (within the same trading day), in line with Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and (ii) events can be determined with precision on a daily basis (see inter alia 
Falagiarda and Gregori 2015, Gade et al 2013 or Bird Du and Willett 2017 for a similar 
assumption). All in all, since the data on yield spreads is collected as of end-of-day, while the 
construction of the communication variable is on the basis of news releases during the day, the 
issue of endogeneity would be contained. However, the two premises on which the assumption 
of weak exogeneity rests may be misleading. First, it may be possible that a piece of news does 
affect financial markets for a longer period of time and/or that financial markets may need more 
than one day to price in a news correctly (Wolflinger et al 2018). Second, there may be more 
than one relevant piece of news per day, in particular when one is not only looking at statements. 
One may thus end up finding a fallacious relationship between political communication and 
financial markets. For their part, Gade et al. (2013) run Granger causality tests to determine any 
reversed causality problem both in the short term and over a reasonable longer period, through 
the inclusion of lagged variables, but they find inconclusive results (see also Collignon et al 
2013)17.  
 
17 Notice that some scholars have also relied on high-frequency data, namely intraday data, to overcome the 
endogeneity problem (see Conrad and Zumbach 2016, Haupenthal and Neuenkirch 2017, Bahaj 2018). 
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The second problem has to do with how existing papers have dealt with markets’ 
anticipations. As far as macroeconomic news are concerned, it is relatively easy to differentiate 
between expected and unexpected news when consensus surveys are available. For instance, 
Caporale et al (2014) define the surprise component as the standardised difference between the 
consensus prediction and the actual data. Unfortunately, this is much more difficult to 
operationalise for policy-oriented type of news. As noted by Bird, Du and Willett (2017: 279), 
“studies generally note these problems but, because of their difficulty, efforts to deal with them 
have been fairly limited.” To the best of our knowledge, only Kim and Willett (2014), in a study 
about the Korean stock market during the global financial crisis, apply a strategy to differentiate 
between expected and unexpected policy news (see below). 
Notice that relying on the event-study approach may somewhat circumvent this problem 
by simplifying the identification of relevant news. It is indeed easier to identify specific events 
instead of recording all news items over a lengthy period of time (Bird Du Willett 2017). It may 
allow to identify the news (or the absence of news) that eventually were considered the main 
events in the Greek crisis by the markets, instead of treating all news items as relevant data. 
However, scholars might arbitrarily exclude events that were relevant and/or include irrelevant 
ones (see Smeets and Zimmermann 2013 for instance). In addition, this approach, taken in its 
purest form, has a major shortcoming as it requires the estimation of “normal” returns several 
days prior to the event, on the day of the event, and several days after the event (see MacKinlay 
1997).  
 
3. Defining and Measuring News 
 
Before trying to deal with the aforementioned issues, the preliminary question that we should 
answer is the following: what do we mean by news? In this paper, we assume that news can 
take many forms, from verbal political statements, to written political statements, decisions, 
media reports, rumours, etc. On the contrary, we do not consider analyses or explanatory articles 
to be news since by definition they interpret the meaning of other news such as events and/or 
decisions. Having set the limits of our dataset, we now turn to the three main measurement 






3.1. Can we distinguish between endogenous and exogenous statements?  
 
The problem of news endogeneity mainly concerns political statements since we do not include 
any analytical or explanatory reports in our dataset. A first solution is to run Granger causality 
test as it has already been done in several papers in order to exclude specific vectors of news 
items. However, it may be more insightful to treat the problem of endogeneity right from the 
very beginning by excluding potentially endogenous single news items. In conceptual terms, 
part of the endogeneity problem may indeed come down to an informational problem. If a 
statement has sufficient informational content, it does not really matter whether it came as a 
reaction to market developments or not because it will affect markets anyway. So which 
statements could have such informational content? Arguably, statements that are unlikely to be 
endogenous are statements that inform financial markets about future policy choice. 
Consequently, relevant statements should clearly advocate or refute a particular policy option. 
In addition, the number of statements on particular policy options should increase as policy-
makers engage with each other. Actually, we observe such “bursts” in the dataset where an 
initial proposal causes the many stakeholders to react to it and feed a discussion among policy-
makers through the media (see figure 19 in Appendix A). 
On the contrary, an important share of reassurances or statements such as “Greece will 
not default,” “Greece does not need a bailout,” “Greece will not leave the eurozone,” etc. that 
were very likely made in reaction to large swings in the markets plausibly convey very little 
information for financial markets. More generally statements expressing confidence or trust 
that a positive outcome will occur may be particularly endogenous as they are precisely made 
to reassure markets. Those statements will therefore be excluded from our dataset. 
 
3.2. Can we determine the importance of a piece of news?  
 
Intuitively, policy decisions or data releases should be more important than rumours, statements 
issued by single policy-makers or discussions over future decisions. But that is debatable. 
Another way to express this problem would be think of importance as credibility, in particular 
for political communication. The credibility issue may come from the identity of the issuer as 
it has already been documented in the literature (see above). It may also come from the content 
of message: policy-makers’ reassurances may have very low informational content and may 
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therefore be irrelevant for the markets18. Since such assurances were plentiful during the crisis, 
this feature may explain the asymmetric effect of news found in papers including those 
assurances: they might have simply diluted the effect of positive news altogether. 
 
3.3. Can we disentangle between anticipated and unanticipated news? 
 
Most of the time, scholars have not attempted to do it. Indeed, it can be very challenging to 
determine which news was anticipated and which news was not without perfectly knowing 
investors’ expectations in real-time. However, by closely following policy debates and 
developments, we may be able to identify decisions and events that were foreseen by previous 
news reports and therefore already priced in by the markets. 
  
 In order to deal with this problem (as well as for the importance/credibility of news), 
we will follow Kim and Willett’s (2014) approach by differentiating between hard (policy 
decisions or sometimes lack of decisions, important events, European collective or Franco-
German statements or economic news releases) and soft news (statements issued by single 
policy-makers, media reports, policy discussions or rumours). If soft news related to a particular 
policy action, event or data release were released few days before the hard news eventually 
occurred, then the hard news can be coded as “expected hard news.” On the contrary, if there 
were no soft news released before the hard news or the hard news contradicts the previously 
released soft news, then the hard news will be coded as “unexpected hard news. 
 
4. A Novel News Dataset 
 
4.1. Collecting the data 
 
We took a two-step approach to collect our data. First, we have extracted relevant news from 
Reuters’ GREECE - Factors to Watch and Eurointelligence daily morning summaries. We used 
these reports to have a first idea of the most important news about the Greek and Eurozone 
crises. Second, we fleshed out our dataset with news releases from the major news agencies 
(Reuters, Dow Jones Newswires, Agence France Presse, Associated Press Newswires, and 
 
18 For instance, Beetsma et al (2013) argue that they cannot objectively distinguish between reliable and 
unreliable assurances and, therefore count all assurances as good news. In this paper, we will adopt the very 




Market News International) and the Greek news agency (Athens News Agency) through Dow 
Jones’ Factiva database. We relied on simple keywords search for retrieving data. We have 
generally focused on headlines and an article’s first paragraph since, in the massive amount of 
news released each day, financial actors usually only look at headlines (see Haupenthal and 
Neuenkirch 2017 and Büchel 2013 for a similar approach of collecting news based on 
headlines). Each time a news was to be included into the dataset, we checked for its first 
occurrence and took great care in not including later duplications. News that were released after 
18:00 CET or at weekends, were assumed to affect financial markets on the following trading 
day. We have collected news from October 1, 2009 to July 25, 2012, i.e. on the eve of Draghi’s 
“whatever it takes” speech, to cover the entire stress period of the Eurozone and Greek crises. 
 
4.2. Cleaning the data 
 
In a second phase, we have applied the strategies for dealing with the endogeneity and 
credibility issues we have described in the previous section. More specifically on the credibility 
problem, we have not included statements made by Greek policy-makers, except if they were 
“surprising” or relevant. Arguably, a large part of Greek policy-makers statements were 
endogenous as they were made to reassure markets. Statements from Greek policy-makers were 
also excluded in order to minimise a credibility issue which may blur our interpretation of the 
results. When PM Papandreou, at the beginning of the crisis, is saying that his country will not 
default or will stick to the agreed fiscal targets, the informational content is very likely to be 
low as this is likely cheap talk. On the contrary, when a Greek official says that Greece will 
default on its debt, her statement should be included in the dataset because it goes contrary to 
what markets may expect from the “dull” Greek official line. We have also decided to exclude 
European policy-makers’ positive reassurances or official denials over negative news. On the 
contrary, we have kept official denials of positive news in the dataset. Following Collignon et 
al (2013) and Gade et al (2013), and as a further check to the reverse causality problem, we 
have run Granger causality and prederminedness tests on the different news variables (see table 
12A to 12C in Appendix A).  
 
4.3. Classifying the data 
 
After the collection and cleaning phases were completed, we have classified news into 9 main 
categories (level I, see Tables 1A and 1B) in order to facilitate the coding of news. This 
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classification is only illustrative though. Indeed, the different dimensions of the Greek crisis 
were closely intertwined. Consequently, a same news could be included into different news 
categories. For instance, a statement saying that Greece had to be more committed to reforms 
or quit the eurozone could be related to both “Grexit” and “Financial Support” (see figure 19 
in Appendix A) 
  
4.4. Coding the data 
 
We have coded news along five different dimensions: positive vs. negative, soft vs. hard, 
expected vs. unexpected (only for hard news), Greek-specific vs. Eurozone-wide, political 
statements vs. media reports (only for soft news). A piece of news was coded as positive 
(negative) when it was expected to reduce (widen) spreads (see tables 1A to 1C). In addition, a 
piece of news can be part of these different categories at the same time. For instance, a piece of 
news can be a positive Greek-specific expected hard news. 
Statements issued by single policy-makers or media reports were coded as soft news. 
On the contrary, decisions (or sometimes lack of decisions), events or collective statements (as 
well as Franco-German statements) were coded as hard news. Note that decisions or events that 
were deemed relatively unimportant on their own were coded as soft news, in particular when 
other relatively important developments took place on the same day. For instance, on July 25, 
2012, the news “Greece appoints new chief for privatisation agency” was coded as a soft news 
even though this was obviously a decision.  
If soft news related to a particular policy decision, event or data release were released 
few days before the hard news eventually occurred, then the hard news was coded as “expected 
hard news.” On the contrary, if there were no soft news released before the hard news or the 
hard news contradicted the previously released soft news, then the hard news was coded as 
“unexpected hard news.” In order not to mix the effect of soft news with hard news, we have 
excluded soft news that took place on days with hard news. 
A piece of news was coded as a political statement if it directly emanated from one of 
the key stakeholders (or from his/her respective spokesperson) of the Greek and Eurozone crisis 
(see table A in the Appendix for the list of the key Greek, European and international 
stakeholders). At this stage, we had two possibilities, either to code the content of the statement 
itself or code the degree of disagreement over policy options a piece of news would reveal. The 
assumption made in the former case is that markets would react positively to a positive 
statement and negatively to a negative news irrespective of the state of the debate on a particular 
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policy option at time 𝑡. On the contrary, in the latter case, the assumption is that markets would 
not to react simply to a single news at a time (as in the content coding) but to the overall message 
sent by policy-makers. The idea is that when at least two policy-makers speak on the same topic 
with two different messages, the message hence become unclear for the markets. Therefore this 
kind of inconsistency about future policy options may negatively affect markets, irrespective 
of the positive content of one (or more) of the statements. 
We have opted for the “content coding” of news in our regressions, since different 
opinions are pieces of news after all. In addition, this coding is more convenient 
methodologically speaking compared to the disagreement coding. Indeed, contradictory 
statements on a particular policy could take place on the same day. In that case, coding 
disagreement can be quite straightforward. However, policy-makers could also express their 
disagreements over a specific subject on different days. In that setting, coding disagreement 
becomes much less intuitive. In addition, the “disagreement coding” would proxy “sentiment” 
rather than “news” and this would introduce a further layer of subjectivity to our coding 
procedure. 
When a piece of news was explicitly referring the Greek developments, it was coded as 
a Greek-specific news, and as a Eurozone-wide news otherwise.  
Finally, we have constructed two types of news variables. Dummy variables are equal 
to 1 on days with at least one piece of news of the respective type (see above) and 0 otherwise. 
Since on many occasions, there were more than one pieces of news of a particular type of news 
on a single day, we have also constructed “count variables.” They would simply take the value 
of the number of pieces of news occurring on a particular day, for a particular type of news. We 
use these count variables for the study of soft news, as their frequency was extremely high: 
virtually every day, there was at least one soft news about the Greek and Eurozone crises (see 
tables 2A and 2B). The intuition behind the count variables is to measure the intensity of the 
debate over future policy decisions and hence the kind of uncertainty surrounding those 
decisions. 
Finally, and to be as transparent as possible on the content of our dataset, we have 
compiled in Appendix B the full and almost exhaustive coding procedure for each news 
category. We have also provided examples of news coding for each news category (see tables 






Table 1A.  Coding of news (1) 
 








A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals that Greece 
is hitting (missing) its fiscal targets, in particular in terms of 
revenues targets 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals that Greece’s 








collateral, legal challenges, 
written commitment)/Loan 
Tranche(disbursement/delay) 
A news is positively (negatively) coded if it signals the Europeans’ 
(un)willingness to offer support or offer support without 
conditionality.  
A news is negatively coded when it signals that Greece needs more 
financial support 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals the 
(un)willingness to disburse funds. 
Loan Reviews (negotiations, 
reports, implementation 
process, austerity packages) 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals that Greece 
is on (off) track with the program 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals Greece’s 
(un)willingness to adjust/reform/privatise 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals a stronger 
(weaker) Greek banking system 
Official Sector Involvement 
(from member states and 
ECB) 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when the EU/IMF signals its 
(un)willingness to lengthen the maturity and/or reduce the interest 
rate of Greek loans. 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals that the ECB 
is (not) willing to participate in the OSI for the second Greek bailout  
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Table 1B. Coding of news (2) 
 
Level I Level II Description 
Restructuring 
Disorderly Default 
A news is negatively (positively) coded when it signals the 
(im)possibility/(in)desirability of a Greek default. 
Forced Orderly Restructuring 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals the 
(im)possibility/(in)desirability of a forced orderly Greek 
default 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals 
support/opposition (opposition/support) for a buyback or 
rollover/swap of Greek bonds 
A news is negatively coded when it signals a disagreement 
between the ECB and the member states on selective default 
Voluntary Orderly 
Restructuring 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals 
progress (delay/breakdown) in negotiations on PSI 
A news is negatively coded when it signals support 






Size (ceiling, leveraging 
strategy, combination of ESM 
and EFSF, early start) 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals the 
(im)possibility/(in)desirability of an increase (limitation) in 
the bailout funds’ firepower 
Flexibility (Bond-buying, 
bank recapitalisations, loan 
interest rate and  maturity, 
parliamentary participation) 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals the 
(im)possibility/(in)desirability of greater bailout funds’ 
flexibility 
PSI 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals the 
(in)desirability of PSI in the ESM (even after 2013) 
Conditions (SGP, policy 
coordination, Fiscal Pact, legal 
challenges) 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it (does not) 
signals a possible compromise on the conditions set for an 







Table 1C. Coding of news (3) 
 
Level I Level II Description 
ECB 
Collateral framework  
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals 
ECB’s (un)willingness to ease (tighten) its collateral 
framework 
Bond-buying 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals the 
(in)desirability of the ECB’s bond-buying program 
Lender of last resort 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals the 
(in)desirability for the ECB to act as a lender of last resort 
for sovereigns 
Liquidity provisison 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals the 





opposition support, majority 
unity, cabinet reshuffle, polls 
(after Nov 2011) 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals (a 
lack of) large political support for reforms. 
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals 
reduced (heightened) political uncertainty. 
Grexit   
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals 
Europeans’ (un)willingness to preserve the integrity of the 
eurozone 
Eurobonds   
A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals 




A news is positively (negatively) coded when it signals 
support for a far-reaching (no/modest) banking union 
 
4.5. Describing the data 
 
Our dataset is made of a bit more than 5800 observations, of which 54% of them are negative. 
Soft news compose the very bulk of the observations. For hard news, most of them were 
expected by markets (according to our definition) while most unexpected news were negative. 
Note that there were more hard positive news than hard negative news. On average, (at least) 
one hard news took place every 4 trading days (see table 2A and 2B). In addition, there was 
news coverage about the Greek and/or Eurozone crises virtually every day. These high numbers 
are due to our comprehensive coverage of the Eurozone and Greek crises. When we exclude 
soft news that occurred on days with hard news, the final dataset shrinks by more than the 
62 
 
double. Consequently, the relative proportion of hard news in the final dataset increases. We 
have also broken down the news variables by topic (see tables 13A to 14B in Appendix A, see 
also figures 2 to 19 in Appendix A to have an idea of the evolution of the different news 
variables over time). 
 
Table 2A. Distribution of the news in the dataset 
  Total % of Total   
% of Days with 
Total 5808 100%   
91.5% 
Negative News NB 3260 56.2% % of Neg 
82.6% 
Soft Negative NB 3001 51.7% 92.1% 
81.1% 
Political Statements Negative NB 1884 32.4% 57.8% 
70.6% 
Media Reports Negative NB 1117 19.2% 34.3% 
61.8% 
Hard Negative NB 259 4.5% 7.9% 
26.0% 
Hard Expected Negative NB 196 3.4% 6.0% 
19.8% 
Hard Unexpected Negative NB 63 1.1% 1.9% 
8.2% 
Positive News NB 2548 43.8% % of Pos 
81.3% 
Soft Positive NB 2268 39.0% 89.0% 
78.0% 
Political Statements Positive NB 1189 20.5% 46.7% 
60.3% 
Media Reports Positive NB 1079 18.6% 42.3% 
63.6% 
Hard Positive NB 280 4.8% 11.0% 
27.6% 
Hard Expected Positive NB 249 4.3% 9.8% 
25.6% 










Table 2B. Distribution of the news in the final dataset  
(excluding soft news on days with hard news) 
  Total % of Total   
% of Days with 
Total 2710 100%   
91.5% 
Negative News NB 1456 53.7% % of Neg 
66.5% 
Soft Negative NB 1197 44.2% 82.2% 
40.5% 
Political Statements Negative NB 735 27.1% 50.5% 
34.2% 
Media Reports Negative NB 462 17.0% 31.7% 
28.6% 
Hard Negative NB 259 9.6% 17.8% 
26.0% 
Hard Expected Negative NB 196 7.2% 13.5% 
19.8% 
Hard Unexpected Negative NB 63 2.3% 4.3% 
8.2% 
Positive News NB 1254 46.3% % of Pos 
66.3% 
Soft Positive NB 974 35.9% 77.7% 
38.7% 
Political Statements Positive NB 540 19.9% 43.1% 
29.4% 
Media Reports Positive NB 434 16.0% 34.6% 
29.8% 
Hard Positive NB 280 10.3% 22.3% 
27.6% 
Hard Expected Positive NB 249 9.2% 19.9% 
25.6% 
Hard Unexpected Positive NB 31 1.1% 2.5% 
3.6% 
 
5. Econometric Methodology and Results 
 
5.1. Econometric methodology 
 
In order to test the effect of policy developments during the Greek and Eurozone crises on 
financial markets, we use an EGARCH (1,1) model as proposed by Nelson (1991). This 
approach has the advantage that it corrects for the serial correlation, skewness, and time-varying 
volatility of the Greek bond spreads. Indeed, we have found significant ARCH effects after 
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performing a standard Engle’s LM ARCH test as well as serial correlation on OLS regressions 
with or without our news variables19.  
The augmented conditional mean equation of an AR(1)-EGARCH(1,1) model is the 
following 










+ θXt + (log (σt
2)) +  εt 
Where ∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 is the daily change of Greece’s 10-year sovereign bond spread (bid 
price20) with Germany at time 𝑡, ∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 is the lagged daily change of Greece’s 10-year 




) is a news variable. We 
construct several types of news variables, whereby 𝑗 indicates the type of the news considered 
(hard, soft, expected, unexpected, political statements, media reports, Greek-specific news, 
Eurozone-specific news) on day 𝑡. For the different types of hard news, we use dummy 
variables. For the different types of soft news, we rely only on count variables.  
 𝑋𝑡 is a vector of control variables. As control variables, we use the daily VIX index to 
take into account for global risk factors, the daily dollar-euro rate to take into account regional 
risk factors and the Euribor 3 month-OIS spread as a proxy for credit risk. In addition, we use 
a dummy variable equal to 1 on days with macroeconomic news releases (Unemployment, CPI, 
Industrial Production, PMI, Construction activity). Log (𝜎𝑡
2) is the logarithm of the conditional 
variance, i.e. the ARCH-in-mean term, as the risk factor may affect the conditional mean change 
in Greek spreads (see Collignon et al 2013). εt is the error term following a Student’s t-
distribution, with the number of degrees of freedom (i.e., the tails’ width) to be estimated by 
the model22. 
The variance equation of the EGARCH is expressed as a function of a constant term, q 
lags of the dependent variable (the GARCH structure) and p lags of the residuals from the 




19 We first estimated the “right” model with the help of the Auto Regressive Distributed Lags methodology. 
Based on this model, we tested for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and ARCH effects. 
20 Boffelli and Urga (2015: 150, see also Büchel 2013) consider that “bid, rather than mid, data as more 
representative of the spreads during crisis periods considering the widening of bid-ask spreads witnessed by 
bond markets.” 
21 The inclusion of the lagged spread variable is be justified by the existence of serial correlation.  
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We also include our news variables in the conditional variance equation in order to 
assess their effect on the Greek spread volatility. Following Erhmann et al (2013), we estimate 
the effect of news on the conditional variance in a slightly different way compared to the mean 
equation. We continue to use dummy variables for hard news and count variables for soft news 
but we do not disentangle anymore between positive and negative news. 
All time series are stationary (table 11, see also tables 9 and 10 for the description of 
the variables and descriptive statistics in Appendix A). There was no more ARCH effect nor 
serial correlation after running GARCH regressions. While the R-squared is low in the 
benchmark models, incorporating news improved it up to 250 percent. Finally, the estimated 
degrees of freedom of the Student-t distribution of errors is always fluctuating around 2 and 3, 
indicating the presence of particularly fat tails, justifying the choice of the Student-t distribution 
to model errors. 
 
5.2. Analysis of the results and robustness checks 
 
Models A and B are the benchmark models to which we assess the value added of accounting 
for policy developments during the Eurozone and Greek crises (see table 3). In those benchmark 
models, we only include the control variables (model A) and the ARCH-in-mean term (model 
B). These two models suggest that there was some inertia in the markets while an appreciation 
of the euro-dollar exchange rate was correlated with spread tightening. Credit risk as well as 
global risk-aversion had no significant effect. Spread volatility also had a widening effect on 
the mean change in Greek spreads. 
Our main result is that financial markets did react extremely strongly to unexpected 
positive decisions and events. Our results are also consistent with the asymmetric effect of news 
commonly reported in the existing literature as financial markets were sensitive to negative 
news as a whole (decisions, events and political communication). The daily number of Greek-
specific negative developments (excluding decisions and events) has widened Greek spreads as 
well while we find no such effect for positive developments. 
Let us now elaborate further on the results. We first estimate the effect of news at the 
most aggregated level and then gradually break down our different news variables. In models 
1 to 10, we study the effect of news without differentiating between Greek-specific and 
Eurozone-wide developments (see tables 4A and 4B). Looking at the most aggregated level of 
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news (models 1 to 5), we find an asymmetric pattern in the reaction of financial markets to 
positive and negative news in the mean equation. Hard and soft negative news have a significant 
effect on spreads while hard and soft positive news have no effect. The coefficients have the 
expected sign when significant: negative news widen spreads while positive news tighten 
spreads. This result is in line with the main findings of the existing literature that negative news 
had an asymmetric effect on markets during the crisis23. 
 
Table 3. Benchmark Models – Mean Equation 
ΔSpread A B 






































Adjusted R-squared 0.032 0.032 
Obs 731 731 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; 
***significant at 1% level. 
 
When breaking down soft news into political communication and media reports, only 
the daily number of negative political statements significantly (at the 10% level) widened the 
mean change in spreads. However, this result should be taken cautiously as political 
communication and media reports are highly correlated. Actually, when we include only one 
 
23 For presentation purposes, we do not report the coefficients, standard errors and significance levels for the 
control variables in the regression tables. But notice that those elements do not change substantially compared to 
the benchmark models. Full regression results are available on demand. 
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of those types of news at a time, we find that negative political communication and media 
reports have significant effects with the expected sign. 
Interestingly, when we differentiate between expected and unexpected hard news 
(models 6 to 10), the asymmetric effect of news somewhat fades away. On the one hand, we 
find that unexpected hard news are significant when both positive and negative and have the 
expected sign, with the former having a greater effect in absolute terms (more than 20 bps 
against 11-12 bps). On the other, financial markets have remained more sensitive to negative 
news in general as markets kept reacting to soft negative news. 
With regard to the variance equation for models 1 to 10, our results suggest that news 
had a destabilizing effect on spreads (table 4C). Hard news as well as soft news increase 
volatility, with the former having a greater impact than the latter. When we delve into greater 
details, we find that unexpected news had a significant, strong and robust effect on volatility 
while expected news had no effect. Finally, it is difficult to conclude on the respective effect of 
media reports and political communication on variance because of the high correlation between 
the two variables. 
In models 11 to 20, we estimate the effect of news when we differentiate between Greek-
specific and Eurozone-wide developments (see tables 4C to 4E). We find some insightful and 
complementary results, in particular when put in perspective with models 1 to 10. First, the 
asymmetric pattern holds with both Greek-specific and Eurozone-wide hard news: hard 
negative news have a significant widening effect even though Eurozone-wide hard news are 
less significant. Still, this result tells us that policy decisions and events during the wider 
Eurozone crisis did matter in driving Greek spreads higher. Second, Greek-specific and 
Eurozone-wide unexpected positive as well as negative decisions and events affected the 
conditional mean change in Greek spreads. In particular, unexpected positive news had a huge 
tightening effect on Greek spreads (up to 30 bps), an effect greater in absolute value than for 
negative news (up to 17 bps). Again, notice that Eurozone-wide unexpected news are less 
significant than Greek-specific unexpected news, especially unexpected negative news. 
Nevertheless, their effect goes way beyond the effect of Greek-specific unexpected news. Third, 
models 11 to 20 suggest that, when taken as a whole, only Eurozone-wide soft negative news 
mattered for financial markets (significant at the 5% level). Moreover, from our regressions, it 
appears that markets did not react to Greek-specific or Eurozone-wide political communication. 
As for models 3 and 8, we also include political statements and media reports one at a time and 
we find that Greek-specific negative political statements and media reports are significant. 
68 
 
With regard to the effect of Greek-specific and Eurozone-wide news on variance, we 
find that Greek-specific hard news had a significant and robust destabilizing effect on spreads 
while Eurozone-wide hard news had no effect. Looking at expected and unexpected news offers 
a picture similar to that of models 1 to 10. The destabilizing effect only came from unexpected 
news, with Greek-specific news having an extremely  significant and robust effect compared to 
Eurozone-wide news. With regard to soft news, we obtain comparable results as for models 1 
to 10 for soft news. Nevertheless, both Greek-specific and Eurozone-wide soft news slightly 
but significantly destabilized markets.  
When we add a ARCH-in-mean term in the mean equation (regressions 21 to 40, see 
tables 5A to 5E), the previous results for both the mean and variance equations continue to hold 
for hard news. For soft news, we also obtain a similar picture even though their levels of 
significance are reduced in the conditional mean equation. Also notice  that soft positive news 
are significant. Anyway, those Mean-EGARCH regressions do not allow to conclude on the 
effect of the conditional variance on the conditional mean as the significance of the ARCH-in-
mean is not always significant and not robust across specifications24.  
More generally, our main result with respect to the effect of news on the mean equation 
turns out to be robust to different model specifications. First, we add more lags of the dependent 
variable as our baseline specification may not fully account for the inertia in Greek spreads but 
we obtain similar results (see tables 6A to 6E in Appendix A). Second, we use the Greek 
sovereign yield instead of the spread as the spreads might have reacted to German-specific 
news. Again, the results offer a similar picture with regard to hard news (see tables 7A to 7E in 
Appendix A). It appears that Greek yields have reacted to Greek-specific negative but also to 
positive soft news. Third, we estimate Asymmetric Power ARCH (1,1) models in order to 
account for the common finding in the empirical financial literature of high serial correlation 
between the absolute asset returns and their power transformations (see tables 8A to 8E in 
Appendix A). The main difference here is that news have no more effect on the variance of 
Greek spreads while the news variables continue to affect the mean change in Greek spreads as 
in the EGARCH models. Finally, we also test alternative EGARCH structures with up to three 
lags in the ARCH and GARCH terms but our results remain robust to such specifications (for 
both the mean and variance equation) except for Eurozone-wide hard negative news.
 
24 We have tested for alternative specifications of both the mean and variance equations – including only the 
daily number of soft news in the variance equation but not in the mean equation and including both hard and soft 
news in the mean equation but only soft news in the variance equation – and for alternative ARCH-in-mean term 
– instead of the logarithm of the conditional variance, we have simply used variance as well as the conditional 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we have showed that financial markets did react to policy developments of the 
Greek and Eurozone crisis. We thus have constructed a novel dataset of 5800 single news items. 
Our contribution in this paper has to do precisely with the construction of the dataset and our 
coding approach. We have tried to be as transparent as possible about how we have built our 
dataset and coded news. And to the best of our knowledge, this is the only paper that has tried 
to differentiate between expected and unexpected news during the Greek and Eurozone crises.  
Interestingly, this coding refinement is not neutral. Disentangling between expected and 
unexpected decisions and events indeed allow us to complement the common finding that 
financial markets have reacted asymmetrically  to news during the Eurozone and Greek crises. 
Financial markets were indeed more sensitive to negative news as they reacted to both negative 
soft and hard news. Still, financial markets were also extremely responsive to clear, and 
unexpected for that matter, positive signals sent by policy-makers, even more so than for 
unexpected negative decisions and events. In addition, Greek spreads reacted more to 
unexpected Eurozone-wide developments than Greek-specific ones.  
These two findings imply that financial markets were not entirely solely concerned 
about the Greek debt problems. They also appeared to be deeply worried by the broader 
sustainability of the Eurozone: financial markets were eager to receive a clear, unambiguous 
and non-contingent signal that policy-makers were actually ready to do whatever it took to save 
the euro and solve the Greek problem after repeatedly claiming to do so.  
Finally, and contrary to the claims made by several European policy-makers that 
financial markets did not acknowledge the steps that were taken to upgrade the Eurozone 
governance and solve the Greek solvency problems, our results rather point to the other 
direction: financial markets did acknowledge the policy efforts. However, the inability of the 
European policy-makers to provide the markets with the decisive proof that the Eurozone was 













Uncertainty has been identified as an important factor behind the protracted slump in advanced 
economies following the Great Recession and Eurozone crisis. However, an important number 
of proxies for uncertainty are volatility-based, implicitly assuming that the underlying 
distribution of shocks is normal. They may thus fail to account for an important source of 
uncertainty coming from disaster risk. We therefore build on the novel Growth-at-Risk 
approach to derive a proxy for disaster risk. We estimate the macroeconomic effect of disaster 
risk on a panel of twelve advanced economies from 1997Q1 to 2019Q3. Our findings suggest 



















Following the Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone crisis, investment has nose-dived in 
advanced economies. However, the recovery has been much more less staggering. Many 
scholars have resorted to uncertainty to explain (part of) the extraordinary investment fall as 
well as the subsequent weak economic recovery in advanced economies. This renewed interest 
in estimating the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty has fostered the development of 
numerous proxies for uncertainty (see inter alia Bloom 2009, Baker et al 2016, Jurado et al 
2015, Rossi and Sekhposyan 2015, see Cascaldi-Garcia 2020 for a comprehensive review).
An important number of scholars have proxied uncertainty by relying on volatility-
based indicators. In this paper, we argue that this understanding of uncertainty overlooks 
uncertainty that originates from disaster risk. Arguably, the 2008 global financial crisis and the 
Lehman bankruptcy have come as powerful wake-up calls towards the risk of extreme left tail 
events. The so-called Eurozone sovereign debt crisis that started in late 2009 also raised major 
questions about the survival of the single currency whose demise could have caused a major 
blaze. And the outburst of the Covid-19 pandemic has simply been the latest evidence that tail 
events, or black swans, are not simply theoretical possibilities but do exist. 
Actually, the risk of tail events may affect agents’ decisions because of the critical 
consequences those disasters may have. In a seminal paper, Rietz (1988) solves the so-called 
equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985) by including a low probability of an extreme 
left tail event. Rietz (1988: 118) shows that “risk-averse equity owners demand a high return to 
compensate for the extreme losses they may incur during an unlikely, but severe, market crash.” 
Following the work of Rietz (1988), some authors have developed new theoretical frameworks 
to solve other existing financial puzzles (see inter alia Barro 2006, Wachter 2013, Gabaix 2012, 
Farhi and Gabaix 2016). Closer to our purpose, several authors have also applied Rietz (1988) 
approach to analyse the real effects of rare disasters risk. Barro (2009) shows that the welfare 
consequences from eliminating all uncertainty from rare disasters are large. Similarly, Gourio 
(2012) shows that an increase in disaster risk leads to recessions and particularly large decline 
of investment (see also Gourio 2013). 
Using the so-called Growth-at-Risk (GaR) methodology developed by Adrian et al 
(2019) that allows to retrieve full conditional density functions from GDP growth time series, 
we therefore construct a proxy for the implied left tail risk of GDP growth at the one-quarter 
and four-quarter ahead horizon for twelve advanced economies. We define disaster risk as the 




depth how our tail risk proxy is defined constructed in section 3. For that matter, our disaster 
risk proxy identifies periods of acute uncertainty that are different from realized stock volatility. 
We then estimate the macroeconomic effect of disaster risk shocks using structural panel 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models coupled with Bayesian techniques for our panel of 12 
countries from 1997Q1 to 2019Q3. The effect of disaster risk shocks on investment is not 
conclusive even though one-year ahead disaster risk shocks tend to have more impact than one-
quarter ahead disaster risk shocks. 
Our paper is related to the literature on disaster risk following Barro (2006) as we 
compute time-varying country-specific disaster risk proxies. Our paper is also closely related 
to Adrian et al (2019) showing that changes in the left tail are largely driven by changes in 
financial conditions, the left tail increasing in periods of high financial stress25. But instead of 
simply estimating the expected distribution of GDP growth, we estimate the effects of tail risk 
shocks on investment. Another important related paper is Forni et al (2021) whose approach 
and objective is similar. Our paper differs as we apply our analysis on a panel of advanced 
economies and not simply on the US. In contrast to Forni et al (2021), we focus on disaster risk 
rather than downside and upside risk. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
proxies of uncertainty. Section 3 presents our tail risk proxy. Section 4 describes our 
econometric strategy and discusses our results. Section 5 draws some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Proxies for uncertainty 
 
An important number of the proxies for uncertainty that have been developed in recent years 
are volatility-based26. Those volatility-based proxies can be grouped into five groups, 
depending on the way they are constructed or on the type of data they rely on. First, implied or 
realized stock market volatility (financial data more generally) has been the most commonly 
used proxy by scholars as financial markets are generally assumed to integrate expectations 
about future macroeconomic developments (see Bloom 2009). Still, those proxies are broadly 
imperfect as market volatility can be related to changes in risk-aversion or sentiments rather 
 
25 For a dissenting view, see Plagborg-Moller et al. (2020). 
26 Newspaper-based indices have also been constructed to proxy for uncertainty (Bloom 2019 and Baker et al 
2013 and 2016 on economic policy uncertainty, see also the geopolitical risk index constructed by Caldara and 





than to changes in uncertainty. In addition, financial markets’ perception of uncertainty may be 
different from that of businesses and consumers.   
Second, uncertainty has also been proxied through the cross-sectional dispersion of 
micro-level data such as profits, returns or productivity across firms or industries (Bloom et al 
2012). More micro-dispersion will reflect more uncertainty because firms with different 
forecasts will make different decisions which in turn will lead to different outcomes. Survey-
derived cross-sectional businesses and consumers’ expectations over the future is another 
similar uncertainty proxy (Bachmann et al 2013). The idea is that economic agents will have 
(dis)similar expectations in periods of low (high) uncertainty as future developments will be 
more (less) predictable. Heterogeneity is the main shortcoming of these proxies though: rising 
dispersion might reflect idiosyncratic firms’ business activity or different prospects across the 
different sectors of the economy. Disagreement rather than uncertainty may also be an 
important factor in changes in survey-derived expectations’ dispersion (see Girardi and Reuter 
2017 for an attempt to disentangle between heterogeneity, disagreement and uncertainty using 
survey data dispersion).  
Third, disagreement among professional forecasters as measured by the cross-sectional 
point forecasts’ variance has been used another proxy for uncertainty (Abel et al 2016). Indeed, 
disagreement among forecasters would suggest that it is becoming more difficult to predict 
future economic developments because of the prevalent degree of uncertainty. However, 
disagreement may simply reflect differences in the underlying models used by the forecasters 
or different information sets and not heightened uncertainty for that matter.  
Fourth, realized forecast errors have been used to proxy for uncertainty. Jurado et al 
(2015, JLN hereafter) compute the conditional volatility of the unforecastable component of 
the future value of a very large range of variables and aggregate those individual volatilities 
into a single index. They thus create “objective” or model-based forecasts using a very large 
factor model. However, this approach implies that economic agents know perfectly the 
distribution of future shocks. Jo and Sekkel (2019) somewhat lessen this problem by resorting 
to subjective forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). They define 
macroeconomic uncertainty as the conditional time-varying standard deviation of a factor that 
is common to the forecast errors for various macroeconomic indicators from the SPF27.  
 
27 Alternatively, Scotti’s (2016) uncertainty index is the weighted sum of the squared forecast errors, computed as 




Finally, several papers have relied on the density distribution of forecasts provided by 
the SPF to compute volatility-based proxies. Abel et al (2016) have constructed two proxies for 
ex ante uncertainty, namely the average variance and the median interquartile range of 
individual density forecasts. Rossi et al (2020) and Soupre (2018) show that ex ante uncertainty 
is a function of the variance of the aggregate forecast density distribution (which is the average 
of the individual forecast density distributions). However, their decomposition relies on the 
assumption of the normality of forecasts. More generally, there is another problem when using 
the SPF’s forecast density distributions since the probability ranges defined in the SPF truncate 
extreme events and thus do not pay enough attention to tail risk. As a consequence, they 
reproduce very partial probability density functions. 
 
While there are specific problems attached to each of these proxies, there is a more 
fundamental issue with volatility-based proxies. By relying on the standard-deviation of some 
exogenous aggregates or idiosyncratic variables, they discount the risks coming from the tails 
of the distribution, thus potentially missing an important driver of uncertainty. Standard 
deviation is indeed a relevant moment if the probability density function of shocks is Gaussian 
since 95% of the data would fall within two standard deviations around the mean. But looking 
at the standard deviation (and the mean) of a probability distribution provides very few 
information about the shape (and the tails) of the density distribution if this distribution is non-
normal. In addition, volatility-based proxies are symmetric and an increase in uncertainty may 
thus only poorly inform about downside risk. 
As a matter of fact, several scholars have used full density functions to proxy 
uncertainty. Following Adrian et al’s (2019) work on expected distribution of GDP growth, 
Forni et al (2021) compute downside uncertainty as the difference between the median and the 
10th percentile, upside uncertainty as the difference between the 90th percentile and the median, 
and total uncertainty as the sum of the two. Using forecast errors, Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) 
have constructed a proxy that is the unconditional cumulative distribution function of observed 
forecast errors from the SPF. If an observed forecast error falls into an extreme percentile of 
the distribution, then uncertainty is deemed to be higher. They also distinguish between upside 
and downside uncertainty28. 
 
28 See also Ferreira (2018) who proxies uncertainty as financial skewness by comparing the cross-sectional 
upside and downside risks of the distribution of stock market returns of financial firms; or Salgado et al (2019) 




Some other authors have focused on disaster risk, i.e. the risk of extreme left tail events. 
This risk is generally calibrated following Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursua (2008). In Barro 
(2006), the probability and size distribution of disaster events was gauged from time series on 
real per capita GDP for 35 countries for the full twentieth century and where a macroeconomic 
disaster is defined as a decline in real per capita GDP by at least 15 percent over consecutive 
years. Barro and Ursua (2008) update Barro’s (2006) approach by correcting errors and filling 
in gaps in Maddison’s GDP data, as well as construct an analogous data set of consumption 
declines for 21 countries for which they had consistent data. Two limitations of this approach 
are that it assumes that that the underlying probability distributions are reasonably similar 
across countries, as well as roughly stable over time (Barro 2009). In the next section, we will 
present the so-called Growth-at-Risk approach developed by Adrian et (2018) that allows to 
construct time-varying and country-specific disaster risk proxies in a rather parsimonious way. 
 
3. Measuring disaster risk 
 
3.1. Defining disaster risk 
 
Before describing how we compute our disaster risk proxy, let us first define more formally 
what we mean by disaster risk. In line with Orlik and Veldkamp (2014), we define disaster risk 
as the probability of occurrence of an extreme left tail event. Disaster risk is the conditional 
probability of the annualized average growth rate of GDP between 𝑡 and 𝑡 +  ℎ, 𝑦𝑡+ℎ, falling 
more than a certain threshold 𝑥𝑖 




Following Orlik and Veldkamp (2014), we set 𝑥𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 − 4.2𝜎𝑖 where 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜎𝑖 are respectively 
the realized mean and standard deviation of annualized quarterly GDP growth compute from 
1972Q1 to 2019Q3 (1992Q1 to 2019Q3 for Germany). If the annualized average growth rate 
of GDP between 𝑡 and 𝑡 +  ℎ, 𝑦𝑡+ℎ, were normally distributed, Pr(𝑦𝑡+ℎ ≤ 𝑥𝑖|ℒ𝑡) would 






3.2. Computing a disaster risk proxy 
 
To operationalise our disaster risk proxy, we rely on the Growth-at-Risk (GaR) methodology 
(see Adrian et al 2019) which is a relatively easy and parsimonious way to fit expected 
conditional density functions of future GDP growth. We focus on real GDP growth since 
changes in GDP are indicative of the state of the business cycle and as such inform 
macroeconomic uncertainty (Stock and Watson 1998, Soupre 2018, Rossi and Sekhposyan 
2015). 
The GaR approach has two steps. The first step is to estimate the quantile function of 
future GDP growth29. Quantile regressions are thus estimated across different quantiles of the 
distribution (every 5 quantiles from the 5th to 95th quantiles) and over two horizons ℎ, 
respectively one-quarter and one-year ahead. The quantile regression takes the following 
specification 
𝑦𝜏,𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼𝜏 + 𝛽𝜏,𝐹𝐶𝐼𝑋𝐹𝐶𝐼,𝑡 + 𝛽𝜏,𝐺𝑋𝐺,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+ℎ 
where 𝑦𝑡+ℎ is the annualized average growth rate of GDP between 𝑡 and 𝑡 +  ℎ, 𝑋𝐹𝐶𝐼,𝑡 and 𝑋𝐺,𝑡, 
represent the financial conditions index (FCI), current quarterly annualised real GDP growth 
(as a control), respectively30. The estimated coefficients 𝛽𝜏 measure the respective effect of the 
different regressors at quantile 𝜏 and for the different forecasting horizons. The quantile 
function is defined as  
?̂?𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝑥𝑡(𝜏|𝑥𝑡) = 𝑥𝑡?̂?𝜏 
with 𝑥𝑡 denoting the vector of conditioning variables and ?̂?𝜏 the quantile 𝜏 specific matrix of 
estimated coefficients.  
As a second step, the quantile function ?̂?𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝑥𝑡 is smoothed to recover a full probability 
density function by fitting the skewed t-distribution developed by Azzalini and Capitanio 
(2003). The parameters – mean 𝜇, volatility 𝜎, skewness 𝜃, and kurtosis 𝜈 – of the skewed t-
distribution are chosen so that they minimize the squared loss between the estimated quantile 
function and the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of the skewed t-distribution for 
the 5th, 25th, 75th and 95th quantiles 
 
29 Adrian et al’s (2019) replication code is available here 
https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/113169/version/V1/view?path=/openicpsr/113169/fcr:versions/V1 





{?̂?𝑡+ℎ, ?̂?𝑡+ℎ, 𝜃𝑡+ℎ, ?̂?𝑡+ℎ} = argmin
𝜇,𝜎,𝜃,𝜈
∑(?̂?𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝑥𝑡,𝜏 − 𝐹𝜏




The conditional probability density function 𝑓𝑡+ℎ is eventually recovered by shaping the 
probability density function of the skewed t-distribution, 𝑡(. ), by its cumulative distribution 
function, 𝑇(. ), and the skewness parameter, 𝜃 
 
























 Using this approach, we construct disaster risk proxies for 12 advanced economies at 
the one-quarter and one-year horizon from 1972Q1 to 2019Q3 (from 1992Q1 to 2019Q3 for 
Germany). 
Figures 1a and 1b report the evolution of the one-quarter and one-year ahead country-
specific disaster risk proxies. First, beyond the country-specific factors behind the fluctuations 
in disaster risk, we generally identify a peak around 2008, around the Lehman bankruptcy. For 
Eurozone countries, like Spain, France or Italy, we also identify another peak around the 
Eurozone crisis. Second, disaster risk at the one-year ahead horizon displays much more 
variability than disaster risk at the one-quarter ahead horizon. These spikes in disaster risk are 
the consequences of financial stress increasing by end-2008 as well as fall in output that enters 
the regression with a lag, thereby fanning out the expected conditional density distribution of 
GDP growth around that time. 
In figure 2, we compare our disaster risk proxies with realized stock volatility, a 
commonly used proxy for uncertainty. For that matter, our disaster risk proxies identify periods 
of high uncertainty that are different from stock volatility. Notice that the uncertainty peak of 









Figure 1a. One-Quarter Ahead Disaster Risk (%) 
 






Figure 2. Disaster Risk and Realized Stock Volatility 
 
Notes: The blue (green) solid line plots the one-quarter (one-year) ahead disaster 
risk proxy; the red dashed line plots realized stock volatility. Series are standardized. 
 
Notice that our proxy is constructed in an ex post manner since we are using final data 
to construct them. We do so for a very practical reason, namely data availability. Proxying 
disaster risk in real time would require vintages for all the time series that are required to 
construct the proxies. This data may exist for some countries and/or for some time series but 
not for all. As a consequence, using real-time proxies for tail risk would restrict the scope of 
our analysis. Our proxy is also objective because we use actual GDP data and not forecast 









In this section, we estimate the macroeconomic effects of disaster risk shocks. We estimate a 
k-variate panel 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑝) model using quarterly data over the largest period for which there is 
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and the variance-covariance matrix is given by 𝛴𝑡 = (
𝛴𝑐 0 ⋯
0  𝛴𝑐 ⋯
⋮ ⋮ ⋱





) = 𝛴𝑐⊗ 𝐼𝑁, Σc 
being time invariant and common to all units. Taking the transposes and stacking over the 
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⋮ ⋱ ⋮



















     
and  ℇ ~ 𝑁(0, Σ̅) with Σ̅ = Σc⨂𝐼𝑁𝑇. 
We estimate this model for N = 12 countries, namely Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States and from 1997Q1 to 2019Q3 because of data availability constraints. In the 
existing uncertainty literature, VAR models are generally performed at a monthly frequency 
and include 12 lags. Since we are using quarterly data, we have decided to use 4 lags. In 
addition, the panel VAR is estimated using Bayesian methods in order to avoid overfitting 
 
31 We use the BEAR toolbox developed by Legrand, Dieppe and van Roye (2018) to run our VAR models. For 




because of the rather short time series we use. Specifically, a traditional normal-Wishart 
identification strategy is adopted. The prior for 𝛽 is assumed to be multivariate normal while 
Σ𝑐 has an inverse Wishart distribution with scale 𝑆0 and degrees of freedom 𝛼0 
 
𝛽~𝒩(𝛽0, Σ𝑐⨂Φ0) 
Σ𝑐  ~ 𝐼𝑊(𝑆0, 𝛼0) 
 
For 𝛽0, a conventional Minnesota scheme is adopted, setting values around 1 for own 
first lag coefficients, and 0 for cross variable and exogenous coefficients. Φ0 is a (𝑝 × 𝑝) 
diagonal matrix defined with two different types of variance terms on its main diagonal. For 












2 is the unknown residual variance for variable 𝑗 in the panel Bayesian VAR model. 𝜎𝑗
2 
is estimated by pooling the samples for variable j over units 1, 2, … ,𝑁 and then estimating an 
autoregressive model over this pooled series. For exogenous variables (the constants and 




The value of the hyperparameters 𝜆1 to 𝜆4 are set in accordance with standard values 
commonly used in the literature32. Furthermore, a Gibbs sampling approach is employed to 
generate draws of 𝛽 and Σ𝑐 from their respective marginal posterior distribution. We collect 
5000 draws by storing every 10th draw to avoid potential autocorrelation across draws, after 
discarding the first 10,000 draws of parameters33.  
In the existing literature on the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty, two Cholesky 
decompositions are generally used, that of Bloom (2009) and that of Jurado et al (2015). In 
Bloom (2009), stock prices are ordered first, followed by the proxy for uncertainty, then by 
prices (interest rates and consumer prices) and quantities (employment and investment). This 
decomposition gives some puzzling assumptions. For instance, inflation can react 
 
32 𝜆1 = 0.1; 𝜆2 = 0.5; 𝜆3 = 1; 𝜆4 = 100 
33 For more information about the specifics of the Bayesian methods used in this paper, please refer to the 




instantaneously to a rate hike, at a monthly frequency while stock prices cannot react 
instantaneously to any other shocks. 
In Jurado et al (2015), investment is ordered first, followed by employment and 
consumption, then by prices, wages and interest rates, and finally by stocks, the growth rate of 
M2 and the proxy for uncertainty. Here, the structural identification goes from slow- to fast-
moving variables with the assumption that slow-moving variables should not be responding 
contemporaneously to shocks on fast-moving variables. But as for Bloom’s (2009) 
decomposition, there are some inconsistent theoretical assumptions here again. For instance, 
stock prices cannot react instantaneously to uncertainty shocks. Or inflation reacts 
instantaneously to an investment or an employment shock despite evidence that prices are sticky 
in practice. Again, this assumption is all the more puzzling since the decomposition is originally 
sets up with monthly data.  























































Where 𝐶𝑃𝐼 is the log of the consumer price index, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is our disaster risk 
proxy (see section 3), 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the log of the gross fixed capital formation excluding 




is the log of total hours worked per worker, 𝑆𝑆𝑅 is the shadow short rate34 and 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 is the 
log of stock prices, in addition to a deterministic trend and a constant. 
Both specifications share three main assumptions. The first assumption is that 
macroeconomic variables should not react contemporaneously to monetary shocks in line with 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). The second assumption is that inflation should never 
react contemporaneously to a shock, because of the common empirical evidence of nominal 
rigidities. The third assumption is that stock prices should always react contemporaneously to 
a shock. But the two decompositions differ with regard to the ordering of the disaster risk 
proxies. At a quarterly frequency, it is plausible that macroeconomic variables may not 
contemporaneously to uncertainty shocks. In the baseline specification, the VAR-8 model, we 
assume that uncertainty shocks affect instantaneously macroeconomic variables (except 
inflation) and policy variables. Still, ordering the proxy for uncertainty in the second place 
implies that uncertainty reacts instantaneously to an inflation shock but reacts only with a lag 
to other macroeconomic variables. This is a debatable assumption that we therefore release in 
the inverse VAR-8 specification by placing the proxy for uncertainty just before stock prices.  
Figures 4a and 4b show the dynamic responses of investment to disaster risk shocks in 
respectively the VAR-8 and inverse VAR-8 models, using our panel of 12 advanced economies 
from 1997Q1 to 2019Q3. Figures 4a and 4b report the median impulse responses of investment 
to a one point of percentage increase in disaster risk as well as the 68 and 95 percent credibility 
intervals for both specifications. Our results suggest that disaster risk shocks have significant 
negative effects on investment under the VAR-8 specification with one-year ahead shocks 
having more and longer impact, up to 1.5%, than one-quarter ahead shocks. Under the inverse 










34 Following Krippner (2013), the shadow short rate (SSR) seeks to measure the accommodation in 




Figure 3a.  IRFs of Investment to one-quarter ahead Disaster Risk Shocks 
  
Notes: the chart plots the median response of investment to a one unit impulse on disaster risk. The dark and 
light shaded areas indicate the 68% and 95% posterior probability regions, respectively. The left (right) panel 
plots the IRF of investment under the (inverse) VAR-8 specification. 
 
Figure 3b. IRFs of Investment to one-year ahead Disaster Risk shocks 
 
Notes: the chart plots the median response of investment to a one unit impulse on disaster risk. 
The dark and light shaded areas indicate the 68% and 95% posterior probability regions, 
respectively. The left (right) panel plots the IRF of investment under the (inverse) VAR-8 
specification. 
 
We also report the economic importance of disaster risk shocks in figure 4a and 4b. The 




attributable to disaster risk under the VAR-8 and inverse VAR-8 model for both horizons.  
Disaster risk shocks explain a larger part of fluctuations in investment under the VAR-8 model 
with one-year ahead disaster risk shocks having more quantitative impact the one-quarter ahead 
risk shocks. 
 
Figure 4a. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of one-quarter ahead Disaster Risk shocks  
  
Notes: The black solid lines plot the respective median estimate of the portion of the forecast error variance of 
investment at that is attributable to a 1 unit shock on disaster risk. The dark and light shaded areas indicate the 
68% and 95% posterior probability regions, respectively. The left (right) panel plots the FEVD of investment 






















Notes: The black solid lines plot the respective median estimate of the portion of the forecast error variance of 
investment at that is attributable to a 1 unit shock on disaster risk. The dark and light shaded areas indicate the 
68% and 95% posterior probability regions, respectively. The left (right) panel plots the FEVD of investment 
under the (inverse) VAR-8 specification.
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
The aim of this paper is to explain why investment in advanced economies has taken so long to 
recover from the Great Recession and Eurozone crisis. By focusing on uncertainty, we have 
taken the footsteps of an important number of scholars who have identified uncertainty as a 
relevant factor behind economic slump. However, unlike many, we have created a new proxy 
for uncertainty by relying on disaster risk rather than on a volatility. Indeed, volatility-based 
proxies may fail to account an important source of uncertainty coming from the tails of a 
distribution since volatility is appropriate to describe the distribution of a variable only if that 
variable is normally distributed.  
To compute our proxy for disaster risk, we have thus relied on the novel GaR approach 
of Adrian et al (2019) that links financial conditions to macroeconomic fragility. Our proxy 
identify periods of high uncertainty that are different from realized stock volatility. We find that 
one-year ahead disaster risk shocks have more impact on investment than one-quarter ahead 
shocks. However, the results are not conclusive since the degree of significance depends on the 
way the empirical model is specified. 
Still, the methodology proposed here can be seen as a first step in evaluating the effect 
of time-varying country-specific disaster risk. It can be used in other applications and with other 
purposes. In addition, it is necessary to think more thoroughly about the features that a good 
(but imperfect) proxy for uncertainty should have. Should it be based on a subjective indicator, 
be forward-looking, constructed in real-time? In any case, this methodology has the advantage 














The overarching objective of this thesis was to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
Eurozone crisis: how from a political crisis, the Eurozone experienced both a financial and an 
economic crises? We have argued that the economic conditions inherited from the 2000s has 
greatly influenced the political conflict between Eurozone member states. We have also 
demonstrated that uncertainty was a potential channel of transmission that allowed the political 
crisis to evolve into a financial and an economic crises. 
In this final chapter, we aim at summarising our main findings, highlight the main 
contributions as well as limitations of our dissertation. Finally, we outline some avenues for 
further research. 
 
1. Summary and contribution of the dissertation 
 
The first paper studies the political dimension of the crisis and in particular how the division 
between debtor and creditor countries has influenced the political conflict. We focus on the 
Greek crisis and in particular on the negotiations over the third Greek bailout. We challenge the 
mainstream understanding of the negotiations as predictable or unsurprising and doomed to be 
won by the Europeans. We argue that outside options, domestic constraints and formal voting 
rules have played, by themselves, only a minor role. On the contrary, we show that double-
sided incomplete information is necessary to explain both the outcome and dynamics of the 
negotiations. To make our case, we create a two-player game-theoretical dynamic model 
integrating three main features of the negotiations, namely the shadow of default, the presence 
of double-sided incomplete information and the exchange of costly signals with a time limit in 
the negotiations. In the game, the two players, the Europeans and the Greeks, exchange signals 
over their willingness to run the risk of a Graccident. All in all, our theoretical game suggests 
the outcome of the negotiations is hard to predict. This is the one of the main lessons of our 
game. In addition, following the logic the model, we argue that Greece could have increased its 
chance of getting a better deal by being more aggressive. 
 
The second paper investigates the feedback effect of political uncertainty on financial 
markets. We have thus constructed a comprehensive new dataset that covers most policy 
developments during the Greek and Eurozone crisis. We have relied on the Reuters Factiva 
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database and complemented it with Eurointelligence daily reports, in order not to miss any 
relevant piece of news. One of the features of our dataset is that it tries to deal with some of the 
limitations that have been highlighted in the literature about the endogeneity and credibility of 
political communication. To minimise the potential endogeneity of political statements, we 
identify and exclude those statements that we suspect were made firstly as reaction to market 
swings and that have only limited informational content. For the credibility issue, we have 
excluded political assurances especially those from Greek policy-makers. After this cleaning 
phase, we thus end up with a dataset of more than 5800 new items.  Each piece of news has 
then been coded manually along different dimensions: positive vs negative, Greek-specific vs 
Eurozone wide. These categories are quite common. Our dataset differs from other dataset 
insofar as we differentiate between soft and hard news, the former being simply pieces of news 
informing about future policy while the latter are actual policy decisions and other events. These 
categories in turn allowed us to determine whether the hard news were expected or not, using 
previous soft news to determine anticipations. To assess the effect of political uncertainty on 
Greek sovereign spreads, we rely on Exponential GARCH(1,1) models that correct for serial 
correlation, skewness, and time-varying volatility of the data. In terms of research design, we 
have no prior testable theoretical predictions because the theoretical literature on the effect 
political uncertainty on financial markets is quite limited. We rather use the information 
embedded in our dataset to answer several questions. Our main result is that financial markets 
did react extremely strongly to unexpected positive decisions and events. Unexpected positive 
news have more impact in absolute terms than unexpected negative news. Our results are also 
consistent with the asymmetric effect of news commonly reported in the existing literature as 
financial markets were sensitive to negative news as a whole (decisions, events and political 
communication). The daily number of Greek-specific negative developments (excluding 
decisions and events) has widened Greek spreads as well while we find no such effect for 
positive developments.  
 
The third and final paper estimates the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty. It tries to 
explain the slow recovery of investment in Eurozone countries and beyond. As such, it 
investigates the real effect of political and financial developments. Numerous proxies for 
uncertainty have been developed following the Great Recession precisely to explain the 
protracted slump in investment in advanced economies. Many of them have been constructed 
as volatility-based indicators. Since those proxies may discount uncertainty from the 
distribution’s tails, we therefore compute a new disaster risk proxy defined as the cumulative 
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probability of GDP falling behind a certain threshold building on the novel GaR approach 
developed by Adrian et al (2019). The GaR methodology is a relatively parsimonious way to 
compute conditional density functions as it requires only two steps. First, we estimate the 
quantile function of future GDP growth with quantile regressions. Second, we smooth the 
quantile function to recover a full probability density function by fitting the skewed t-
distribution. We apply this approach to obtain one-quarter and one-year ahead proxies for 12 
advanced economies that identify periods of acute uncertainty that are quite different from stock 
volatility, a common proxy for uncertainty. We then estimate the macroeconomic effects of 
disaster risk shocks using Bayesian panel structural VAR models with structural shocks being 
identified through two Cholesky decompositions. We find no conclusive evidence on the effect 
of disaster risk on investment. 
 
2. Implications of this dissertation 
 
This dissertation has several implications. While the model developed in paper 1 may not be 
generalizable as it is, it nevertheless demonstrates that informational asymmetries do play an 
important role in negotiations. And this has implications for the scholarly work on 
intergovernmental bargaining in the EU (Schneider and Cederman 1994, Hug and König 2002, 
König and Slapin 2006, Thomson et al. 2006, Slapin 2008 and 2011, Finke et al 2012, 
Wasserfallen et al 2019) and in particular for Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998, 
Schimmelfennig 2015, LI hereafter). Indeed, for Moravcsik (1998), informational asymmetries 
do not play a central role in interstate negotiations because states are the main beneficiaries of 
integration and as such have incentives in sharing information: transaction costs for generating 
information are low compared to the benefits of interstate cooperation. For him, asymmetrical 
interdependence on its own explains most of the distribution of gains from cooperation. 
However, and possibly because Moravcsik (1998) wanted to substantially demark himself from 
supranational theory in which supranational entrepreneurs affect bargaining outcomes precisely 
through their privileged access to information (see also Thomson et al 2006), he might have 
discounted the strategic use of information altogether. He might have made this assumption 
also because LI was developed at a time where European integration was mainly about market 
integration. In that context, distributive conflicts were thus relatively limited. At least, 
disagreement over market integration can be settled on the basis of the largest common multiple 
as argued by Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2017). As a consequence, LI develops a power-based 
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analysis of interstate negotiations where information asymmetry does not affect bargaining 
power. It is simply the state that has more to lose from non-cooperation that has less bargaining 
power. 
This understanding of interstate bargaining is different though from Rational Choice 
Institutionalism (RCI) where information is an important determinant of bargaining power 
(Schneider and Ershova 2018). For instance, Schneider and Cederman (1994) show that  
informational asymmetries significantly may affect a stakeholder’s bargaining power (see also 
Iida 1993). Still, when informational asymmetries have been used by scholars, they have 
generally done so in two-level game frameworks and have focused on the ratification process 
(Hug and Schulz 2007, Walter et al 2016, Pahre 2006).  
Our paper though is much more focused on the effect of informational asymmetries on 
the “exit game” to use the words of Schneider and Cederman (1994). As far as the international 
dimension of bargaining is concerned, the role of informational asymmetries has been under 
researched as the preferences of negotiators have generally been assumed to be sincere in EU 
studies. This is the case for instance in the special issue edited by Wasserfallen et al (2019) 
which studies, among other things, interstate bargaining during the Eurozone crisis. In addition 
to Moravcsik (1998), Bailer (2004 and 2011) explain that EU actors usually hold sincere 
preferences because of the nature of the EU as a forum for policy-makers. Studying Council of 
Ministers negotiations, she shows that for day-to-day legislative procedure, “the shadow of the 
future” induces ministers to hold sincere preferences, much like in a repeated game framework. 
Frequent interactions within the EU institutional framework thus make exchanges of 
information more efficient and limit extreme position-taking. On the contrary, exceptional 
bargains, i.e. when salience is high, are more likely to exhibit strategic moves. 
Yet, this finding (or assumption) may not hold anymore and will hold less and less in 
the future. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2013) have indeed showed that European integration 
has reached core state powers, in particular since the Eurozone crisis. And as integration 
proceeds within core state powers, distributive conflicts become more likely and more acute.  
But unlike with market integration, disagreement cannot always be easily settled. This is all the 
more true for the Eurozone as the Eurozone crisis has demonstrated that risk-sharing 
mechanisms are necessary for the single currency to properly function (Schelkle 2017). And 
the elaboration of risk-sharing mechanisms requires to determine who pays and who benefits 
from the joint resources. 
For that matter, distributive conflicts, and even if states have an interest in reaping 
mutual gains from cooperation, may induce them to use information strategically in order to 
102 
 
manipulate their counterparts’ perception of the asymmetric interdependence relationship and 
thus obtain a larger (lower) share of the distributional gains (losses) (see Fearon 1995). Indeed, 
in distributive conflicts, as opposed to integrative ones, information is generally seen as a first-
order strategic asset in the hands of the negotiators in order to move the negotiations to their 
own advantage. However, existing analyses of the politics of the crisis have hardly studied the 
role of information asymmetry beyond the very few papers that we have mentioned in paper 1. 
This paper thus try to fill this gap. What is more, we also show that the use of double-sided 
incomplete information does not lead to over-complex models and as such it should induce 
scholars to generalise its use when necessary. 
 
The second paper contributes to the existing literature on the effect of news on financial 
markets in methodological, conceptual and empirical terms. Methodologically, our paper tries 
to address some of the main limitations of existing news datasets that may undermine the 
reliability of the econometric results, in particular the problem of endogeneity of political 
communication. This is a problem that has been identified by many authors (see inter alia 
Blinder et al 2008, Ehrmann et al 2013, Büchel 2013, Collignon et al 2013) but that has not 
been systematically treated. And when authors have done it, they have generally used statistical 
fixes by choosing dependent variables that would have been more immune to endogeneity that 
others (see Erhmann et al 2013 for instance) or by resorting to Granger causality tests (see 
Collignon et al 2013). On the contrary, we have tried to think of endogeneity in more conceptual 
terms by arguing that the endogeneity problem may come down to an informational content 
problem. In addition to this endogeneity problem, existing papers can also be quite opaque over 
the way news datasets are constructed: news datasets are often “black boxes.” This may 
undermine the confidence one may have in the results. This is why we have been extremely 
clear, transparent and exhaustive about what is inside our dataset and how we have coded news. 
Our main conceptual contribution in the paper rests on the difference that we make 
between expected and unexpected news. According to the efficient market hypothesis, a piece 
of news that has been expected by financial market is no news and should not affect the markets.  
Still, very few papers have tried to test this prediction and identify news that were expected and 
those that were unexpected (Kim and Willett 2004 for a wide range of news types, Kim et al 
2004 for scheduled announcements), beyond macroeconomic news releases that is (see 
Caporale et al 2018). As far as the Eurozone crisis is concerned, we are not aware of any paper 




This coding refinement has important empirical consequences that affect the analysis of 
the financial markets’ behaviour during the crisis. By differentiating between expected and 
unexpected news, we find that financial markets did react to positive news, when they were 
unexpected. Our results are also consistent with the asymmetric effect of news commonly 
reported in the existing literature. Büchel (2013), Haupenthal and Neuenkirch (2017), Bird Du 
and Willett (2017), Conrad and Zumbach (2016) find such an effect during the Eurozone crisis 
period when differentiating between positive and negative news.  
Still, this implies that the existing interpretations of a negative bias in the markets is not 
entirely warranted. If we solely identify the asymmetric effect of news on markets, that may be 
consequence of confirmation bias or loss aversion, whatever European policy-makers might 
have done to solve the crisis would never have been sufficient. Since the negative bias of 
financial markets somewhat disempowers policy-makers, the same policy-makers can rightly 
shift the blame to financial markets for unwarranted financial stress. Our results rather show 
that policy-makers had a responsibility in the development of financial stress during the 
Eurozone crisis. 
Our findings contradict that of Büchel (2013) or Mohl and Sondermann (2013), as they 
indicate that political communication had at best a weak effect on Greek sovereign spreads. It 
is not so much uncertainty stemming from contradictory political statements, i.e. political noise, 
that has affected Greek sovereign spreads but rather the whole media feeding frenzy. Finally, 
our results differ from Collignon et al (2013) who find that volatility had an effect on the mean 
change in the Greek spreads as we find no such effect in a robust way. 
 
Paper 3 has implications for the literature on the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty 
following Bloom (2009) and the literature on disaster risk following Barro (2006). With regard 
to the first literature, the main implication of the paper has to do with the measurement of 
uncertainty as we focus on disaster risk rather than a volatility-based proxy for uncertainty that 
may discount uncertainty coming from the distributions’ tails. Our focus on the distributions’ 
tails to proxy uncertainty is not unique though as some authors have relied on the full density 
functions of relevant variables, like Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015)35 who proxy uncertainty as 
the ex post comparison between a forecast error and the ex ante unconditional distribution of 
forecast errors. The use of forecast errors for proxying uncertainty is problematic as it is by 
nature backward-looking while economic decision-making is forward-looking (this criticism 
 
35 Also notice Ferreira (2018) who proxies (financial) uncertainty as the cross-sectional skewness of the 
distribution of log returns.  
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also holds for Jurado et al 2015). For that matter, our approach is very similar to that of Forni 
et al (2021). While our proxy as well as that of Forni et al (2021) are constructed ex post, the 
GaR approach is flexible enough to allow for the construction of ex ante proxies (see Caldara, 
Cascaldi-Garcia, Cuba-Borda, and Loria 2020 or Lopez-Salido and Loria 2019). The only 
requirement to do so is the availability of real-time data and vintages. In addition, as rightly 
noted by Scotti (2016: 16): “Agents base decisions on their perceived uncertainty rather than 
an objective uncertainty that they do not observe.” It may thus be preferable to construct 
uncertainty proxies using subjective data such as surveys or forecasts instead of constructing 
objective forecasts as in Jurado et al (2015). Here again, the GaR approach may be instrumental. 
Lastly, our approach is interesting for the literature on disaster risk because we can 
compute relatively parsimoniously country-specific and time-varying indicators of disaster risk, 
thus offering a potential solution to deal with one of the limitations of this literature. 
 
From this dissertation, we may also draw two general policy-oriented lessons. Paper 1 
shows (indirectly) that policy-making is indeed a source (out of many) of uncertainty that may 
affect financial markets and the real economy (papers 2 and 3). Financial conditions are also an 
important element contributing to macroeconomic uncertainty (paper 3). When taken together, 
the findings from the three papers would signal that policy-makers should simultaneously 
constrain themselves to more discipline (through more rules and less discretion?) and design 
policies that minimise as much as possible uncertainty. For instance, with regard to the latter, 
financial regulations and macroprudential policies have been developed in the wake of the 
Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone crisis to contain financial uncertainty. We will not 
elaborate on this dimension that has already attracted much attention. On the contrary, we would 
like to reflect on the wider implications of uncertainty for policy-making.  
First, does policy-induced uncertainty make more policy rules desirable? The simple 
fact that policy-making or politics can be a source of uncertainty should not be the alibi for the 
creation of more policy rules and ever less discretion – as many economists would surely 
advocate. This view of the world is extremely short-sighted as it assumes that politics is simply 
a noise that impedes the economy from functioning well. This tendency of economists to treat 
politics simply as a disturbing factor was particularly acute during the Eurozone crisis as 
economists have generally blamed politics to be the cause of suboptimal collective management 
of the crisis (Baldwin and Giavazzi 2015). On the contrary, as noted by Matthijs and Blyth 
(2015:7), it is precisely “complicated bargains and distributive politics that make integrated 
markets and a single currency possible in the first place and assure its sustainability over the 
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long term.” And simply assuming away all politics by taking a “what is to be done” view of the 
world will not help improving economic stability in the Eurozone (and elsewhere). 
Second, should policy-makers always aim at systematically minimising uncertainty? 
Possibly not. Even though our findings and other existing findings show that uncertainty is 
harmful for the economy, uncertainty may also be a necessity. To see how, it may be insightful 
to reflect on Taleb’s (2012) concept of antifragility. Taleb (2012) argues that systems can either 
be fragile, robust or antifragile. Fragility is the property of a system to collapse under stress and 
is commonly contrasted to robustness that is the ability to be indifferent to stress. Robustness 
may be appropriate for normal times disruptions but may fail to resist to extreme events though. 
Taleb (2012) explains that the exact opposite of fragility is antifragility rather than robustness. 
Antifragile systems indeed benefit from uncertainty and disorder. A system that is antifragile 
uses stressors of rather moderate levels to improve itself and be able to resist stronger shocks 
later.  
As a matter of fact, and as the Great Moderation has demonstrated, aiming for maximum 
stability is not a panacea. While business cycles became less volatile during those years thanks 
to a systematic micromanagement of the economy, the virtual elimination of uncertainty has 
rendered the economy more fragile in the long-run by fostering the creation of imbalances and 
systemic risk that prepared the ground for the Great Recession. Yet, pushed to its extreme, 
antifragility would imply perfect competition and full economic and political decentralization. 
This horizon may be politically unfeasible but more importantly politically undesirable. As a 
consequence and while antifragility is theoretically appealable, it remains to be seen how this 
may apply to policy-making: how can policy-makers ever measure uncertainty correctly and 
control it? What level of uncertainty would be efficient or desirable for the economy? When 




Through the three papers of this dissertation, we cover only fragments of the three dimensions 
of the Eurozone crisis. This may thus limit the scope of our findings in explaining the different 
dynamics at play during the Eurozone crisis. For instance, we focus on the third Greek bailout 
negotiations to illustrate the political conflict at the heart of the Eurozone crisis. One may rightly 
argue that the Eurozone crisis was way broader than the Greek bailouts. The political conflict 
over the reform of the governance was another important dimension of the political crisis. In 
addition, the Greek crisis may not be used to analyse developments in other peripheral 
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countries. Greece was in all likelihood insolvent while this was not the case of Spain and 
Ireland.  Can our model thus still apply to those countries? What is more, our model integrate 
double-sided incomplete information as a specific and central feature of the third Greek bailout 
negotiations. Has incomplete information been so important in other negotiations? 
Alternatively, can we use this model to analyse future debt negotiations in the aftermath of the 
Covid-19 crisis? Similar remarks can be made with regard to our analysis of the effect of 
political uncertainty on financial markets. We indeed only focus on one type of asset and for 
only one country. As for the political model, would our findings hold for other assets and for 
other countries? How would have the euro dollar exchange rate reacted? What of country-
specific stock returns, bank and corporate bonds? What of other peripheral sovereign spreads’ 
response to policy developments? 
What is more, each paper has its own specific limitations due to the variety in the 
research designs, methodologies applied and data used. In paper 1, the main limitation concerns 
the simplifying assumptions that we need to make in order to create a sufficiently parsimonious 
game-theoretical model. Indeed, we assume that Europeans can be modelled as a unitary actor. 
This assumption may result in underestimating the heterogeneity of the creditors having 
generally different motives and preferences. 
For the second paper, it is the manual coding procedure that may limit the reliability of 
the results.  The coding procedure is highly context-dependent, making the coding extremely 
dynamic. But in the meantime, it is subjective and thus we cannot rule out wrong classification 
in some cases. To mitigate this problem, at least we have tried to be as transparent and 
exhaustive as possible on the coding procedure, giving every possible insights into our 
procedure. In addition, and while  the volume of data that we are dealing with remains 
manageable for performing a manual coding review, going fully through the dataset may be 
very time-consuming. As a consequence,  we could have not applied the common standard of 
content analysis to the letter (Holsti 1969) by having different individuals coding the news. 
Still, we have tried to be as consistent as possible for coding equivalent news items but coding 
errors remain a possibility. Finally, it would also have been interesting the estimate the effect 
of political uncertainty on financial markets after July 2012 and up until the time when Greece 
left its bailout programme in 2018. 
In paper 3, the main limitation has to do with data availability. It would have been 
optimal to have real-time GDP forecasts as well as data vintages for each country included in 
the panel in order to create both subjective and real-time tail risk proxies. One should also 
mention the inherent shortcomings of the Growth-at-Risk approach. As the GaR methodology 
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relies on quantile regressions to retrieve a conditional density function, the tails of a predictive 
density may be characterized with very few data points. We have tried to minimise this issue 
by using as long as possible time series. What is more, we could have extended the panel to 
include more countries: other Eurozone countries, other EU non- Eurozone or non-EU 
countries. 
 
4. Avenues for further research 
 
This dissertation offers several avenues for further research. First, one of the guiding principles 
of further research on the Eurozone crisis in particular and in European studies in general should 
be to integrate an interdisciplinary view of the problems. While such an agenda may face 
numerous barriers, such an approach would represent a significant added value. By fostering a 
dialogue between economists and political scientists, scholars from both disciplines may 
develop better analyses and policy recommendations by integrating political and economic 
constraints. 
 It could be interesting to apply concepts from one discipline to another. For instance, it 
could be possible to approach the erratic management of the Eurozone crisis itself through the 
lenses of uncertainty. In the presence of uncertainty, economists have argued for a long time 
that there is an option value for delaying an investment decision because an investment 
generally has irreversible consequences. While waiting may come with a cost, it is an 
opportunity to gather more information about the return of a particular investment.  This is the 
so-called real option theory (Bernanke 1983, Dixit and Pindyck 1994, see Henry 1974 and 
Arrow 1968). With that perspective in mind, the kicking-the-can-down-the-road strategy used 
by European policy-makers throughout the crisis might have been a way for policy-makers to 
get more information before making irreversible decisions. Indeed, given the stickiness of 
European Union reforms, the assumption of irreversibility is plausible.  
We can go further in that direction and apply it to an even more specific case: the Greek 
bailouts. Why have Eurozone policy-makers decided to repeatedly bail out Greece with a 
massive debt relief while there was evidence the strategy was not working? We can see the first 
Greek bailout as an investment decision made by Eurozone policy-makers. If they had retreat 
from this initial investment once the first bailout failed to bring the expected outcome, by 
offering a massive debt relief to Greece for instance, they would have incurred non-recoverable 
sunk costs: they would have simply lost the money they had put in the Greek bailout. On the 
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contrary, by putting more money, they would have bought more time to have more information 
about the Greek fiscal problems.  
A second avenue for research would be to systematically study the different 
interlockings between the political, financial and economic dimensions of the Eurozone crisis 
through the uncertainty channel. Because of the breadth of the Eurozone crisis, we have only 
covered fragments of each of these three dimensions of the crisis. This dissertation can thus be 
read as a first step in reaching this ambitious objective. It would be thus quite logical to pursue 
this work by investigating each and every feedback loop between the political, financial and 
economic dimensions of the Eurozone crisis. It could also be interesting to further elaborate on 
the two feedback loops that we have analysed in order to deal with some limitations of the 
second and third papers. What is more, there could be more conceptual work on defining and 
measuring uncertainty as well as more theoretical work on the effect of tail risk on the one hand 
and political uncertainty on financial markets on the other. 
Third, it may be fruitful to elaborate more on the implications of paper 1 on the role 
played by informational asymmetries. For instance, one may study how laggard (in terms of 
integration will) or weak states have influenced integration in response to the Eurozone (or 
migration) crisis through their manipulation of information. 
Finally, it would be interesting to explore further how structural uncertainties 
surrounding the computation of estimates and forecasts may affect the reliability of any 
quantitative results and our approach to conventional probabilistic methods (see Taleb and 
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Appendix of Paper 1 
Appendix A – Summary of the negotiations 
 
In April 2014, Merkel refused to grant debt relief to the then Greek Prime Minister Samaras 
during their bilateral meeting in Athens. As Merkel’s decision likely signed  Samaras’ political 
death36, the refusal can be interpreted as a clear signal sent to Tsipras, who was poised to 
become the next Greek Prime Minister, that it would be counter-productive to seek a change in 
the terms of the adjustment program. In the meantime, Tsipras also raised the stakes by 
repeatedly pledging to oust the troika, to end austerity and obtain a major debt relief to Greek 
citizens would he get elected. And once elected, he allied, to most people’s surprise, with the 
far-right, anti-bailout Independent Greeks rather than team up with a centre-left, pro-bailout 
party such as To Potami.  
The negotiations started right after the elections as the second bailout was planned to 
end by end-February. As soon as January 30, only five days after the Greek elections, during 
the first bilateral meeting between the new Greek Finance Minister Varoufakis and Eurogroup’s 
Chair Dijsselbloem, the latter apparently, more or less implicitly, threatened Varoufakis with 
Grexit in the case Greece would decide to stop implementing the agreed program (Varoufakis 
2017, Dijsselbloem 2018, and Dendrinou and Varvitsioti 2019). During this encounter, 
Varoufakis also apparently threatened to default on the ECB if the Europeans refused to grant 
a debt relief to Greece. But shortly after that meeting, Tsipras sought to reassure his counterparts 
by publicly stating that Greece would honour his signature to the ECB and the IMF 
(Chrysoloras and Ruhe 2015). Few days later, on February 8, Thomas Wieser, the then head of 
the very influential EuroWorking Group, made Dijsselbloem’s implicit threat more explicit. He 
described to his Greek counterparts what would happen if Greece were to disagree with the 
Europeans’ terms and/or default to its creditors. If Greece were to follow such an 
uncompromising path, Greece would surely become some sort of “Venuezela-plus” outside of 
the eurozone (Dendrinou and Varvitsioti 2019).  
After two failed Eurogroup meetings in February where the Greeks refused to comply 
by the creditors’ terms, a deal was struck on February 20 to extend the second bailout by four 
months. The wording of the statement was ambiguous enough for the two sides to claim victory, 
 
36 Samaras’ political fate was tightly linked to his ability to renegotiate the terms of the loans (and eventually exit 
the program). In August 2012, few months after his election, Samaras invested almost all of his political capital 
when he decided to accept the terms of the bailout after meeting with Chancellor Merkel, making a U-turn on his 
previous electoral pledges. Securing a debt relief thus became a paramount objective for Samaras to obtain a return 
on his political investment. Samaras even devised a plan to exit the bailout earlier than expected as a last-ditch 
effort to save his position. But his idea was only met with scepticism in Berlin and in the financial markets (Brown 
and Papadimas 2014). 
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even if Greece made a major concession on the substance as Tsipras repeatedly pledged that he 
would never seek an extension of the existing program.  
On March 19, on the sides of a European Summit, key European leaders gathered with 
Tsipras for a special meeting on the Greek crisis. Their message to the Greek Prime Minister 
was clear-cut: the logic of the program cannot change and reforms are necessary for any 
financial support. The Greeks can have ownership of the reforms but they have to yield 
equivalent savings compared to those in the existing memorandum. Finally, the reforms must 
get the prior approval of the institutions. This message was in plain and clear wording the 
Europeans’ understanding of the February 20 deal (Dendrinou and Varvitsioti 2019).  
During Easter’s weekend, Greece was close from defaulting on the IMF. Actually, 
Varoufakis (2018) writes that Tsipras decided to default on the IMF before calling it off at the 
very last minute, while keeping the threat to do it in the future (see also Dendrinou and 
Varvitsioti 2019)37. This story seems also confirmed by Blustein (2016) who reports that 
Varoufakis ambiguously implied to Lagarde that Greece could default on its loans during their 
meeting on Easter Monday. 
On April 24, during the Riga Eurogroup meeting, Slovenia Finance Minister went as far 
as saying that the Eurogroup should talk about a plan B for Greece (Dendrinou and Varvitsioti 
2019, Dijsselbloem 2018) after Varoufakis warned his counterparts that an accident could 
happen without further financial support. By the Monday following this infamous meeting, 
Tsipras side-lined Varoufakis by removing Varoufakis’ close confidant Theocarakis from the 
Greek negotiating team and by re-appointing Chouliarakis, who had been advocating for a 
compromise with the Europeans from the very beginning (Varoufakis 2017, Dendrinou and 
Varvitsioti 2019). 
In early June, the creditors presented a common offer to Greece with a slightly reduced 
long-term fiscal target and the full list of the reforms needed to attain it (Blustein 2016 and 
Dendrinou and Varvitsioti 2019). This offer did not change substantially the distribution of the 
adjustment costs though as it still required most of the adjustment to be carried by Greece. By 
accepting such a high fiscal target, Tsipras implicitly recognised that he did not need debt relief 
after all (Blustein 2016). 
Later, during the Eurogroup of June 18, ECB’s Benoit Coeuré expressed his doubts over 
the ability of Greek banks to reopen on the following Monday. Soon after Coeuré’s threat, the 
Greeks worked on a consistent proposal including, for the first time, the long-asked-for pension 
cuts. Prior to June, the Greeks relentlessly made sure that “communication [at the technical 
 
37 On March 15, in a letter to the European leaders, Tsipras threatened to default on the debt Greece owed to the 
Europeans and the IMF if it did not receive funds rapidly (Spiegel 2015). 
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level] was often pointless, if it occurred at all” (Blustein 2016: 401, see also Dendrinou and 
Varvitsioti 2019) as they sought to negotiate at the political level, aiming at changing the logic 
and parameters of the program. 
During the following June 22 Eurogroup meeting, the Greek proposal that included 
pension cuts was received as a sign of improvement by the Europeans. Yet, in coherence with 
their strategy, the Eurozone finance ministers decided that the Troika had to first give its green 
light in order to move forward. On the contrary, finance ministers discussed the possible need 
for capital controls in Greece. The following day, on June 23, the Troika gave its verdict: the 
Greek offer was sent back all barred in red. The heads of the Troika, the head of the Eurogroup 
and the Greek Prime Minister thus met on the morning of June 24 until the next morning to find 
a solution to this stalemate. Still, those high-level negotiations did not produce any conclusive 
outcome. The two sides were said to be about 600 million euros apart but the negotiations 
stumbled over the VAT hike and pensions cuts, two very sensitive issues for the Greeks. During 
those 24 hours, Tsipras oscillated between accepting the terms of the creditors and refusing 
them, eventually refusing to sign a joint proposal with the Troika. The Eurogroup that was 
planned on the morning of June 25 was therefore once again inconclusive (Blustein 2016 and 
Dendrinou and Varvitsioti 2019). And at the Summit that started on the afternoon of June 25, 
Merkel refused to intervene to broker a deal (Blustein 2016). 
A last meeting was planned for June 27 but, facing what seemed to be an immovable 
European wall, Tsipras decided to unilaterally break the negotiations by calling a referendum 
on the terms of the latest proposal made by the creditors. The referendum, taking place after the 
end of the second bailout, forced Greece to impose tight capital controls. In the meantime 
though, the ECB maintained ELA to Greek banks at its current level but did not pulled the plug 
as some policy-makers advocated (Draghi 2015). Shortly after calling the referendum though, 
Tsipras reportedly asked President Hollande and Cyprus’ President to reach out to Merkel but 
she eventually refused to compromise on both occasions (Dendrinou and Varvitsioti 2019). 
Minutes after the No was projected to be winning the day, Tsipras unambiguously told 
President Hollande that he was willing to remain in the Eurozone (Dendrinou and Varvitsioti 
2019, Hollande 2018) while Varoufakis handed in his resignation. It was by that time that 
Chancellor Merkel, Vice-Chancellor Gabriel, Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Finance 
Minister Schäuble decided to push for Grexit as a way to extract more concessions (Palaiologos 
2016). A non-paper prepared for the Eurogroup by the German Finance Ministry was leaked to 
the press. It envisioned a Greek time-out from the Eurozone and the creation of a privatisation 
fund controlled from Luxembourg.  
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The July 12 Eurogroup’s statement explicitly made reference to a Greek time-out but 
simply passed the hot potato onto the Eurozone leaders as such matters could only be dealt at 
this level. In the following make-or-break July 12 Euro Summit, Merkel resisted for some time 
but finally agreed that such reference should be removed from the leaders’ statement. However, 
she kept insisting on the Luxembourg-based privatisation fund and at some point the 
negotiations were on the verge of collapsing for about 2.5 billion euros. A deal was nevertheless 
reached on the morning of July 13 as Merkel conceded some ground on the privatisation fund. 
At the end of the day, Tsipras surrendered to most if not all creditors’ demands and failed to 
obtain a debt relief (Blustein 2016 and Dendrinou and Varvitsioti 2019). 
 
Appendix B – Proofs of propositions 1 and 2 
 
This appendix presents the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.  
 
Proposition 1. Under complete information, the game has three equilibria. Equilibrium 1: if 
Europe is Grexit-averse and Greece is compromise-averse, the negotiations result in a quick 
fair deal for Greece. Equilibrium 2: if Europe is compromise-averse or Grexit-averse and 
Greece is Grexit-averse, the negotiations result in a quick asymmetric deal for Greece. 
Equilibrium 3: if Europe and Greece are compromise-averse, the negotiations result in a 
default and a Graccident happens with probability h. 
 
We derive the subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) by backward induction.  
Proof of Equilibrium 1. When Europe is Grexit-averse and knows that Greece is compromise-
averse, i.e. always plays Challenge and Default. Since 𝜋1
𝐸 > 𝜋3
𝐸 > 𝜋𝑋
𝐸 by assumption, Europe 
plays Debt relief. Thus we conclude that the outcome must be a quick fair deal. 
Proof of Equilibrium 2. When Greece is Grexit-averse, Europe knows that Greece will always 
play Back down since 𝜋4
𝐺 > 𝜋𝑋
𝐺  by assumption. Since Greece knows that 𝜋4
𝐸 > 𝜋3
𝐸, i.e. Europe 
prefers a delayed asymmetric deal to a delayed fair deal, Greece will play Resign. Thus we 
conclude that the outcome must be a quick asymmetric deal. 
Proof of Equilibrium 3. When Europe is compromise-averse, it always plays No debt relief and 
Rejects. When Greece is compromise-averse, it always plays Challenge and Default. Thus we 






Proposition 2. Under double-sided incomplete information, the game has 4 sequential crisis 
equilibria and depends on the values of p and 𝑞. 
Equilibrium 1 exists only when 0 < 𝑞 ≤ ?̅? and 0 < 𝑝 ≤ ?̅?. Grexit-averse and compromise-
averse Europe never grants a debt relief at the beginning of the negotiations. Compromise-
averse Greece always challenge the status quo. Grexit-averse Greece randomizes its strategy 
between challenging the status quo and resign. In the latter case, a quick asymmetric deal 
occurs. In the former case, Grexit-averse Europe randomizes its strategy between rejecting and 
accepting a Greek offer. If Greece is compromise-averse, Greece defaults and a Graccident 
occurs with probability h. If Greece is Grexit-averse, a delayed asymmetric deal occurs. 
Equilibrium 2 exists only when 0 < 𝑞 ≤ ?̅? and ?̅? < 𝑝 < 1. Grexit-averse and compromise-
averse Europe never grants a debt relief at the beginning of the negotiations. Compromise-
averse Greece always challenge the status quo. Grexit-averse Greece resigns and a quick 
asymmetric deal occurs. Compromise-averse Greece challenges the status quo. Grexit-averse 
Europe randomizes its strategy between rejecting and accepting a Greek offer. Compromise-
averse Greece defaults and a Graccident occurs with probability h. 
Equilibrium 3 exists only when ?̅? < 𝑞 < 1 and 0 < 𝑝 ≤ ?̅?. Grexit-averse and compromise-
averse Europe never grants a debt relief at the beginning of the negotiations. Compromise-
averse Greece always challenge the status quo. Grexit-averse Greece randomizes its strategy 
between challenging the status quo and resign. In the latter case, a quick asymmetric deal 
occurs. In the former case, Grexit-averse Europe accepts the Greek offer and a delayed fair 
deal occurs. Compromise-averse Europe rejects the Greek offer. If Greece is compromise-
averse, Greece defaults and a Graccident occurs with probability h. If Greece is Grexit-averse, 
a delayed asymmetric deal occurs. 
Equilibrium 4 exists only when ?̅? < 𝑞 < 1 and ?̅? < 𝑝 < 1. Grexit-averse and compromise-
averse Europe never grants a debt relief at the beginning of the negotiations. Compromise-
averse Greece always challenge the status quo. Grexit-averse Greece resigns and a quick 
asymmetric deal occurs. Compromise-averse Greece challenges the status quo. Grexit-averse 
Europe accepts the Greek offer and a delayed fair deal occurs. Compromise-averse Europe 
rejects the Greek offer. If Greece is compromise-averse, Greece defaults and a Graccident 
occurs with probability h. 
 
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of the playersˈ optimal actions, given the other agentsˈ 
equilibrium moves and beliefs about types. Let us thus define the players strategies and beliefs 
under double-sided incomplete information. Let us start with examining E’s expected payoff at 
𝜃𝐸(2) when E is Grexit-averse. Let 𝜇𝐸
∗  be the value of Europe’s beliefs about Greece’s type 𝜇𝐸 
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that leaves a Grexit-averse E indifferent between rejecting and accepting a Greek offer. A 
Grexit-averse E will be indifferent between refusing and accepting a Greek offer after observing 
G challenging the status quo when 
 





∗ ) = 𝜋𝐸
3 







4. And a Grexit-averse E’s best response at 𝜃𝐸(2) is 
therefore 
{
𝛾 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝜇𝐸 > 𝜇𝐸
∗
𝛾 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝜇𝐸 < 𝜇𝐸
∗
𝛾 ∈ [0,1]0 𝑖𝑓 𝜇𝐸 = 𝜇𝐸
∗
  
with 𝛾 being the probability that Europe plays Reject when Grexit-averse. Applying Bayes’ 





























with 𝛽 the probability that Greece plays Challenge when Grexit-averse. The next strategy to 








Since a compromise-averse E would always reject a Greek offer, a Grexit-averse G will 
always resign challenging E because there is no chance of ending up with a fair deal, hence 







, a contradiction. 𝛾∗ is therefore lower than 1. The 





















𝑋 = ?̅?. In other words, a Grexit-averse E escalates when the probability 𝑞 that G is 
compromise-averse is low enough. 
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Now let us determine 𝛾∗ and 𝛼∗. With 0 < 𝛽∗ < 1, a Grexit-averse Greece will be 
indifferent between challenging and not challenging the status quo after observing Europe had 
refused to grant debt relief when   
𝐸𝑈𝐺(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒|𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒, 𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓) = 𝐸𝑈𝐺(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛|𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒, 𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓) 
𝜋𝐺
4𝜇𝐺 + [𝛾𝜋𝐺
4 + (1 − 𝛾)𝜋𝐺


























3 . Note that because a Grexit-
averse E mixes at 𝜃𝐸(2), E’s expected payoff if the game reaches this information set is 𝜋𝐸
3 
(randomization indeed requires equality of expected payoffs). Then a Grexit-averse E will be 
indifferent between granting and not granting debt relief to G when 
𝐸𝑈𝐸(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓|𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒) = 𝐸𝑈𝐸(𝑁𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓|𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒) 
𝜋𝐸
1 = 𝑞𝜋𝐸
3 + (1 − 𝑞)[𝛽𝜋𝐸
3 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜋𝐸
2] 
{
𝛼 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝜋𝐸
1 > 𝑞𝜋𝐸
3 + (1 − 𝑞)[𝛽𝜋𝐸
3 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜋𝐸
2]
𝛼 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝜋𝐸
1 < 𝑞𝜋𝐸
3 + (1 − 𝑞)[𝛽𝜋𝐸
3 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜋𝐸
2]
𝛼 ∈ [0,1] 𝑖𝑓 𝜋𝐸
1 = 𝑞𝜋𝐸
3 + (1 − 𝑞)[𝛽𝜋𝐸
3 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜋𝐸
2]
 
For there to be a sequential crisis equilibrium, then 𝜋𝐸
1 ≤ 𝑞𝜋𝐸
3 + (1 − 𝑞)[𝛽𝜋𝐸
3 +
(1 − 𝛽)𝜋𝐸
2], hence 𝛼 = 1. In other words, Europeans never grant a debt relief at the first stage 
of the negotiations.  













3 . For 𝛾
∗ to 






4 = ?̅?. In other words, a 
Grexit-averse G escalates when the probability 𝑝 that E is compromise-averse is low enough. 
Hence, we can summarize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game with double-
sided incomplete information. Player E will always play no debt relief and reject when 
compromise-averse. When Grexit-averse, E will always play no debt relief but will randomly 
play reject only when 0 < 𝑞 ≤ ?̅?. When ?̅? < 𝑞 < 1, Grexit-averse E will always play accept. 
At her first information set, E’s posterior beliefs coincide with his prior 𝑞 while her beliefs at 




Player G will always play challenge and default when compromise-averse. When 
Grexit-averse, G will randomly play challenge when 0 < 𝑝 ≤ ?̅? and will play back down 
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otherwise. When ?̅? < 𝑝 < 1, Grexit-averse G will always play Resign. At her information set, 






Appendix of Paper 2 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9. Macroeconomic Variables and Indices 
Variable Abbreviation Source Transformation Frequency 
Greek 10-year 
sovereign bond bid 
spread (in basis 
points) 
∆Spread Bloomberg First Difference Daily 
VIX Index VIX Bloomberg First Difference Daily 
Euro US Dollar 
Exchange Rate 
EURUSD Bloomberg Growth Rate Daily 
Euribor – OIS 3 
month spread 






















Political Statements NB 
Eurointelligence 
(G/E) Positive(Negative) 
Media Reports NB 
Associated Press (NB) refers to 
count variables as 
the daily number 











































5.82 3 302 -484 47.39 -1.01 27.04 17722.01*** 731 
Euribor-OIS 
spread 0.00 -0.00 0.12 -0.12 0.02 0.11 12.17 2560.81*** 731 
EURUSD -0.02 0 2.36 -2.38 0.69 -0.09 3.36 4.76* 731 
VIX 
-0.01 -0.12 16 -12.94 2.01 1.05 15.85 5159.53*** 731 
 
Table 11. Unit Root Tests 
Series 
Phillips–Perron 








EURUSD -26.95*** -26.94*** 
VIX -36.39*** -19.15*** 
 
Notes: Phillips-Perron and Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with intercept  




Table 12A. Granger Causality Tests for News Variables 




 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Hard Positive 731 1.173 0.279 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause HardNegative 731 0.091 0.763 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Hard 731 1.127 0.289 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Expected Positive 731 1.274 0.260 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Unexpected Positive 731 2.241 0.135 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Expected Negative 731 0.286 0.593 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Unexpected Negative 731 0.002 0.965 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Expected News 731 1.108 0.293 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Unexpected News 731 0.238 0.626 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Soft Positive NB 731 0.000 0.999 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Soft Negative NB 731 0.050 0.824 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Soft News NB 731 0.005 0.943 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Positive Political Statements NB 731 0.015 0.902 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Negative Political Statements NB 731 0.214 0.644 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Positive Media Reports NB 731 0.023 0.878 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Negative Media Reports NB 731 1.575 0.210 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause Political Communication NB 731 0.146 0.702 















Table 12B. Granger Causality Tests for Greek-specific and Eurozone-wide News Variables 




 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Hard Positive 731 1.262 0.262 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Hard Negative 731 0.005 0.943 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Hard Positive 731 0.605 0.437 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Hard Negative 731 0.056 0.813 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Hard News 731 1.234 0.267 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Hard News 731 0.743 0.389 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Expected Positive 731 1.606 0.205 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Unexpected Positive 731 0.000 0.986 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Expected Negative 731 0.639 0.424 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Unexpected Negative 731 0.192 0.661 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Expected Positive 731 5.801 0.016 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Unexpected Positive 731 4.728 0.030 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Expected Negative 731 0.000 0.995 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Unexpected Negative 731 0.696 0.404 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Expected News 731 3.043 0.082 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Unexpected News 731 0.066 0.798 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Expected News 731 5.014 0.026 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Unexpected News 731 5.093 0.024 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Soft Positive NB 731 0.036 0.850 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Soft Negative NB 731 0.627 0.429 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Soft Positive NB 731 0.030 0.862 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Soft Negative NB 731 0.580 0.446 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Soft NB 731 0.280 0.597 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Soft NB 731 0.285 0.593 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Positive Political Statements NB 731 0.014 0.907 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Negative Political Statements NB 731 0.084 0.772 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Positive Political Statements NB 731 0.000 0.993 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Negative Political Statements NB 731 1.797 0.180 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Positive Media Reports NB 731 0.239 0.625 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Negative Media Reports NB 731 1.737 0.188 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Positive Media Reports NB 731 0.331 0.565 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Negative Media Reports NB 731 0.165 0.685 
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 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Political Communication NB 731 0.009 0.925 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause G Media Reports NB 731 1.073 0.301 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Political Communication NB 731 0.628 0.428 
 ∆Spread does not Granger Cause E Media Reports NB 731 0.004 0.948 
 
 
Table 12C. Test of predeterminedness 
  Value P-value 
E Positive Expected 0.160 0.689 
E Positive Unexpected 0.615 0.433 
G Expected News 0.731 0.393 
E Expected News 0.021 0.884 
E Unepected News 1.383 0.240 
Note: Test of the validity of the first lag as instrument in a IV 









































Figure 6. Negative hard news dummies by type 
 
 







































Figure 12. Greek-specific Hard news by topic (dummies) 
 
 










Figure 14. Greek-specific Hard news by topic and type (dummies) 
 








Figure 16. 20-day moving average of the number of soft news by topic 
 













Figure 18. 20-day moving average of the number of Eurozone-wide soft news by type 
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Table 13A. Greek-specific News 
  Total % of Total   % of Days with 
G Total 3536     85.6% 
G Negative News NB 1977 55.9% % of Neg 69.9% 
G Soft Negative NB 1790 50.6% 90.5% 66.2% 
G Political Statements Negative NB 1068 30.2% 54.0% 50.8% 
G Media Reports Negative NB 722 20.4% 36.5% 
49.5% 
G Hard Negative NB 187 5.3% 9.5% 
20.8% 
G Hard Expected Negative NB 140 4.0% 7.1% 
15.7% 
G Hard Unexpected Negative NB 47 1.3% 2.4% 
6.2% 
G Positive News NB 1559 44.1% % of Pos 
71.4% 
G Soft Positive NB 1344 38.0% 86.2% 
65.9% 
G Political Statements Positive NB 594 16.8% 38.1% 
38.0% 
G Media Reports Positive NB 750 21.2% 48.1% 
53.2% 
G Hard Positive NB 215 6.1% 13.8% 
23.0% 
G Hard Expected Positive NB 197 5.6% 12.6% 
21.2% 




Table 13B. Greek-specific News (excluding soft news on days with hard news) 
  Total % of Total   % of Days with 
G Total 1683     80.2% 
G Negative News NB 896 53.2% % of Neg 53.2% 
G Soft Negative NB 709 42.1% 79.1% 32.4% 
G Political Statements Negative NB 393 23.4% 43.9% 22.8% 
G Media Reports Negative NB 316 18.8% 35.3% 
23.1% 
G Hard Negative NB 187 11.1% 20.9% 
20.8% 
G Hard Expected Negative NB 140 8.3% 15.6% 
15.7% 
G Hard Unexpected Negative NB 47 2.8% 5.2% 
6.2% 
G Positive News NB 787 46.8% % of Pos 
55.4% 
G Soft Positive NB 572 34.0% 72.7% 
32.4% 
G Political Statements Positive NB 258 15.3% 32.8% 
17.6% 
G Media Reports Positive NB 314 18.7% 39.9% 
24.8% 
G Hard Positive NB 215 12.8% 27.3% 
23.0% 
G Hard Expected Positive NB 197 11.7% 25.0% 
21.2% 













Table 14A. Eurozone-wide News (excluding soft news on days with hard news) 
 
  Total % of Total   
% of Days with 
E Total 2265     
66.1% 
E Negative News NB 1280 36.2% % of Neg 
55.1% 
E Soft Negative NB 1211 34.2% 94.6% 
54.6% 
E Political Statements Negative NB 808 22.9% 63.1% 
46.5% 
E Media Reports Negative NB 403 11.4% 31.5% 
32.8% 
E Hard Negative NB 69 2.0% 5.4% 
7.3% 
E Hard Expected Negative NB 54 1.5% 4.2% 
5.5% 
E Hard Unexpected Negative NB 15 0.4% 1.2% 
2.1% 
E Positive News NB 985 27.9% % of Pos 
47.9% 
E Soft Positive NB 922 26.1% 93.6% 
46.4% 
E Political Statements Positive NB 589 16.7% 59.8% 
39.1% 
E Media Reports Positive NB 333 9.4% 33.8% 
25.3% 
E Hard Positive NB 63 1.8% 6.4% 
7.3% 
E Hard Expected Positive NB 51 1.4% 5.2% 
5.7% 











Table 14B. Eurozone-wide News (excluding soft news on days with hard news) 
  Total % of Total   
% of Days with 
E Total 1021     
44.6% 
E Negative News NB 557 54.6% % of Neg 
32.8% 
E Soft Negative NB 488 47.8% 87.6% 
25.6% 
E Political Statements Negative NB 338 33.1% 60.7% 
22.6% 
E Media Reports Negative NB 150 14.7% 26.9% 
13.3% 
E Hard Negative NB 69 6.8% 12.4% 
7.3% 
E Hard Expected Negative NB 54 5.3% 9.7% 
5.5% 
E Hard Unexpected Negative NB 15 1.5% 2.7% 
2.1% 
E Positive News NB 464 45.4% % of Pos 
29.1% 
E Soft Positive NB 401 39.3% 86.4% 
21.9% 
E Political Statements Positive NB 277 27.1% 59.7% 
19.0% 
E Media Reports Positive NB 124 12.1% 26.7% 
10.7% 
E Hard Positive NB 63 6.2% 13.6% 
7.3% 
E Hard Expected Positive NB 51 5.0% 11.0% 
5.7% 

















Appendix B – Description of the coding procedure 
 
1. Data Releases 
 
All Greek public finances’ statistics were closely scrutinised as they signalled Greece’s 
ability to meet its yearly fiscal targets and the roadmap set in its adjustment programs. All data 
releases on Greece’s public finances were therefore included in the dataset as hard news. When 
Greece met (missed) its fiscal target, the news was coded positively (negatively). All media 
reports or statements suggesting that Greece would be missing its targets were coded as negative 
soft news. Only media reports suggesting that Greece would meet its targets were coded as 
positive soft news. Positive statements were excluded out of credibility and endogeneity 
suspicions. 
The Greek adjustment path was also highly dependent on optimistic fiscal revenues 
targets. We thus went through the full articles in order to check whether the data releases 
mentioned Greece’s meeting (missing) its revenues target. Thus, when Greece met (missed) its 
revenues target, we coded the news positively (negatively).  
 In addition, GDP growth trajectory was also key in the Greek adjustment as it provided 
information about Greece’s ability to meet its fiscal targets. Media reports about GDP growth 
were coded as soft news while GDP releases were coded as hard news. 
European Commission, Eurostat or troika reports about Greece’s fiscal targets and 
economic forecasts were coded as hard negative (positive) news when revised downwards 
(upwards). Reports showing that Greece’s debt sustainability has deteriorated (improved) were 
coded as negative (positive) hard news. 
 
2. Financial Support 
a. Bailout package and loan tranches 
 
News about a bailout package can have contradictory effects on spreads. On the one hand, if a 
bailout is being prepared, it signals that Greece has failed to adjust, hence a higher probability 
of default: spreads should widen. On the other, if there is a bailout in the works, it suggest that 
Greece will not be allowed to default in a disorderly manner: spreads should tighten. All in 
all, we will assume that this latter effect is dominant. 
Media reports or statements suggesting Europeans’ unwillingness to grant a bailout to 
Greece were included in this sub-category and coded negatively as soft news. We have thus 
coded negatively any statement that stated that Greece should not Expect any external help or 
that Greece had to deal with its problems on its own. We have also negatively coded any 
statement that implied that financial support would be conditional on Greek reforms. This last 
point is based on the idea that, prior to the crisis, financial markets Expected that the no-
bailout clause was not credible and that all public liabilities were unconditionally guaranteed 
by the area as a whole.  
Statements expressing unconditional support or solidarity with Greece as well as 
media reports that the Eurozone was mulling plans for bailouts were coded positively as soft 
news. In addition, prior to the first Greek bailout, We have not included reassurances by 
Greek but also European policy-makers that Greece needed no bailout out of endogeneity 
suspicions. Such statements might have been direct replies to fears in the markets about 
Greece being unable to meet its financial commitments without external help. Eurogroup and 
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European Council’s decisions on Greece’s bailout packages were included and coded as hard 
news. 
In the run-up to the first Greek bailout, there was a debate among European policy-
makers about whether the IMF should be part of the Greek bailout. We will assume that media 
reports or statements suggesting that the IMF should (not) participate in the Greek bailout were 
coded as negative (positive) soft news. For an IMF loan package is likely to be stricter than one 
solely coming from the euro zone, and will thus increase the chance of a Greek default. Media 
reports or statements suggesting that the IMF needs (no) more financing guarantees from the 
Eurozone before approving a bailout/loan tranche were coded as negative (positive) soft news.  
 Right after the decision to grant a second bailout to Greece in July 2011, there was also 
a controversy about the Finnish requirement for collateral. Media reports suggesting that the 
collateral deal between Greece and Finland for the second bailout was (not) progressing were 
coded as positive (negative) soft news. Only equivalent negative statements were included in 
the dataset. News that the collateral deal was off the table were coded as negative hard news. 
News that a deal was reached between Greece and Finland was coded as positive hard news. 
Parliamentary (dis)approval in “recalcitrant” countries (Germany, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Finland, Slovakia (until the pro-European reshuffle that took place in October 2011)) 
were coded as positive (negative) hard news. News signalling support (opposition) for 
parliamentary approval were coded as positive soft news. 
Regarding loan tranches, media reports or statements issued by single policy-makers 
suggesting that Greece will/may not receive its loan tranche and/or receive it conditionally were 
coded as negative soft news. Only media reports suggesting that Greece will receive loan 
tranches were included in the dataset as positive soft news. Positive statements issued by single 
policy-makers were not included out of endogeneity and credibility suspicions. Decisions by 
the Eurogroup to disburse (delay) a loan tranche were coded positively (negatively) as hard 
news.  
Media reports or statements suggesting that the official creditors are requesting written 
commitment before disbursing funds were coded as negative soft news. Decisions to disburse 
funds only after written commitments were coded as negative hard news. Media reports or 
statements suggesting that Greek policy-makers will (not) commit to reforms in writing were 
coded as positive (negative) soft news. Statements  
 
b. Loan Reviews 
 
Financial support to Greece was disbursed in tranches and was conditional on Greece 
completing reforms’ milestones and fiscal targets. And because the Greek macroeconomic 
situation deteriorated gradually, the memorandum had to be amended from time to time, 
creating space for uncertainty about Greece’s ability to secure funds and enact new reforms. 
 The Europeans and the IMF would exert pressure on Greece to implement the program 
or to agree additional measures to correct for fiscal slippage. On the one hand, such news signal 
that the official creditors will not give free rein to Greece, implying that adjustment will 
proceed. On the other, they signal that the Greek situation has deteriorated to a significant extent 
and/or that Greece is not tackling the problem head-on. We assume that the latter effect should 
be dominant. And therefore, only news signalling that Greece had bowed to the creditors’ 
pressure or that Greece and its creditors had found an agreement were coded as positive news. 
Media reports or statements suggesting that completion of reviews are going badly/will 
be delayed were coded negatively as soft news. News signalling that negotiations have broken 
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down or decisions to delay the completion of a review were coded as negative hard news. On 
the contrary, media reports or statements suggesting that a review will resume (after a 
breakdown) were coded positively as soft news while actual review resumptions were coded 
positively as hard news.  
Media reports or statements from individual policy-makers suggesting that Greece 
adjustment is off-track were included in the dataset and coded negatively as soft news. 
Statements issued by single European policy-makers and the IMF saying that Greece needed 
additional measures or needed to step up its efforts were also coded negatively as soft news. 
Statements issued by single policy-makers pressuring Greece to improve implementation were 
coded as negative soft news.  
For equivalent positive soft news, We have included all media reports suggesting 
Greece was on-track but included such statements only when they were closely linked to Troika 
reviews and reports. Indeed, statements signalling that “Greece is on track with the program” 
could be particularly subject to endogeneity as they would simply aim at reassuring markets. In 
the same vein, we have excluded statements praising Greece for its efforts. Indeed, such 
statements might have a very low informational content as they are part of standard political 
discourse and are potentially only made for form. Reassurances by Greek policy-makers about 
fiscal adjustment, for instance saying that they will stick with program targets and/or are 
determined to implement the programs were not included as this is arguably cheap talk.  
Media reports or statements suggesting new austerity announcements or privatisations 
are being prepared have been included into the dataset only when austerity measures were 
detailed. Decisions on new austerity measures or privatisations were positively coded as hard 
news as well as parliamentary or cabinet approval of austerity measures. Statements saying that 
Greece is not planning any new cuts were coded as soft negative news. 
Public disagreements between Greece and the Troika on the required measures as well 
as public disagreements within the Troika were coded negatively as hard news. Formal reports 
issued by the Commission or the IMF on program reviews were also coded as hard news. Even 
if the institutions issue favourable opinion for review completion, whenever they raised doubts 




Over the course of the Greek bailouts, the Europeans and the IMF gradually eased the 
repayment terms of their loans, once they realized that the Greek deteriorating situation made 
the repayment virtually impossible. 
Media reports and statements were coded positively (negatively) as soft news when 
suggesting support (opposition) for an increase of the official loans’ maturity and a decrease of 
the interest rate. Decisions on loans’ repayment terms were coded as hard news. 
In the run-up to the completion of the talks between Greece and its private creditors, the 
issue of what would happen to the ECB’s holdings of Greek bonds arose. In particular, a 
restructuring of these bonds were seen as an additional way to ease Greece’s debt burden. Media 
reports or statements suggesting that the ECB is (not) willing to participate in the OSI for the 
second Greek bailout were coded as positive (negative) news. ECB’s decisions to participate in 
the OSI were coded as positive hard news. Media reports or statements suggesting that the ECB 
participation in the second Greek bailout was (not) necessary for the Greek PSI were coded as 




3. Greek debt restructuring 
a. A long story short 
Since the beginning of the Greek crisis, there had been doubts about the Greek capacity to 
repay its debts in full. There had also been doubts about whether Greece would be able to 
escape debt restructuring even with a bailout. But up until the Deauville meeting on October 
19, 2010, sovereign default was not an official option. Only Germany would design and 
present plans for sovereign restructuring or insist on the need to impose forced losses on 
private bondholders.  
The debate on a specific Greek default really started in April 2011 (there was also a 
debate about a bond buyback in January and February 2011). Initially, the debate was about 
whether the (orderly) restructuring would be voluntary or not. The ECB had a very strong 
position in this debate. In particular, the ECB threatened to stop accepting Greek bonds as 
collateral if Greece’s debt restructuring led to selective default. The debate was more or less 
settled on June 17, 2011 when Sarkozy and Merkel decided that losses on Greek bonds had to 
be voluntary. During the negotiations up until the July deal, there were 2 main options on the 
table: a rollover of Greek bonds (the French plan) or a bond swap (the German plan). The 
French plan for a debt rollover might have avoided a selective default according to rating 
agencies while the German plan for a debt swap would have been more likely rated as a default. 
Still, understanding that no option would avoid selective default, the ECB and the European 
Council found a compromise on July 2011: the ECB would continue accepting Greek bonds as 
collateral even after a default but member states would provide guarantees. 
Negotiations between Greece and its private creditors started shortly after the June 17 
decision. The new bailout that was decided in July 2011 left negotiations open between Greece 
and its private creditors to find a solution on how to reach the targets set by the European 
Council. However, the targets set in July became quickly out-of-date with Greece’s fiscal 
situation. Negotiations started once again but got finalised only in February 2012. Throughout 
this period, there were renewed concerns about a forced default. 
 
b. Coding procedure 
 
That being said, let us now describe our coding procedure. Statements or media reports 
suggesting that Greece should/would default on its debt were coded as negative soft news. Only 
media reports signalling that Greece will not default were coded as positive soft news because 
of endogeneity and credibility concerns. Yet, after Greece asked for the activation of the bailout 
in April 2010 up until the first bailout, reassurances that default was off (on) the table were 
coded as positive (negative) soft news. Statements suggesting that a Greek default would be 
catastrophic were coded as positive soft news (such messages raised fears about a Greek default 
but the message was precisely aiming at saying that because of the catastrophic effects of a 
default, default should not be an option). 
Statements or media reports suggesting that private creditors should (not) bear forced 
losses, even through a “soft” restructuring, were coded as negative (positive) soft news. 
Statements or media reports that private creditors would be forced to bear losses, even through 
a “soft” restructuring, were coded as negative soft news. Only media reports that private 
creditors would not be forced to bear losses were coded as positive soft news. Decisions (not) 
to force Greece’s private creditors losses were coded as negative (positive) hard news. 
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Statements that the ECB would (not) accept Greek bonds after a Greek default were 
coded as positive (negative) soft news. Media reports that agency ratings will (not) treat a 
potential Greek PSI arrangement as default were also coded as negative (positive) soft news. 
The decision that the ECB would accept Greek bonds even after a default was coded as a 
positive hard news. 
Media reports or statements suggesting support (opposition) for the rollover of Greek 
debt were coded as positive (negative) soft news. Media or statements suggesting support 
(opposition) for the swap of Greek bonds were coded as negative (positive) soft news. 
Media reports suggesting that (no) progress was being made on the PSI deal between 
Greece and its private creditors were coded positively (negatively) as soft news. Equivalent 
positive statements were not included in the dataset (out of credibility and endogeneity issues) 
but negative statements were. Failure (success) to reach a compromise between Greece and its 
private creditors were coded as negative (positive) hard news. Negotiations breakdowns 
(resumption) were coded as negative (positive) hard news.  
Media reports or statements suggesting that losses on Greek bonds should (not) increase 
were coded as negative (positive) soft news. Media reports or statements suggesting that losses 
on Greek bonds would increase were coded as negative soft news. Only media reports 
suggesting that losses on Greek bonds would not increase were coded as positive soft news. 
Decisions (not) to increase private creditors losses were coded as negative (positive) hard news.  
Media reports or statements signalling the (un)willingness to include collective action 
clauses (CACs) in the Greek PSI deal were coded as negative (positively) hard news. Decisions 
(not) to include collective action clauses (CACs) in the Greek PSI deal were coded as negative 
(positive) hard news. 
Statements or media reports suggesting support (opposition) for a buyback of Greek 
bonds/Brady bond plan were coded as positive (negative) soft news. 
 
4. Crisis Resolution Mechanisms (EFSF and ESM) 
 
As the Greek crisis gradually evolved into a systemic Eurozone crisis, European policy-makers 
tried to devise new crisis resolution mechanisms. They first hastily set-up the EFSF as a 
temporary fund and later created the ESM, a permanent crisis fund. Following the dramatic turn 
of events, the Europeans incrementally amended their plans by either adjusting the size of the 
funds or their scope of intervention. 
 
c. Size 
Like for financial support news, news about increasing the size of the funds may have 
contradictory effects. On the one hand, news suggesting that Europe is ready to increase the 
firepower of the crisis funds may imply that the existing resources are not sufficient and that 
more countries are close to ask for help. On the other, it may also signal the Europeans’ 
commitment to safeguard the eurozone. We will assume that the latter effect is dominant 
(except for the debate that arose right after the Irish bailout following a statement by the then 
head of the Bundesbank Axel Weber). 
Statements Expressing support (opposition) for more firepower for the EFSF and ESM 
were coded as positive (negative) soft news. Media reports suggesting (no) an increase in the 
firepower of the EFSF and ESM were also included and coded positively (negatively) as soft 
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news. Decisions (not) to increase the firepower of the EFSF/ESM were coded as positive 
(negative) hard news. 
Parliamentary (dis)approval, in particular in “recalcitrant” countries (Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Slovakia (until the pro-European reshuffle that took place in 
October 2011)), were coded as positive (negative) hard news. News signalling support 
(opposition) for parliamentary approval were coded as positive soft news. 
 Legal challenges to the EFSF and ESM delaying the implementation of the deals were 
coded as negative hard news. News reports about such challenges were coded as soft news. 
Decisions by the respective court were coded as positive (negative) hard news. News reports 
suggesting positive (negative) ruling were coding as positive soft (negative) news. 
There were different identifiable debates about the size the EFSF/ESM. Starting in 
January 2011, there was a debate about raising the effective lending capacity of the EFSF. The 
headline ceiling was indeed higher that its effective capacity because the EFSF was based on 
state guarantees. Media reports or statements suggesting that triple-A countries refuse (accept) 
to increase the EFSF guarantees were coded as negative (positive) soft news. Media reports or 
statements suggesting that triple-A countries will have to increase the EFSF guarantees were 
coded as negative soft news. 
Shortly after the deal to improve the flexibility of the EFSF and ESM in July 2011, calls 
mounted to increase the firepower of the funds. The debates really intensified in late September 
2011 when policy-makers openly debated about leveraging the funds through the ECB, a 
banking license, the IMF resources, bond insurance, etc. News reports or statements suggesting 
that the EFSF would/should (not) be leveraged were coded as soft positive (negative) news. 
Decisions (not/delay) to leverage the EFSF were coded as positive (negative) hard news. 
In December 2011, the Europeans decided to leverage their fund through the IMF. 
Following this decision, media reports or statements suggesting that countries (do not) support 
an increase in the IMF’s financial capacity in order to leverage the EFSF were coded positively 
(negatively) as soft news. Decisions (not) to increase the IMF capacity were coded as positive 
(negative) hard news. 
Starting in early December 2011, Eurozone policy-makers debated the relationship 
between the ESM and the EFSF. Policy-makers debated whether the ESM and EFSF resources 
should be combined permanently, or if both funds should simply operate in parallel until the 
EFSF Expires in 2013 raising the ceiling only temporarily or if the combined ceiling should 
remain capped at 500 billion euros. Delays to make a decision were coded as negative hard 
news. Media reports or statements supporting the last two (first) options were coded as negative 
(positive) soft news. The decision not to raise permanently the ESM size was coded as negative 
hard news. 
 The Europeans also started to debate whether to allow for an earlier start for the ESM 
by late September 2011. News reports or statements suggesting support (opposition) to such 
early start were coded as positive (negative) news. (Dis)agreement to do it was coded as hard 
positive (negative) news.  
News reports or statements suggesting that the ESM paid-in capital would/should be 
rapidly contributed (spread out over time) and in fewer (more) tranches were coded as positive 
(negative) soft news. Decisions to rapidly contribute (spread out over time the contribution) to 








Statements Expressing support (opposition) for more flexibility (ability to buy bonds on 
primary and secondary markets, ability to recapitalise banks directly, majority voting, 
parliamentary powers) for the EFSF and ESM were coded as positive (negative) soft news.  
Media reports suggesting discussions for (against/delay) an increase in the flexibility of 
the EFSF and ESM were coded positively (negatively) as soft news. Decisions (not/delay) to 
improve the flexibility of the EFSF and ESM were coded as positive (negative) hard news.  
Media reports or statements suggesting support (opposition) for more parliamentary 
support were coded as negative (positive) news. Decisions (not) to increase the participation of 
parliaments in the decision-making process of the EFSF/ESM were coded as negative (positive) 
hard news. 
Parliamentary (dis)approval, in particular in “recalcitrant” countries (Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Slovakia (until the pro-European reshuffle that took place in 
October 2011)), were coded as positive (negative) hard news. News signalling support 
(opposition) for parliamentary approval were coded as positive soft news. 
Legal challenges to the EFSF and ESM were coded as negative hard news. Decisions 
by the respective court were coded as positive (negative) hard news. News suggesting positive 
(negative) ruling were coding as positive (negative) news. 
Making ESM loans junior only to the IMF was likely to discourage private creditors 
from buying the bonds of countries likely to call for ESM loans, creating a bad equilibrium. 
Media reports or statements suggesting that the ESM will (not) have a senior creditor status 
were coded as negative (positive) soft news. Decisions (not) to make the ESM a senior creditor 




At Deauville, Sarkozy eventually swapped Merkel’s insistence on automatic sanctions for fiscal 
violators for his endorsement of a sovereign insolvency procedure to be included in the coming 
permanent mechanism, the ESM. After this deal, the Europeans debated the parameters of the 
ESM’s PSI: whether losses would be automatic or not, voluntary or forced, etc. 
Media reports or statements suggesting support (opposition) for forced losses for private 
investors in the permanent eurozone mechanism (ESM) were coded as negative (positive) soft 
news, and even if losses were to start only after 2013 (except for the G20 statement before the 
Irish bailout). Media reports or statements signalling the (un)willingness to impose automatic 
losses on private creditors or delays to clarify how private bondholders would face losses were 
coded as negative (positive) soft news. Decisions (not) to impose automatic losses on private 
creditors or delays to clarify how private bondholders would face losses were coded as negative 
(positive) hard news. 
Media reports or statements signalling the (un)willingness to include collective action 
clauses (CACs) in the ESM PSI mechanism were coded as negative (positively) soft news. 
Decisions (not) to include collective action clauses (CACs) in the ESM PSI mechanism were 






Changes to the crisis resolution funds were generally made conditional on the approval of  other 
reforms, such as a reform of the SGP, the creation of a competitiveness pact, the creation of a 
fiscal pact, etc. But as those reforms may not aim at immediate firefighting, the reforms in 
themselves were not coded. Only (dis)agreements were as they affected the likelihood of 
improving the EFSF and ESM. For instance, the debate (and proposals) about reinforced fiscal 
rules and closer economic coordination starting in April 2010 were not included before these 
reforms became clear conditions for some countries for agreeing to reforms of the EFSF/ESM 
in early 2011 and later on.  
Statements or media reports signalling compromises (opposition) to these reforms were 
coded as positive (negative) soft news. Decisions were coded as positive hard news. Opposition 
or delays to find a compromise, in particular in Germany among German political parties, were 
coded as negative hard news. 
 
5. ECB 
a. Collateral framework 
 
Statements Expressing support for easing (tightening) the collateral framework were coded 
positively (negatively) as soft news. ECB’s decisions on easing (tightening) the collateral 
framework were coded positively (negatively) as hard news.  
 
 
b. Bond-buying program 
 
Statements or media reports suggesting that the ECB would (not) buy sovereign bonds were 
coded positively (negatively) as soft news. Obviously, the decision to buy bonds on May 9, 
2010, was coded positively as hard news. After this decision had been made, statements 
signalling support (opposition) for the program were coded positively (negatively) as soft news.   
 
c. Lender of last resort 
 
News  signalling the (in)desirability/(un)willingness of the ECB to become a lender of last 
resort for sovereigns were coded as positive (negative) soft news.  
 News suggesting that the ECB would/could (not) act after governments have done their 
part were coded as soft positive (negative) news. 
 
d. Liquidity provision 
Announcements of long-term liquidity programs were coded as positive hard news. Statements 
or media reports suggesting that the ECB is (not) looking for an exit strategy were coded as 
positive (negative) hard news. 
 
6. Political Environment 
 
Ownership of reforms is a very important factor determining the eventual success of fiscal and 
economic adjustments because it directly affects program implementation. This is all the more 
relevant in the case of Greece where the scale of the adjustment was unprecedented. We used 
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political support within the ruling majority, support from the political opposition and the wider 
public for the reforms as a proxy for reform ownership.  
Media reports or statements suggesting that support within the ruling majority is strong 
(faltering) is coded positively (negatively) as soft news. For instance, news that MPs from the 
ruling party will defect (vote) on an austerity package vote were coded as negative (positive) 
soft news, or that the PM is considering cabinet reshuffle to reinvigorate implementation effort, 
or that the PM is considering to hold elections or referendums as he feels he does not have the 
sufficient legitimacy within his cabinet, party, etc. were all coded negatively. News were coded 
as hard news only when there was a reshuffle, a referendum or an election. Positive (negative) 
election results were coded positively (negatively) as hard news.  
Following the November 2011 cancelled referendum or the May and June 2012 
elections, news suggesting that negotiations to form a new government are going well (bad) 
were coded as positive (negative) soft news. Failure (success) to form a government were coded 
as negative (positive) hard news.  
After the cancelled plan for a referendum, media reports or statements suggesting that 
negotiations on austerity measures within the ruling coalition are going well (bad) were coded 
positively (negatively) as soft news. Failure (success) or delay to reach a deal was coded as 
negative (positive) hard news (see also in May 2011). 
Prior to the Greek plan for a referendum, media reports or statements suggesting that 
the opposition will (not) support the government’s reform drive were coded positively 
(negatively) as soft news. Decisions by the opposition (not) to support the socialist government 
were also coded as soft positive (negative) news. 
 
7. Grexit  
 
Prior to the cancelled plan for a Greek referendum, media reports or statements signalling 
support for Grexit were coded as negative soft news. Only media reports suggesting opposition 
to Grexit were coded as positive soft news because of endogeneity and credibility concerns. 
After this date and especially after the May Greek elections, Grexit was openly 
discussed by European policy-makers. Henceforth, we also included statements expressing 
opposition to Grexit. Media reports or statements signalling contingency planning against 
Grexit were coded as negative soft news. Decisions (not) to rule out Grexit were coded as 
positive (negative) hard news. 
 
8. Banks and Banking Union 
 
Media reports or statements suggesting (no) consolidation in the Greek banking sector were 
coded as positive (negative) soft news. (Cancellation of) mergers of Greek banks were coded 
as positive (negative) soft news. Greek banks attempts (failure) to raise capital were coded as 
positive (negative) soft news. 
Results of stress tests were coded as hard positive (negative) news when the stress tests 
were deemed (non) credible. 
News signalling the (in)desirability/(im)possibility of a banking union were coded 
positively (negatively) as soft news. And news signalling (in)desirability of a wide-scope 





9. Eurobonds  
 
For news, reports or statements over Eurobonds, endogeneity issues were arguably minimal as 
these news were part of a debate among European policy-makers. All news were thus included 
in the dataset. They were positively (negatively) coded when they Expressed support 
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Table B1. Examples of positive news (1) 

















Greek Jan budget revenues exceed target -Finministry 
(17/02/2010) 
  1 G  
Greek Jan-Sept Central govt budget gap shrinks 31.1 pct 
(11/10/2010) 







Eurozone agreed in principle to aid Greece-German source 
(09/02/2010) 
1   G M 
EU promises to support Greece over deficit crisis 
(11/02/2010) 
 1  G  
Europe can help out cash-strapped Greece without IMF: 
Brussels (10/02/2010) 
1   G P 
Eurogroup Agrees To Provide Collateral To Finland In 
Exchange For Future Aid For Athens (04/10/2011) 
 1  G  
Greek Fin Min Confirms Has Received 1st Tranche Of EMU 
Aid (18/05/2010) 
 1  G  
Loan 
Reviews 
Greece and EU-ECB-IMF to agree on 2011 fiscal policies 
(21/09/2010) 
1   G M 
Greece agrees deeper austerity to secure extra funds 
(02/06/2011) 
 1  G  
Greece eyeing cigarette and alcohol tax increase (04/01/2010) 1   G M 
Greece orders alcohol and tobacco tax hike to counter crisis 
(08/01/2010) 
 1  G  
Greek PM orders tough austerity measures ahead of EU 
verdict (03/02/2010) 
 1  G  
OSI 
Greek debt maturity lengthening possible -Juncker 
(25/05/2011) 
1   G P 
Greece to get lower rate on loans, longer maturity 
(14/03/2011) 
 1  G  
Interview - ECB ready to forego Greece bond profit 
(15/02/2012) 






Belgian Finance Minister Didier Reynders on Saturday also 
suggested increasing EFSF funds (06/12/2010) 
1   E P 
Deal building to pump up IMF to handle Europe fallout 
(01/12/2011) 
1   E M 
EU Agrees Treaty Change To Create Permanent Bailout Fund 
(17/12/2010) 
 1  E  
Euro zone brings forward permanent bailout fund 
(09/12/2011) 
 1  E  
ECB's Nowotny: ESM banking licence could be advantageous 1   E P 
Finland committee to support EFSF changes-source 
(01/09/2011) 
1   E M 
Dutch parliament approves contribution to enlarged European 
bailout fund EFSF (07/10/2011) 
 1  E  
Flexibility 
Official: Spain open to EFSF bond-buying, lending boost 
(02/02/2011) 
1   E P 
Euro zone brings forward permanent bailout fund 
(09/12/2011) 
 1  E  




Table B2. Examples of positive news (2) 














IMF: Greece restructuring costs outweigh 
benefits (20/10/2010) 




Trichet warns against forced losses on sovereign 
bonds 
1   G P 
Merkel, Sarkozy Invoke Vienna As Basis For 
New Greek Aid (17/06/2011) 
 1  G  
EU Confirms Plan For New Greek Loan To Buy 
Back Debt 'On The Table’ (28/01/2011) 




 Major banks accept Greek bond swap 
(05/03/2012) 
1   G M 
Greece Bailout Clinched, With Larger Private-
Sector Haircut (21/02/2012) 




Trichet Supports Fresh Look At Collateral Rules 
(15/03/2010) 
1   G P 
ECB suspends minimum credit rating threshold 
on collateral for Greece (03/05/2010) 
  1 G  
Bond-buying ECB defends bond buying scheme (13/05/2010) 1   E P 
Lender of 
last resort 
ECB Announces Bond Buying, Other 
Stabilization Measures: Text (10/05/2010) 
  1 G  
Liquidity 
provision 
Major central banks to provide dollars to markets: 
ECB (15/09/2011) 




Greek Main Opposition May Support Bailout On 
Cost-Benefit (23/04/2010) 
1   G P 
Greek reshuffle, Berlin-Paris deal ease euro fears 
(17/06/2011) 
 1  G  
Greek finance minister says opposed to euro 
referendum (03/11/2011) 
 1  G  
Greek conservative leader writes to EU, IMF 
(23/11/2011) 
 1  G  
Grexit  
Austria's Fekter: Shouldn't Force Greece To 
Leave Euro Zone (27/02/2012) 
1   G P 
Merkel, Hollande say want Greece to stay in the 
euro (16/05/2012) 
 1  G  
Eurobonds  
IMF head Christine Lagarde piles pressure on 
Germany's Merkel by advocating joint debt 
(22/06/2012) 
1   E P 
Italy's Tremonti Says Eurobonds Will Be 
Necessary (13/07/2011) 




ECB Knot: Euro Bank Supervisor Shouldn't Be 
Limited to Big Banks – Report (12/07/2012) 
1   E P 
EU agrees to seek integrated banking system: 
G20 (20/06/2012) 




Table C1. Examples of negative news (1) 


















Eurostat revises upwards Greece's 2009 deficit for 
a third time, to 15.4 percent of GDP compared 
with a previous 13.6 percent estimate (15/11/2010) 
 1  G  
Austerity hits Greek economy harder than forecast 
(12/08/2010) 
  1 G  
EU-ECB-IMF Troika: Greek recession deeper than 
anticipated (11/10/2011) 







Greece must not expect EU bailout: ECB 
(06/01/2010) 
1   G P 
ECB Stark: Greece Must Do More To Get Next 
Tranche Of Aid  (16/05/2011) 
1   G P 
Eurozone stalls Greek cash aid despite austerity 
deal (18/02/2012) 
 1  G  
Eurogroup gives provisional approval for new 
Greek package (01/03/2012) 
  1 G  
Euro Zone Mulls Delaying EUR5.2B Payment To 
Greece – Sources (09/05/2012) 1 
  G M 
Loan 
Reviews 
Greece, Troika Talks Suspended As Govt Resists 
Fresh Measures (02/09/2011) 
  1 G  
Greek creditor talks end without decision on return 
of inspectors, to continue Tuesday (20/09/2011) 
 1  G  
Greece's lenders demand wage and job cuts at state 
firms (13/10/2010) 
1   G M 
IMF-EU: Greek Reforms Broadly On Track But 
Challenges Exist (11/02/2011) 
 1  G  
Greece slams intl debt inspectors after IMF and 
EU visit, says they overstepped their roles 
(14/02/2011) 
  1 G  
OSI 
Greece's Hopes For EU/IMF Loan Extension Fade 
(19/11/2010) 
1   G M 
Germany Wants Higher Interest Rates On Aid For 
Greece: FT (06/04/2010) 
1   G M 
Weidmann: No Central Bank Participation In 
Voluntary Greek Haircut – Report (15/02/2012) 1 







Schaeuble In Letter To Lawmakers Rejects 
Boosting EFSF -Report (18/08/2011) 1 
  E M 
Euro zone ministers delay deal on bailout fund to 
March 21 (14/03/2011) 
 1  E  
Bigger euro firewall needed before more IMF 
funds: G20 (27/02/2012) 
 1  E  
Euro zone raises bailout capacity to 700 bln euros 
(30/03/2012) 
  1 E  
German Dep Fin Min: Important To Germany 
That EFSF Cannot Tap ECB (17/11/2011) 1 
  E P 
Flexibility 
Finland Opposes Using ESM for Secondary 
Market Bond Buying (02/07/2012) 1 
  E P 
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Germany:'No Automatism' For Allowing Direct 
EFSF-ESM Bank Aid (02/07/2012) 1 
  E P 
PSI 
Deauville Meeting (19/10/2010)   1 E  
Merkel: Private Creditors Must Share Losses In 
Future Crises (02/11/2010) 
1   E P 
Conditions 
Dutch, Germans Demand Conditions For 
Reinforcing Euro Rescue Fund (18/01/2011) 1 
  E P 
EU Leaders Rebuff Franco-German Euro-Zone 
Plan (07/02/2011) 










































Table C2. Examples of negative news (2) 















Greece should consider insolvency if cannot 
pay debt: German central banker (19/03/2010) 




ECB warns it could reject Greek bonds as 
collateral (19/05/2011) 
1   G P 
Euro zone's silence on selective default breaks 
taboo (12/07/2011) 




Merkel doesn't rule out Greek bailout change 
amid talk bondholders may face greater losses 
(29/09/2011) 
1   G P 
Greek debt swap talks end without deal, to 
resume next week (13/01/2012) 




Stark: ECB would reject Greek bonds after 
restructuring (19/05/2011) 
1   G P 
ECB Puts Squeeze Back On Greece With 
Collateral Ban (20/07/2012) 
  1 G  
Bond-buying 
Draghi douses hopes on ECB bond buying 
(08/12/2011) 
 1  E  
Lender of 
last resort 
Stark: ECB must not become lender of last 
resort (10/11/2011) 
1    E P 
Liquidity 
provision 
BBK Board Member Nagel: Must Discuss ECB 
Exit Scenarios Now (19/03/2012) 




Greek prime minister calls referendum on new 
aid deal (01/11/2011) 
  1 G  
Greek Pasok Party Member Resigns Over New 
Austerity Measures (14/10/2011) 
1   G M 
Greek Opposition Leader Says Elections To Be 
Held Feb 19 (11/11/2011) 
 1  G  
Greek prime minister says coalition talks with 
opposition failed (16/06/2011) 
 1  G  
Grexit  
Dutch have studied Greek euro exit scenario –
FinMin (15/05/2012) 
1   G P 
Merkel, Sarkozy Warn Of Greece Euro-Zone 
Exit If Plan Rejected (03/11/2011) 
  1 G  
Eurobonds  
Schaeuble: no euro bonds in my lifetime either 
(02/07/2012) 
1   E P 
Hollande draws first blood in eurobonds battle 
(24/05/2012) 




Sweden rejects talk of ECB as pan-EU bank 
supervisor (22/06/2012) 
1   E P 
ECB unlikely to supervise all euro banks-
Nowotny (02/07/2012) 






Appendix of Paper 3 
 
Construction of the FCIs. We retrieve the FCIs through a factor-augmented vector 
autoregression with time-varying parameters (TVP-FAVAR) based on Koop and Korobilis 
(2014). Unlike standard Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Koop and Korobilis’ (2014) 
method has the advantage of allowing for time-varying variables’ weights and for purging 
shocks that originate outside the financial and macro-financial indicators such as the business 
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Table 4. List of financial indicators used to construct the FCIs 
Indicators 
Equity return implied or realized volatility 
Sovereign bond spread with the US 
Sovereign bond spread with the Germany39 
Long term interest rate 
VXO 
Equity returns 
Realised stock market volatility 





















Table 5. Description and source of the different indicators 
Indicator Description Source 
Gross Domestic Product Annualized growth rate of real GDP OECD 
Consumer price index Log of CPI OECD 
Total employment Log of total employment OECD 
Wage Log of total wages OECD 
Hours Log of total hours worked per worker OECD 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 
excluding construction 
Log of GFCF OECD 
Shadow short rate  Krippner (2013) 
Stock price index Log of stock price index Bloomberg 
Equity return realized volatility Change in the realized volatility of equity returns Bloomberg 
Stock Market Volume Annualized growth rate of stock market volume Bloomberg 
Equity returns Annualized growth rate of equity returns Bloomberg 
Commodity price Annualized growth rate of commodity prices Bloomberg 
Dividend yield Change in dividend yield Bloomberg 
Long term interest rate Change in the 10-year government bonds yield OECD 
Sovereign bonds spreads 
Change in the yield on 10-year government bonds 
minus the yield on the 10-year German government 
bond 
Bloomberg 
VXO Change in the implied Volatility of S&P 500  Bloomberg 





Change in 3-montth interbank interest rate minus 
yield on three-month Treasury bills 
Bloomberg 
Term Spread 
Change in yield on 10-year government bonds 
minus yield on three-month Treasury bills.  
Bloomberg 
House prices return Annualized growth rate of real house prices. BIS 
 
 
Figure 5. Financial condition indices 
 
